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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation comprises exegesis and critique of the 
personalistic idealism of Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884 -
1953). Chapter One offers a biography of Brightman's life 
and identifies the intellectual heritage out of which he 
emerged and in which his thought may be situated. Chapters 
Two to Seven contain major exegesis of Brightman's 
metaphysical system relevant to the detailed critique and 
redefinition of person which follows in the remaining two 
Chapters. 
In these chapters the implications of Brightman's account 
of experience are examined extensively. The critique 
develops from relatively minor difficulties to a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship that holds 
between the way he viewed experience and the category of 
substance. The argument will show that there is a 
distinction between experience and person which Brightman 
fai led to recognize. The person is discovered to be (what 
will be called) a functional unity of purposive will and 
body with experience being one dimension of the person 
rather than its defining criterion. 
The concept of person as a functional unity of purposive 
will and responsive body with experience being a dimension 
in the person is found to be a more consistent outworking 
of Brightman's experiential foundation than his own 
bifurcation of person and body. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars are divided In their opinion about the worth of 
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, '" Nels Ferre, for example, has 
described him as "a primary philosopher" offering a, "clear 
and powerful analysis", (1) He further described him as a 
"great spirit and scholar", (2) Daniel Callahan, In sharp 
,,-
contrast to Ferre, comments that Brightman's Influence on 
American Philosophy, "was not great, even during his 
lifetime", And he continues that after "his death In 1953 
his small influence has rapidly waned", (3) 
The present author is cautious about intervening in the 
contradictory Judgements of one philosopher and another on 
someone else's greatness, But If a dissertation such as 
this has Brightman as its subject some word to note his 
distinction must be made. 
Brightman can be described as the central figure of the 
Boston School of Personalism, a school of thought In the 
tradition of German and American Idealism. Associated 
with Boston University for most of his working years 
Brightman earned considerable respect from his colleagues 
for his work both as a rigorous teacher and University 
Professor, In the Methodist Church he was a Minister and 
very active In Church Co 11m I ttees, expressing a particular 
Interest In social concern. His writing was prolific as 
the Bibliography shows, and in addition he maintained an 
extensive academic correspondence with thinkers world-wide. 
Many of his research and graduate students went into 
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high-level posts In both Church and University circles, not 
least of these being Martin Luther King. 
Brightman Is best known for his concept of a finite God. 
This concept which saw Its fl rst most substantive 
presentation In The Problem of God, was subsequently 
developed Into a concept of God as finite-Infinite. By 
this Brightman means that God Is limited In power and will 
and Is unable to overcome certain refractory hindrances In 
his own Infinite, eternal nature. Brightman's concept of 
a finite-Infinite God was an attempt to understand both the 
reality of evil, and make sense of belief In a personal, 
worshipful, benevolent God. In such a God, Brightman 
considered supreme goodness was Incompatible with 
omnipotence. Along with this concept of God, Brightman 
developed a complex and Interlinked metaphysic which 
encompasses a system of ethics, epistemology and ontology. 
It Is Brightman's concept of a finite-Infinite God together 
with his treatment of the problem of good-and-evll (as he 
phrased It) which has attracted most researchers In 
his philosophy. 
Most theses for Higher Degrees which have tackled 
Brightman's philosophy have been within the U.S.A., not 
surprisingly most of these at Boston University Itself. 
Only two have been discovered by the present author outside 
the U.S.A., both of which were submitted to Universities In 
Rome. The dissertation by Joseph Gibbons, In the Salesian 
University Is 1,162 pages In length and possesses the 
fullest Bibliography of all relating to Brightman. In 
terms of sheer magnitude of material the researcher Into 
Brightman Is much aided by Gibbons' work. Gibbons main 
thrust Is to expose Brightman's thought to that of 
neo-Thomist Transcendentalism, particularly as found In 
Stephan Strasser, Emerich Coreth, and Carlo Cantone - his 
own supervisor. But In this gigantic thesis, and with 
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only a few exceptions In other theses the present author 
had the privilege to read, there was persistent 
disappointment at failing to find a sustained study of 
Brightman's basal metaphysics from within his own terms of 
reference. Comparison wlh other thinkers was frequent, as 
was analysis of particular themes within Brightman's 
philosophy. Discussion with Professors Lavely and Muelder 
at Boston University confirmed my suspicions about this 
area of neglect. 
Study of these theses and other secondary critiques of 
Brightman presented the author with a fundamental question 
which took some considerable effort to resolve. The 
question may be worded thus, 'In what terms, and by what 
method, might Brightman's philosophy be most successfully 
challenged?' The method of comparing Brightman with other 
thinkers and schools of thought to show the respective 
worth of each Is one I have rejected for this dissertation. 
To expose Brightman's thought to cross-currents of 
theological and philosophical thought Is an illuminating 
way Into his system. But ultimately the presentation of 
other thinkers and their thoughts alongside Brightman 
neither verifies nor falsifies his system as a whole. What 
Is meant by this? 
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It would seem that areas of qualification and clarification 
are exposed by such method but unless a lack of coherence 
or consistency can be shown with regard to Brightman's 
premises, or an Inadequacy with the results he brought 
forward, his system has not been successfully challenged. 
The reason for this resides In the persistence and clarity 
with which Brightman secured his philosophy In a particular 
frame of reference - establishing very carefully its basis 
and subsequent development and the testing of hypothesis 
and knowledge. Brightman argued that his system was founded 
on, and Justified by, the experience of persons and by 
coherent interpretation of Its implications. 
Therefore a challenge to Brightman's metaphysics must be 
made from within his frame of reference to the experience 
of persons, and to the coherence of Brightman's 
understanding of Its Implications. Such a challenge, if 
successful, will be more secure than one which tackles 
details of his system forcing persistent qualification of 
It and of its outworking. 
Accordingly the direction of this present dissertation was 
established. The subject was to be Brightman, and the 
particular focus was to be that upon which he based his 
metaphysics of reality - his account of experience. 
But with the task established, the quarry proved difficult 
both to trace and eventually corner. The chapters that 
follow are the distilled product of much work containing 
varyi ng levels of excitement, worry and disappointment. 
It was found Impossible to Identify one area of Brightman's 
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philosophy and present It in these pages without Impinging 
on other areas of his wide-ranging vision. To those who 
who have similarly struggled with Brightman the need to 
present substantial exposition and exegesis will have been 
recognised as necessary. The temptation was always near at 
hand, however, to deviate from the task and follow others 
In the critique of particular aspects of Brightman's 
thought. Therefore a constant reminder was needed that 
Brightman's whole philosophy rested on a particular 
understandl ng of experience. All other areas of his 
thought are contingent upon this foundation as the 
Irreducible datum for a metaphysics of reality. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN (1884 - 1953) - THE MAN 
A Personal Biography 
Edgar Sheffield Brightman was born the son of George Edgar 
Brightman and Mary Sheffield on September 20th 1884 at 
Holbrook, Massachusetts. The family Into which which he 
was born was one In which characteristics of "strong 
conscientiousness" as well as "pronounced convictions and 
great courage" have been recorded. (1) This background 
seems to have left its mark on Bri ghtman for he offered the 
same qualilties as a teacher and administrator for more 
than thirty years at Boston University, as well as In the 
Methodist Church In which he was a pastor. 
Brightman records that he was "subjected to unceasing 
religious Influences from the start" (2) In his boyhood 
home, the location of which frequently changed In southern 
New England as his father moved around the congregations of 
the Methodist circuits in which he was a minister. 
Brightman says of his father, that he was conservative, 
cheerful and affectionate and in an enigmatic statement 
states also that his father's conception of the Fatherhood 
of God "preserved him (the father) from practical 
illiberalism". (3) Brightman does not elaborate on this 
point. 
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Brightman's mother was "highly endowed" and "read the best 
books". She started teaching her son French and Botany at 
an early age. Having suggested that In such a home he 
could not avoid having both religious and intellectual 
interests, Brightman, in his intellectual autobiography, 
goes on to say: 
Before I was ten years old I had read much of Adam 
Clarke's Commentary and many bound volumes of old 
Methodist Reviews (going back often with exceptional 
glee to a sound Methodist article which flayed a 
Unitarian edition of the old hymns). At about ten I 
lured my father into buying Larned's History for Ready 
Reference and earned a financial reward from the book 
agent as well as the greater prize of reading many of 
the articles. Soon after, I completed Edersheim's 
Life of Jesus the Messiah, a feat which I should not 
care to perform again. Dickens was my favourite 
author. In my early teens I received David 
Copperfield as a birthday present and read It through 
before midnight. (4) 
Brightman's youthful interests saw him enjoying woods and 
the seashore and in furtive moments he nurtured a "romantic 
strain" which "led me to write a good many secret poems and 
even short novels". (5) The present author has not seen 
these novels but Brightman's poetic activity continued 
through his life can be seen in the Brightman Archive at 
the Mugar Memorial Library in Boston University. (6) 
An interest in philately which saw the development of an 
excellent collection of stamps helped cultivate In 
Brightman a historical knowledge (he was fascinated, we are 
told, by ancient history, particularly that of Egypt) as 
well as his "spirit of internationalism". 
The first mentor whom Brightman cites as being of any 
si gnificance in his development was Dudley I. Whitmarsh, 
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his High School principal who "stimulated my mind more than 
any man I had met before", (7) Under him he learned 
Geometry and the challenge and drive towards original 
thinking, Outside school hours without recompense 
Whitmarsh taught, "an unscheduled class three years of 
Greek in a year and a half", In a somewhat cryptic 
statement Brightman says of Whitmarsh that he: 
'" conducted In his home a series of obJective, 
scientific experiments in psychic phenomena which was 
my fascinating introduction to psychology, (8) 
After graduating from High School at sixteen Brightman 
worked at p, R, Howes Grocery Store and Meat Market, 
Provincetown for a "work-week that would shock the modern 
employer, as would his weekly wage of $3,00", (9) 
At Brown University (1902 -1906) Brightman received - In 
his own words - "as good an education as America afforded 
at that time", (10) 
In the liberal atmosphere of Brown the young Brightman 
found Interests In Homer and Lucian, evolution, 
argumentation, Browning and Omar Khayyam, He read his 
"philosophical hero", Plato, In the original Greek and 
carried about In his pocket Marcus Aurelius and Eplctetus, 
and studied Berkeley and Nietzsche, He recalls the 
Increasing Influence of Kant and Schopenhauer as he began 
to think more deeply, though - as he tells us - his first 
real allegiance was to the absolutism of Josiah Royce (1855 
- 1916), something Brightman accepted whole for two or 
three years, This was replaced, In his graduate days, by 
an allegiance to the philosophical pragmatism of William 
James (1842 - 1910). 
When William James' Pragmatism (11) was first published 
Brightman recalls that it, "swept me off my feet", 
Brightman remained under the Influence of James until a 
certain Professor Delabarre, "gave me a pat illustration of 
a useful and successful error, which left me permanently 
critical of pragmatism In all its forms". (12) As we shall 
discover in due course Brightman returned later in his 
career to favour, at the very least, a modified form of 
pragmatism. 
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During his final year at Brown, Brightman assumed many of 
the responsibilities of his home due to his father's 111-
-health, and though himself seriously burnt when an 
alcohol lamp exploded and as a consequence unable to return 
to Brown for the winter term of the 1905 - 1906 session, he 
nevertheless graduated in June that year. 
The following two years saw Brightman as assistant in 
philosophy and Greek at Brown teaching logic under Dean 
Alexander Mel k/eJohn. During this time he read for the 
Master of Arts degree at Brown. Janette Newhall, later a 
close colleague and one of the editors of Brightman's 
posthumously published MetaphYsics, remarks that the 
teaching methods of Mei kleJohn and rigorous discipline In 
logic classes and discussion "set a standard of clarity and 
precision of thought which Brightman never forgot". (13) 
During the period 1908 - 1910 Brightman was Involved In 
intense study at Boston University reading for the S.T.B. 
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Degree. It was here that he came Into contact with Borden 
Parker Bowne. Bowne inparted to Brightman a personalistic 
philosophy which combined the truth he felt there was In 
Royce and James with a "criticism of the errors of each". 
Brightman later supplemented his studies of Royce, Bowne 
and James with Hegel. (14) The Jacob Sleeper Fellowship 
was awarded to Brightman (1910 - 1912) and enabled study at 
the University of Berlin (2 semesters) and Marburg (1 
semester in 1912). 
His stUdies were divided amongst philosophy, Bible and 
Church History. At Berlin, Brightman's teachers were 
Munsterburg, Riehl and Lasson. He attended Delssman's 
lectures in the New Testament and those of Hugo Gressman In 
Old Testament. The historian Adolf Harnack made his 
Impression on the visiting Scholar. 
At Marburg, Brightman's most notable teacher was the 
Ritschlian, Wilhelm Herrman. Herrman and Brightman on 
long wal ks frequently discussed the philosophy of 
personalism and of Ritschl, upon whom Brightman's own 
doctoral thesis was to be submitted to Boston University 
with the degree being awarded In June 1912. (15) In 
Berlin, Brightman met Fraulein Charlotte Hulsen who In July 
1912 became his wife. 
Before the en d of the winter semester 1911 - 1912 at 
Marburg, Brightman was called back from Germany to a 
position In philosophy at Nebraska Wesl~an University. 
His teaching load at Nebraska Wesleyan was rigorous and 
extensive throughout the fields of General Psychology, 
History of Philosophy, Ethics, Metaphysics, Christian 
Faith, Bible History, Bible Introduction and the graduate 
direction of seven students. 
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In June 1914 Howard Hulsen Brightman was born the first son 
of Edgar and Charlotte. Tragically, however, Charlotte 
Brightman developed a facial cancer from which she died In 
1915 after a grim battle. 
Brightman's seminars at Nebraska Wesleyan Included 
Hocking's Meaning of God In Human Experience (16) after Its 
appearance In 1912. The following year he moved on to 
Bergson's Creative Evolution, the English translation of 
which had appeared In 1911. (17) Royce and Eucken 
attracted his efforts In other years. 
In the spring of 1915 Brightman received an Invitation to 
be the Associate Professor of Ethics and Religion, for a 
three year period, at the Wesleyan University In 
Middletown. After two years he gained a full 
professorship. At Wesleyan Brightman's first book 
appeared. This, an examl nation of the BI bllcal text of the 
Hexateuch, made him the object of attack from 
fundamentalist groups In the U.S.A. His work, entitled 
The Sources of the Hexateuch (18) Introduced, explained and 
presented In textual sequence the three principal strands 
of the Old Testament; Jahwistic, Elohlstic and Priestly. 
This Is the only one of Brightman's books which does not 
Impinge upon issues considered In this dissertation. 
During his time at Wesleyan Brightman married Irma B. Fall 
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of Middletown. Jeanette Newhall considers that Miss Fall's 
preparation for work In religious education, her "practical 
interests in homemaking, her love of the out-of-doors, and 
her ready sense of humour were a healthy balance to 
Brightman's scholarly concentration, and furnished him much 
needed relaxation". (19) They had two children, Miriam 
Fall (born 1921) and Robert Sheffield (born 1928). Miriam 
was a genealogist and has traced their family's maternal 
and paternal ancestries. Her superbly presented records 
are, since her death In 1980, in the keeping of Robert 
Sheffield Brightman, himself a Methodist Minister with a 
doctorate from Boston University. 
In 1919 Brightman returned to Boston University as 
Professor of Philosophy In the Graduate School and in 1925 
the Borden Parker Bowne Chair In Philosophy was established 
with Brightman as its first occupant. 
Brightman taught Latin American thought, religious values, 
social philosophy, logic, metaphysics, epistemology and 
aesthetics. His seminars opened both new ground (In 
evolutionist thinking) and explored new avenues Into the 
more familiar areas of Kant, Hegel, Plato and Aristotle. 
Brightman's Interest In evolutionary theory was no mere 
armchair philosophising. It profoundly affected his 
concept of God as Finite-Infinite, and Interacted closely 
with his concern for the problem of evil. 
Brightman in detailed autobiographical vein outlines the 
evolutionist influences upon him: 
I started with a theism substantially Identical with 
Bowne's. Then, first of all, I was stimulated by 
Frank H. Foster's article on 'Some Theistic 
Implications of Bergson's Philosophy,' In The American 
Journal of Theology, 22 (1918), pp.274 - 279, and by 
J. A. Leighton's two articles on 'Temporallsm and the 
Christian Doctrine of God In The Chronicle, 18, 
(1918), pp.183 - 88, 339 - 44. lowe further 
suggestions to the whole literature on the finite God, 
especially to Bishop Francis J. McConnell's book, Is 
God Limited? But the immediate occasion for the first 
formulation of my present view was an Intensive study 
of evolution, and In particular of Edmund Noble's book 
Purposive Evolution. Strange as It may seem, my view 
also owes much to recent studies of Hegel. With none 
of these writers do I agree entirely (although I am 
very close to Foster and Leighton); but to all of them 
lowe much. (20) 
The 1920's saw a rise In extensive literary and lecture 
output from Brightman's pen. In 1925 he accepted the 
Ingersoll Lectureship at Harvard. (21) In addition there 
also appeared In 1925 An Introduction to Philosophy and 
Religious Values. (22) A Philosophy of Ideals (23) 
appeared In 1928 and this together with Religious Values 
and An Introduction to Philosophy formed the initial 
foundation upon which Brightman was to formulate his 
theistic Idealism. In 1926 Brightman was a contributor to, 
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and editor of, the 6th International Congress of Philosophy 
held at Harvard University. (24) 
The emerging theistic flnltlsm of Brightman found Its first 
presentation In two volumes, both of which appeared in the 
early 1930's; The Problem of God and The Finding of God. 
(25) Both works advocated the concept of a God who is 
finite in the sense of being limited in power. The 
Problem of God was based on Brightman's Adams Lectures at 
Indiana University in 1930 and the Goldwin Smith Lecture at 
Cornell University in 1929. The other work was dedicated 
to the 'Boston-In-Berlin Colony 1930 - 1931' where 
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Brightman spent his only sabbatical leave and with whom 
after enjoying the 1930 summer in the Austrian Tyrol he 
studied chapters of The Finding of God during the winter 
semester. Three works now followed in rapid succession to 
support his by now well known and highly debated 
metaphysic. Is God a Person? (26) further develops the 
hypothesis of a finite God and argues that a personal God 
is the best rational explanation of the universe. Moral 
Laws (27) is a Hegelian-like presentation of dialectically 
advancing moral laws which develop from a basis in the laws 
of logic and culminate in the 'Law of the Ideal of 
Personality' in which the system reaches Its 'climax'. 
1934 saw the publication of Personality and Religion (28) 
as Bri ghtman's Lowell Institute Lectures delivered at 
King's Chapel Boston, in 1934. One of the most significant 
features of this book In connection with our present study 
is his restatement of the idea of God as Finite-Infinite. 
This is a much more exact formulation than the earlier 
I Finite God'. The Henry Martin Lound Lectureship at the 
University of Michigan formed part of The Future of 
Christianity, a volume which appeared in 1937. (29) 
It is fortunate that a short essay written by Brightman in 
1939 documents the development which took place in his 
thought over the important 10 years from 1929. (30) It 
will serve our purpose well to draw out the nature of this 
development from this essay, even though exposition of the 
issues raised will be postponed to later, and more 
appropriate locations. The essay is particularly useful 
also, for in it Bri ghtman details all areas of his concern, 
intellectual as well as social. 
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The dominant change In Brightman over this decade was, as 
his essay stresses a "change from emphasis on the 
\ 
rationalistic and a priori factors in religious knowledge 
to emphasis on the empirical". (31) Brightman's empiricism 
took severai forms. On the one hand It found expression In 
a raised appreciation of the synoptic approach of Hegel who 
In affirming that, "the true Is the whole" was led to 
explore "every nook and cranny of the spiritual life, 
individual and social, logical and historical, aesthetic 
and religious, relating it to every experience of physical 
nature". (32) It has to be noted however, that whilst 
Brightman rejects Hegel's "schematlsm" and also his 
Absoiutistic metaphysics, it appears that his greatest debt 
to Hegel is in his adoption of the latter's methodology. 
The following quotation should serve as an example of this: 
Hegel has led me to see that true rationalism is 
simply the principle of confronting every part of 
experience with our view of the whole, while true 
empiricism is the principle of accepting only that 
view of the whole which Is honestly built up by 
observation of the accessi ble parts of experience. 
(33) 
In addition to this, Brightman's empiricism has taken the 
form of a new social conscience. He writes that: 
The war, the experience of prohibition, and the 
depression had left many of us In a state of somewhat 
dazed social thinking, and It Is only In the past ten 
years that I have really come to grips with the 
Implications of social experience. (34) 
The particular 'political' stance this social conscience 
assumed In Brightman he gave the label 'Christian 
Socialism'. This he saw operating In the following manner: 
Through the common action for social Justice, for 
cooperatives, for peace between labor and capital 
based on a socialised conception of their relations, 
and for international peace, men and women of 
different faiths and no faith may learn to understand 
one another better, may discover through social 
experience more evidence for religious faith, and may 
actually work with God's plan for a good society. (35) 
Alongside this social philosophy there developed In 
Brightman, during the decade, an Increased emphasis on 
personalism as the correct method both for philosophical 
use and as the model for Interpretation of the universe. 
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He defines the parameters of his pOSition by admitting that 
"the ontology of matter Is less central ... than the 
development of a social philosophy of personalism". 
This position he calls "organic pluralism". The organic 
aspect of personalism arises here "by virtue of Its view of 
the structure of personality, the Interaction of persons, 
and the dependence of man on nature". The pluralist title 
arises because of Its view of "the real separateness of 
persons and Its Insistence that 'social mind' occurs only 
In Individual persons". (36) 
Brightman calls the fourth phase of his empirical 
development a greater realism with reference to the Church. 
In this respect he despairs of the Church's record on the 
military (Brightman was a pacifist after the First World 
War), racial and labour fronts and he complains bitterly of 
the Church's own resentment of self-criticism. 
The fifth and last phase of the ten year development In 
Brightman's thinking is the conception of God as finite. 
He arrived at such a view after having confronted the 
evidence of nature developing life by the struggle for 
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survival. Nature seems full of waste, blind alleys and 
species of life which become extinct after a seemingly 
purposeless existence. His conclusion, after a serious 
reading of Darwin and others was that evolution shows 
purpose at work, and even though this Is confronted with 
all sorts of difficulties, nevertheless purpose Is there, 
fully at work overcoming evil. 
In the cosmos It Is possible to Identify a (dominating) 
tendency toward order, life and purpose and an opposing 
tendency toward chaos, waste and pointless anguish. The 
one order of nature produces both the teleological 
principles and also the dysteleologlcal. A sound empirical 
philosophy - for Brightman one based on all the facts of 
experience - has to take account both of teleology and 
dysteleology. Throughout nature Brightman discerned 
energy, law and brute fact - these respectively he called 
Will, reason and empirical content of experience. 
Brightman considered It Incoherent to suppose that God 
created either reason or the non-rational. God Is, he 
suggests, "eternally a person whose will finds and controls 
something within the nature of God which he calls the 
Given". The finiteness of God therefore refers to those 
rational and non-rational limitations In the nature of God 
which Impinge and limit the range of possible volition In 
God's will. The will of God, Brightman affirms, Is 
eternally loyal to God's own Ideal. Since the will of God 
attempts to overcome that evil which seeks to thwart It, 
God's will might be defined as Itself eternally good, 
albeit not omnipotent. A return will be made to these 
Issues In the chapter, 'God: Finite and Infinite'. 
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In 1940 Brightman published his magnum opus In religious 
philosophy, a volume entitled A Philosophy of Religion. 
In this work through each of the chapters he sets out with 
great clarity the views of his opponents and over against 
these his own personalistic position which he argues Is, on 
each point, a more reasonable and coherent evaluation of 
the evidence available to the Inquirer. The Indefinite 
article In the title of this book Is Important for It 
indicates the hypothetical nature of the philosophical 
enterprise. Brightman believed there could never be 'The' 
(in the sense of definitive) Philosophy of Religion. He 
therefore offered 'A' Philosophy of Religion. He 
Illustrates this In the Preface to A Philosophy of 
Religion, where It Is noted a correct understanding of the 
title of the book Is pertinent If one Is to comprehend the 
direction it takes, thus: 
My primary purpose is to Interpret religious 
experience rather than to discuss systems of 
philosophy. I have a system of my own, but I am 
convinced that my views are not absolute truth. I 
present them as hypotheses to stimulate thought and as 
stepping stones to higher truth, rather than as the 
last word on any Issue. The book, as I have said, Is 
~ philosophy of religion. Only God, or someone who 
confused himself with deity, could write the 
philosophy of religion. (37) 
In 1943 The Spiritual Life (38) continued the axiological 
perspective of Religious Values and A Philosophy of 
Religion, In that religious experience (or more 
specifically, the 'spiritual life') Is considered as a 
special dimension or form of value experience. 
During his time at Boston University Brightman saw the 
expansion of the department of Philosophy. His energies 
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and his devotion to work were unstinting. Until the late 
1940's he remained In normally good health though a boyhood 
accident with a carelessly thrown stick had destroyed all 
but colour vision In one eye thus causing Brightman to be 
never wholly free from eyestrain. 
As a teacher and supervisor Brightman was rigorous and 
precise, both In method and manner. In conversation 
with the present author, Walter G. Muelder, pupil and 
later eminent colleague of Brightman said that: 
Edgar Brightman was a marvellous teacher, but Edgar 
Brightman always answered your questions at the level 
at which you asked them verbally. If you asked him a 
question he would answer It In the terms of that 
proposition. He did not always answer the question 
behind the question that a student Is groping to ask 
and didn't ask. Brightman's theme song to a student 
was 'Say what you mean, and mean what you say'. 
Students are not often able to ask what they want to 
ask because they don't know enough or are troubled by 
layers of dynamics that they can't articulate. Edgar 
was not as good as should have Ideally been the case 
to deal with students In that sense. (39) 
Janette Newhall, one of Brightman's closest associates, 
cites a similar experience recalled by Professor L. Harold 
de Wolf: 
In my first semester of graduate study with Brightman, 
I had a sharp difference wlh him In Logic class 
concerning the Interpretation of the mnemonic lines. 
Both orally and In writing his rejoinders were so 
sharp, despite my mustering of considerable historical 
and contemporary authority as well as logic, on my 
side that I thought his mind was closed and that he 
was so hostile to me I should have to look elsewhere 
for my studies. However, when I was In the depths of 
discouragement (unexpressed), he Introduced me to Mrs 
Durant Drake, In his office, as 'a young man who has 
Just shown me a mistake In logic which I have been 
making all these years'. (40) 
Brightman, It seems, could be repentant as well as forceful. 
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In October 1949 a coronary thrombosis necessitated his 
withdrawal from teaching for the rest of the semester, 
although he did manage to return to full work during the 
Spring. Prior to this, attacks of Angina Pectoris had 
caused his shedding of commitments outwith Boston 
University though he had continued a regular teaching load. 
Between 1949 and 1952 Brightman published his 'University 
Lecture', Persons and Values (41), revised his An 
Introduction to Philosophy (42), and had completed ten and 
a half chapters of his Metaphysics before a stroke In 
October 1952 compelled him to abandon Its completion. 
Brightman's mind was expansive. Though convinced of the 
truth of the Christian faith he learned much from an 
Intimate and sympathetic study of other religions, most 
particularly from Hinduism through a great friend, Swami 
Akhilananda. (43) In addition Brightman, as will be seen, 
was active across the board In philosophical circles. 
Two volumes not yet mentioned here will receive exegesis In 
due course. These are firstly, Brightman's most definitive 
work on the theory of nature, Nature and Values and the 
symposium Personalism In Theology, to which Brightman was 
both a contributor and also an editor. (44) 
On February 25th 1953 Brightman died. His colleagues 
published the unfinished Metaphysics. The ten and a half 
chapters Brightman left were published with only minor 
editorial redaction as the text he left was substantially a 
finished piece. The editors of this work selected passages 
from Brightman's own works to complete the three unfinished 
chapters. Peter Bertoccl added a final chapter as his own 
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product entitled 'The Person as Key to Reality'. The work 
was finally published In 1958 as, Person and Reality: An 
Introduction to Metaphysics (45) 
The Significance and Reception of Brightman's Work 
Some mention must now be made, to supplement what has 
already been said, on the Impact Brightman's work has had 
on both contemporary and subsequent thought. A start can 
be made by reference to the empirical Idealism that was his 
hallmark. 
This Idealism Is seen as soon as one encounters his 
criticism of scientific and naturalistic explanations of 
the nature of personality. One commentator asks If it Is 
possible to explain personality by "Inductively verified 
hypotheses concerning the relation of Intelligence, 
purpose, and valuation to physical and organic processes 
as well as social processes Involving other persons?". (46) 
Brightman answers that "scientific or methodological 
naturalism" was metaphysically Inadequate to explain such 
Interaction. For Brightman It was as valid to say that one 
could observe causes between mental and physical events as 
It was to observe them between physical events. His own 
Idealism was one which he argued made change In 
consciousness and personality Intelligible and coherent In 
a way that alternative views did not. 
In A Philosophy of Religion (pp.208ff) Brightman considers 
the limits of a mechanistic world-view, what he elsewhere 
calls the naturalistic view. Whilst sufficient In Its own 
field - for explaining the survival of the fit - such a 
view fails to account for the evidence of purpose In the 
universe. A view which recognises this limitation, and 
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which supplements It with a broader perspective Is one more 
In line with the facts of experience. 
In this sense we can see Immediately that he subordinated 
the principle of causality to that of empirical coherence. 
For him there could be no coherent explanation of value, or 
purpose, or religious belief In the universe without 
reference to some prior cause that gave rise to each. 
Lloyd Easton (47) identifies what he perceives as an 
ambiguity here and reflects on the disjunction between 
evidence which points towards a pluralistic world-view 
enshrining difference between causes and effects and on the 
other a more unified world-view which affirms that value 
cannot be created out of a valueless universe. 
It was this latter view, based on what Easton has called a 
'rationalistic premise' which kept Brightman both from a 
naturalistic explanation of personality (say) and to his 
personalistic Idealism. Walter G. Muelder has In 
conversation with me, argued that on this point Brightman 
was weak. Brightman had failed, he considered, to 
recognize fully subtleties in the various positions which 
naturalists might take. In other words Brightman's 
description of the naturalist's position is extreme at 
best, and a misleading carrlcature at worst • . 
As will be developed in later chapters it was this 
idealistic personalism which formed the fundamental axiom 
of Brightman's doctrine that a"-there-is comprises a 
unified universe of conscious personal experience. Thus 
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Bri ghtman's account of experience goes beyond the narrower 
corridors of a naturalism or mechanism that would seem to 
restrict experience to, for example, the evidence revealed 
by human sense perception. In this way we shall shortly 
see that Bri ghtman speaks of experience both in the 
verificatory sense of what I perceive, as well as in the 
broader sense of conscious awareness. Indeed we shall see 
that he equates experience with person. It will be this 
equation. fundamental in Brightman, which will form one 
cornerstone of the critique that will arise in the final 
two chapters. 
Easton, in his own paper, has developed a critique of 
Brightman along this axis. Briefly his view is that whilst 
Brightman has defended his idealism, firstly, as being more 
empirical than any alternative since it is, he claims, more 
coherent with conscious awareness he, secondly, stretched 
the notion of experience to include all the contents of 
consciousness. The fi rst of these gave rise in part to 
the ambi guity we saw above. But the second was to be 
ultimately fatal to any meaningful description Brightman 
might give of empiricism, so Easton claimed. It was, as 
Easton proposed, a definition that was too all inclusive to 
have valid reference in the particular. 
Whether Easton's alternative is more secure, that Brightman 
should have embraced a pluralist perspective, is not the 
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concern of this dissertation. For though others have made 
similar challenges (especially with regard to Brightman's 
theism when several authors have argued that Brightman's 
view led to an ultimately Innevltable dualism) Brightman 
attempted to meet them all and challenged each to refute 
him by offering a more coherent alternative. All failed 
In some measure to provide this. Even Easton's perceptive 
categorization of Brightman's "ali-Inclusive empiricism" as 
meaningless would do little to persuade. The alternative 
pluralism he advocates "raises many questions and needs far 
more qualification and elaboration". (48) Whether these 
outweigh "the serious difficulties and Incongruities we 
have found in Brightman's effort" others can Judge. 
Nevertheless though, our own analysis below will In part be 
parasitic upon this view. However we shall not attempt 
to force an alternative worldvlew upon Brightman to resolve 
problems In his metaphysic. Rather from his working we 
shall unfold results which will enable us to see that 
conclusions other than the ones he drew may more ooherently 
be reached. This will form the heart of our own Internal 
critique. 
As perhaps might be expected there was little commerce 
between Brightman and what was to become a much more widely 
accepted philosophical world view, analytical philosophy. 
Apart from Brightman's essay on Bertrand Russell's 
philosophy of religion and his own statements of others' 
positions prior to presenting his own In An Introduction 
To Philosophy and A Philosophy of Religion, material Is 
scarce. 
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A sharp, and short-lived correspondence between Brightman 
and his near neighbour at Harvard W. V. Quine however, 
enables us to focus on Issues that would Innevltably 
divide Brightman and the mainstream analytical tradition. 
Brightman for example argued with Quine over the 
distinction between truth and knowledge. Brightman wrote, 
"Following Lelbniz, I'd say that there are truths of fact 
and truths of reason; the former empirical, the latter 
formal. Every Instance of truth Is an Instance of 
knowledge •.• Why, then, have two terms ••• If 'It Is true 
that' and 'I know that' are synonymous?". (Sept. 19, 1942) 
For Brightman truth Is a more Impersonal term - It obtains. 
Whereas knowlede Is personal - It Is a personal act. 
Quine, In his own letter to Brightman (April 16, 1942), 
predictably perhaps, considers the issues in terms of 
linguistic function and he contrasts three Questions, "(1) 
Which statements are true? For answers, look to science 
generally. (2) What is truth? For answer, look to 
semantics. (3) How can we know which statements are true? 
For answer, look to epistemology". 
Brightman replying (Sept. 19, 1942) suggests that 
metaphysical and other truths are not adequately 
encompassed by science "In the narrow sense". Whether 
Quine was speaking of science In a 'narrow' sense Is 
Questionable we feel. With regard to the second Question 
Brightman asks that "If semantics gives only the highly 
abstract answer suited to logical purposes, does It give a 
complete answer?" Is It not the case, he goes on to 
propose, that a complete definition of truth gives more 
than a logical answer? With respect to the third 
question, Brightman asks whether epistemology Is 
appropriate to deal with considerations concerning the 
truth of statements. The problem that Is Implied by what 
Quine is saying is that of the criterion of truth and 
addressing It seems "to be the task of philosophical 
logic". 
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Brightman then goes on to outline a case p( for his own 
epistemological dualism and asks Quine whether an adequate 
semantics (perhaps In terms of Quine's question (2) ) would 
turn into the epistemology Brightman defines. His 
suspicion is that Quine would wish to restrict the use of 
the term and its applicability. Nevertheless he Invites 
Quine's comments in reply. No doubt Quine would have felt 
that Brightman failed to address the specific points he was 
making, in particular with regard to the first question 
that he sought to restrict Quine's use of the term 
'science' in a way that perhaps Quine would not have 
accepted. Whatever the case, and however Quine felt, and 
with a lack of good material upon Brightman's relationship 
with the analytical philosophical tradition we can only 
mourn the predictable outcome that there is no reply from 
Quine. 
Also central in Brightman's thinking was the Impact of 
evolutionary thinking upon conceptions of God. This 
Brightman relates to our awareness of, and God's 
faithfulness to, purpose in the universe. God strives 
constantly against all sorts of hindrances that are an 
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Intevitable by-product of the creative process. These 
hindrances, which might include human free-will as well as 
seemingly uncontrollable natural forces, are neither willed 
nor created by God. They are simply part of 'The Given' 
which God encounters. In His struggle to overcome 'The 
Given', God is limited In his omnipotence. 
This feature of Brightman's thought has already been 
alluded to. It was that area which attracted most 
hostility from his critics. Extensive correspondence held 
In the Brightman archive documents this. 
What was perhaps not recognised by most of Brightman's 
critics was that he was writing In a tradition that 
arguably began with Locke, passed through Hume, and on to 
Hegel. It provided that fertile soli in which courage to 
question the omnipotence of God might seed. Hegelian 
thought entered the U.S.A. from Hermann Lotze (1817-
1881) via Borden Parker Bowne (1847 - 1910) and many 
prominent idealists resulted either directly or indirectly. 
In Britain similar fertile soil was being cultivated, 
though perhaps here the impetus towards Idealism came from 
Hegel via Bradley. Hastings Rashdall, F. R. Tennant, 
Pringle-Pattison, James Ward and William Sorley are all In 
that broad tradition of natural theology where we might 
also locate Brightman. Brightman corresponded with these 
thinkers across the Atlantic. Sorley wrote In answer to 
questions raised at one of Brightman's seminars on his 
Gifford Lectures on the relation of moral experience and an 
approach to theism, as well as on religious consciousness. 
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(27th November 1921) 
There were also three exchanges of letters In 1935 between 
Tennant and Brightman regarding the validity of reason 
being dependant on divine will. Both, after some 
clarification of terms, agreed It was not and Brightman 
wrote, "I do believe it necessary to think that the 
principle of coherence and the laws of logic and 
mathematics would be valid In any possible world, whether 
there is a God or not". (June 18, 1935) However he 
tantalisingly adds, ..... in the real world these truths 
exist only in so far as they are actually known by 
spi rits". 
By way of aside it is also interesting to note that 
Brightman commended his eventual successor at Boston, Peter 
Bertocci, to Tennant when Bertocci went to study at 
Cambridge. 
At the same time arguments also challenging God's 
omnipotence were being popularised by the former army 
chaplain Geoffrey Studdert-Kennedy in England. In more 
recent times such arguments have found increasing 
acceptance and have developed a more substantial 
Intellectuai and theological pedigree. The furore that 
greeted Brightman's publication of The Problem of God now 
.. 
seems very distant. Jurgen Moltmann, in The Power of the 
Powerless (49) Is a recent expositor of the idea of 
limitation in God. None however, have been as careful and 
as sensitive In their approach as has Jan Milic Lechman in 
his commentary on the Creed (The Faith We Confess). (50) 
Seen in the light of all this Brightman was no lone voice. 
He was one of many contributing to an embryonic but 
wide-ranging debate about the Interaction of evolutionary 
thought, time, the problem of evil and the content of 
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belief in God. But although the work of others In these 
fields was immense it was Brightman's merger of temporalism 
with his doctrine of a finite-infinite God that signalled 
his most radical departure from the personalism of Lotze 
and Bowne and marked his own most distinctive and original 
contri bution to American philosophy. 
The Place of this Study in Relationship to Brightman's 
Thought as a Whole 
Our title is Person and Experience: A Study in the Thought 
of Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Brightman was an unusually 
organic thinker and understanding one area of his thought 
without reference to other areas Is difficult. In this 
study his epistemology, ethics, metaphysics of reality, 
understanding of God, and of persons, selves and nature 
will be examined. Each of these areas will be seen to be 
vital In the critique that will be offered concerning his 
account of persons and experience. 
It is therefore on this basis that I shall not consider 
Brightman's Biblical writings (most notably The Sources 
of the Hexateuch), his sermons, and lecture notes on the 
Bi ble from the Archive, except where issues he raises in 
these locations affect the content and purpose of this 
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dissertation. I shall similarly leave out his work on 
social philosophy and social activism. The same applies to 
Brl ghtman's copious work for the Methodist Church as well 
as for Boston University. 
The justification for these omissions will be self-evident 
when, In the course of exegesis and argument the range of 
other primary references will be seen. At the bar of 
reason we are testing Brightman's phenomenology of person 
and experience. To Its scrutiny the results are submitted. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BRIGHTMAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENCE 
The Starting Point 
If one is to understand adequately Brightman's philosophy 
from within, one must begin from where he argued all 
philosophy begins. He wrote, "we must begin from where we 
are ••• 'where we are' is our own mind". (1) 
Accordingly, this chapter will examine Brightman's account 
of experience. This Is the fundamental constituent of 
mind, and is the basis of Brightman's whole philosophical 
enterprise. 
Brightman addressed the theme of experience persistently 
throughout his writings from the early 1920's up to his 
death. Indeed In the volume he was preparing for 
publication when he died Brightman dedicated considerable 
space to presenting, once more, his account of experience. 
His treatment of experience, his understanding of Its 
nature and purpose In epistemology as well as Its role In 
defining the person, remained thorough and consistent for 
the duration of his writings. Only terminology changed. 
This change appeared in Brightman's final major pieces, his 
University Lecture (Persons and val yes) and the 
posthumously published Person and Reality. 
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In Persons and Values and Person and Reality Brightman 
called the immediate moment of experiencing the 'shining 
present'. In his earlier works he had described the same 
moment as the 'situation-experienced', or sometimes the 
'datum-self'. Reflection upon the immediate moment of 
experiencing reveals the object of that experiencing. This 
he called in his last two works the 'Illuminating absent'. 
In his earlier writings he had called this the 
'situation-believed-In', or similarly, the 'whole self'. 
It seems beyond doubt that for Brightman, the terms 
'shining present' and 'illuminating absent' and their 
respecti ve corollaries 'situation-experienced', 
'datum-self' and 'situation-believed-In', 'whole-self' are 
dl rect synonyms. There Is no Indication In the later 
Brightman that a shift In meaning is Intended by the 
adoption of new terminology. Peter Bertoccl, Brightman's 
closest disciple, supports this. (2) 
In Person and Reality Brightman asks the question, "Where 
then can a metaphysician begin?" and goes on to say that he 
"must begin where he Is now - with his present experience". 
(3) One's present experience Is one's "Now ••• 'the source 
of evidence' ••• the 'this' and the 'mine' ••• the 
'Immediacy of feeling' .... " (4) 
The content of the shining present comprises "an almost 
Indescribable variety of conscious experience ••• all 
sensations, Images, reasoning, loves, hates, fears and 
hopes of Now, all conatlons, strivings and efforts, 
desires, aversions". (5) Moments of extraordinary 
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concentration, unconsciousness, sleep, drug Influence 
or accidents are occasions when the shining present 
contains no data. 
When data are present In a conscious experience they 
constitute a shining present. Brightman however does not 
perceive ali data as included within the shining present. 
There is an 'absent' which illuminates the present. This 
absent, the illuminating absent, is not contained within my 
experience, it is the object of my experience. 
Brightman, in defining experience, distinguished between 
experience as we, "live and find it before the work of 
analysis", and abstractions, knowledge claims, inferences, 
and hypothe~ which are formulated "after analysis" but 
still on the basis of experience. (6) He writes: 
All knowledge, all faith, all facts and inferences 
from facts, rest on the foundations of human 
experience. (7) 
No-one ... has any facts before him save the facts 
of his own experience. (8) 
To illustrate the distinction he sees between the shining 
present and its illuminating absent, the object of the 
experience, Brightman offers the example of hearing a bell 
ringing: 
When I fl rst hear it, I do not know whether its cause 
is 'In' a bell, 'In' my ears, or merely 'In' my 
imagination. But the ringing Itself is certainly my 
experience; and my experience Is a problem to me. 
In fact, one of the most certal n truths about 
Immediate experience Is that we do not know what It 
means until after Investigation, If then. (9) 
Developing his position Brightman offers another example: 
When I say, '1 see a rose', the immediate fact is 
conscious perception plus a strong beiief that 
something not my experience Is being 'perceived'. 
But both the perception and the belief are my 
conscious experiences. (10) 
Between the experience and its object there was, for 
Brightman, a qualitative distinction with respect to the 
certainty of each. Concerning experience he says: 
About what is actually present to us there is 
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absolute certainty and no error is possible. It is 
what it seems. If you are color-blind and see gray 
where others see red or green, there is no doubt that 
you do see gray. (11) 
One's present self-experience constitutes the "only 
absolutely certain empirical fact". (12) What is present to 
us In our experience, our shining present, is immediate and 
Its presence is beyond doubt. This is the halimark of 
Brightman's whole philosophical enterprise and upon It the 
rest of his metaphysics stands or falls. 
But it is a metaphysic which is not without problems. 
And the problems arise when one asks questions about the 
nature of experience. As soon as such questions are asked 
one begins to reflect on one's experience and Its 
referential objects beyond the experience. If present 
experience is the only certainty I have we must ask what it 
is In Brightman's system that allows us to posit reality 
beyond our own experiencing at all. This question Is 
particularly important given the strict distinction 
Brightman makes between experience and Its object. 
He writes that "the being of the present Involves and 
requl res the being of the absent if the present is to be 
understood ... belief in myself requires me to believe In 
the absent". (13) This he develops: 
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Memory, observation of things, and records and 
testimony of others together urge me to acknowledge my 
past as a causal determinant of my present ... We 
find, then, that In the very nature of the present 
there are references to the absent ... The present 
requl res the absent, and we know the absent only In 
the present. (14) 
Brl ghtman developed this phenomenology In his earlier 
writings. A quotation will help Identify this and will 
also assist comparison of terminology. 
Ideas refer to objects, and In so doing they refer to 
somethi ng beyond themselves. This Is called 
Intentionality or the objective reference of thought 
... that Is, the Ideas and thoughts In a mind - In the 
situation-experienced - transcend themselves by 
meaning or referring to an object or the 
situatlon-belleved-i n. (15) 
In other words Brightman is arguing that the experiencing 
person cannot "know other objects or selves without the 
certainty that In the present self there Is the possl billty 
of valid knowledge of what Is not the present self". (16) 
The sort of transcendence as Indicated above is quite 
loosely defined by Brightman. Insofar as objective 
reference specifies objects it Is called 'spatial 
transcendence'. There Is also 'temporal transcendence'. 
Because one can remember past experiencing and remembered 
anticipation of the future, present anticipation of future 
experiencing Is justified. Thus, "Memory, observation of 
things, and records and testimony of others together urge 
me to acknowledge my past as a causal determinant of my 
present". (17) However a more lengthy quotation will not 
only situate Brightman's thought more substantially In his 
metaphysic as a whole, but It will also serve to highlight 
the importance of reason in his system: 
What then do the mental data imply about the 
environment of mind? As mind understands itself, it 
speedily finds reasons to Justify the hypothesis that 
there Is an environment. The belief that there is no 
envi ronment - called by the traditional name of 
solipsism - asserts that there is nothing except 
present experience. But if this assertion means 
anything, it Is an appeal to reason, and reason 
requires an explanation of the present data In terms 
of thel r relations to something else. That 'something 
else' Is partly the mind's own past, but chiefly the 
environment of mind. Yet the very belief that there 
Is an environment, let It be repeated, Is an 
hypothesis rather than an experience. It is a 
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rational hypothesis. If you say, 'There Is no outer 
world - there Is nothing but my own experience of here 
and now,' you fly In the face of reason and refuse to 
think. Even your own words 'here and now' mean 
nothing except in contrast to an envlronlng there and 
then. None the less, when you say, 'I see a table and 
a table Is there,' strictly the first proposition, 'I 
see a table,' represents your datum, the experience In 
your ml nd, while the second, 'the table Is there,' Is 
a rational hypothesis which can never be verified 
except on the further hypothesis that the 
Interpretation of the contents of your mind wi" shed 
light on what Is not contents of your mind ... We know 
that there Is an environment because otherwise mind 
becomes meaningless. (18) 
Reason, for Brightman "implies otherness, reality, 
obJectivity". (19) To this he adds that one must "assume, 
or presuppose, or perceive that there Is something real 
other than ourselves". A coherent account of experience, 
defined In the way Brightman does, demands that we 
recognise this. In other words: 
... we cannot give a reasonable account of our 
sensations unless we ascribe to them a world beyond 
themselves. (20) 
That every human consciousness is largely determined 
by factors beyond Its control Is manifest. The past 
and the environment exercise an unescapable Influence 
on us. (21) 
In due course more wi" be said about the nature of that 
which Is posited, or requl red, 8S the object of our 
experience. As might be expected in a philosophy which 
claims its ground in experience, the word 'empirical' 
readily finds a place in Brightman's system: 
The empirical Includes all that we actually find in 
the present consciousness [i.e. our present 
experience]; In addition to sensations, we find 
reasonings, inferences, beliefs, emotions, hopes, 
anticipations, memories and Imaginations. (22) 
Developing this, Brightman goes on: 
When we try to Interpret the empl rlcal situation, we 
gain knowledge (or belief) about it. This knowledge, 
as a conscious process, Is In turn part of an 
empirical situation which has the property of 
referring to other empirical situations. The 
knowledge (or belief) which is asserted ... Is that 
every empirical situation Is a 'datum self', connected 
with previous empi rical situations by memories (memory 
linkages, as they may be called) and with future ones 
by anticipation-linkages. (23) 
Brightman Is not saying that the self is comprised of a 
collection, or series of individual experiences each 
disconnected from the rest. Rather that " ••• if we take 
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ourselves as we are at any given moment we find a flowing 
stream of experience ... constantly changing ••. " (24) 
It is this flowing stream of experience which comprises 
within Brightman's system, the 'whole self'. The whole 
self is a unity of past and present held together In the 
experiencing self. From this unity all knowledge and 
belief begi n: 
Personal experience, apprehended as completely as 
possible, analysed as thoroughly as possible, tested 
as experimentally as possible, and then grasped as 
synoptically as a system or totality - that is the 
basis and method of metaphysics. (25) 
In his work there Is an Identity of meaning between the 
terms experience and consciousness. Experience in general 
includes the "whole field of consciousness, every process 
or state of awareness in it; not sensation alone, not 
sCientifically Interpreted experience alone", (26) 
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In that consciousness Involves awareness, and that 
awareness ceases In unconsciousness, Brightman means that 
to be aware of something one must be actively conscious of 
It, His defl nltlon of consciousness as experience 
presupposes the present possession of ordering and ordered 
mental faculties, These faculties are those by which the 
Individual's past, present and anticipated future 
awarenesses are organised, 
In his phenomenology of consciousness as experience 
Brightman identifies two related features, "there Is an 
inseparable relation between the will and the nature of any 
conscious being", (27) By 'nature' he means that a being 
has a "definite structure, definite properties and 
Qualities", (28) Elsewhere, Brightman says that 
consciousness responds to stimuli and "its choices and 
decisions initiate activity", (29) The fact that the 
conscious being can make choices "we call Its will", (30) 
The will and the nature are not separate faculties for 
there cannot be a will without a being possessing any 
definite structure, properties and qualities, The will he 
called the active aspect of consciousness and the passive 
its nature or structure, I shall return to a further 
dimension of this shortly, For the moment we must ask what 
epistemological Implications follow from Brightman's 
distinction between the experient as subject and as object 
of experience, What does he mean, for example, by the 
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statement "Every situation experienced is a 
self-experience"? (31) The question may seem tedious but 
it Is nevertheless relevant. 
To answer we must distinguish between 'self-experience' and 
'experience of a self' as found In Brightman. In the 
former, one's own self is the experiencing subject alone. 
In the latter two Interpretations are possible. Firstly, 
that another self is the experiencing subject (I.e. another 
self Is the self-experlent). Or, secondly, that one has 
as the object of one's own experiencing another self. I 
shall take these In turn. 
Brightman argues that one Individual cannot have another's 
experiences "all direct experience (acquaintance) Is 
experience of the self ... ". (32) He says also, that one's 
own experiencing "Is observable to each of us In a way (the 
way of Immediate experience) totally different from the way 
in which the consciousness of anyone else is accessible to 
us (the way of inference or well-grounded belief)". (33) 
And again: 
Each of us experiences his own consciousness; that 
experience Is private and can be literally shared by 
no one else. (34) 
In the second scenario where one has as the object of one's 
experience another self, Brightman means that though others 
cause me to have experiences they remain the ob lect of my 
experience not the content. He writes, firstly concerning 
one's own body as the object of experience: 
... in my experience I have never found my brain, or 
my nervous system, my eyes nor my ears, heart nor 
lungs; not even my hands and feet. (35) 
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Similarly, it follows that another's body as the object of 
experiencing would not qualify for inclusion as the content 
of experience either. Thus another's hands and feet (etc) 
can never be in one's experience, only sensory patterns, 
"plus a firm belief" (36) that they are there. Insofar as 
thinking is part of one's experiencing, the thinking Is 
not to be confused with what Is thought about. In the way 
self-experience has been descrl bed here, "All experience 
... Is self experience". (37) 
So, therefore, in one's experience one has direct 
experience oniy of the contents of the consciousness. 
Indeed Brightman actually defines consciousness In terms of 
experience, "Personal consciousness alone Is experience". 
(38) The activity of another consciousness can be Inferred 
from the observations of others' bodily behaviour. This 
Inference rests not only on observation but also analogy. 
By this is meant that if there was no similarity (I.e. no 
reason for making an analogy from one person to another) 
then one would not even tal k of other persons or other 
selves. Since one does talk this way, there seems at the 
very least a kinship between my self and other selves. 
If we rely on this observed similarity between myself and 
other selves and upon the actual Interaction between us, we 
can produce a more coherent account of other selves and 
infer that consciousness is as applicable to their nature 
as it is to mi nee Indeed It seems with reference to any 
object of experience that "If consciousness and its objects 
were actually as different as they seem ... the dally 
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commerce between our minds would be impossible". Thus 
although minds, experiencing selves, are ontologically 
alike in kind, Brightman argues that this in no way affects 
the epistemological bifurcation between them. 
Therefore although my consciousness cannot be seen by 
another in the way I see it (and vice versa), their 
interaction in the world is presupposed by their similarity 
and their similarity Is the condition of their 
interraction. Developing these thoughts Brightman wrote: 
Although all direct experience (acquaintance) is 
experience of the self, that experience as such is not 
knowledge; but the self consists entirely of what at 
some time Is direct experience, and knowledge of the 
self is (epistemologically dualistic) knowledge of 
what is Or was or will be direct experience. (39) 
What for Brightman would have been the consequences of not 
adopting an epistemological dualism between the 
situation-experienced and the situation-believed-in? He 
believed that without such a dualism talk of 'me' would be 
impossible for the universe and my self would be one . 
... if one adopts the principle that the causes of a 
datum self (immediate experience) are a part of the 
self, it Is difficult to see on what logical grounds 
one stops with the organism. If what causes X Is a 
part of X, then, if we are thorough, every X is the 
enti re universe. (40) 
This is a complex statement involving a seemingly ludicrous 
reductio ad absurdum. Before we pass too hasty a judgement 
on him we must aim to understand him further. Another 
quotation will help. Here Brightman expresses the same 
view but with different terminology: 
If we were to regard everything that stimulates or 
causes my subconsciousness as part of me, then there 
would be no distinction between the world and me, or 
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between God and me .•. If we Included the subconscious 
- which is not and, as subconscious, never has been 
or can be In my present consciousness ... we should 
have given up immediacy and memory as our criteria of 
selfhood, and have committed ourselves to the 
principle that whatever causes my consciousness Is a 
part of me. (41) 
The consequence of such a false position, Brightman 
believes, Is that one has then started down the slippery 
slope to absolutism. On Brightman's terms one cannot say, 
'I see a rose' and mean that the rose Is a part of the 
experience. The only content of the experience is the 
experiencing self with Its perception. The object of that 
perception is the rose. If the rose was the experience, or 
was in the experience, then Brightman Is saying there would 
be no logical distinction between experience and universe. 
Understanding this will be fundamental for the critique 
that will appear later. 
As will be obvious there are fundamental problems In what 
Brightman says. The most basic question that can be asked 
is whether Brightman is Justified in his contention that 
the Immediate experience is an experience of one's own 
consciousness and nothing else. In advocating this 
Brightman seems to accept an extreme Cartesian position 
along with much that can be found in the earlier writings 
of British empiricism. Brightman's contribution to this 
Is to Include within experience the categories of volition, 
purpose and so on. He also Includes within it the capacity 
to remember and organise past and present data with future 
anticipations. He thus alms to protect himself against the 
sort of solipsism of which some commentators would Imply 
he was vulnerable. 
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No commentator, as far as we know, has fully explored the 
implications of what Brightman Is saying when he adopts 
this philosophical perspective. One writer, J. R. Martin 
(42), highlights a valuable agenda and Indeed could have 
developed a very searching critique of Brightman. Martin's 
treatment Is brief and compact in the extreme, and because 
of this he fails to secure the criticism he makes. His 
point is that Brightman is guilty of confusing experient, 
experiencing and the experienced. Martin asks, "Is it any 
more possi ble to conceive of an experient apart from 
something experienced by him, which is not simply his 
experienci1:lg of it, than It is to conceive of something 
experienced which is not the experience of some 
experient? ". 
Brightman was aware of the possibility of such a challenge 
to his metaphysic. Indeed, one of Brightman's main aims 
In his epistemology was to ensure that his own brand of 
idealism did not fall into the 'psychologistlc fallacy' of 
which Martin accused him. For Brightman It was reason 
which united experient, experiencing and experienced, not 
confusion. His position rested upon what he claimed was a 
coherent understanding of the data of experience. 
Whether Brightman Is correct In making such a claim will 
remain to be seen. However worthy his criticism, Martin 
for his part failed to drive home his challenge because, 
like many others who have Investigated Brightman, he rested 
content with accusing Brightman of error rather than 
demonstrating why Brightman was In error. 
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Martin, in the same location, then goes on to find fault 
with Brightman's account of transcendence - by which is 
meant the faculty a consciousness has to infer the 
existence of other experients. For Brightman, it is the 
case that one's consciousness is dependent, for its 
coherent self-understanding upon objects of consiousness 
which the subject knows as illuminating absent. Is this a 
"confusion between knowing and being" as Martin suggests? 
Or rhetorically, is it an indication that knowing and being 
are in a tension in which each is mutually dependent upon 
the other, with any separation of the two being empirically 
untenable? Martin, again like other critics of Brightman, 
seems to read into him a definition of experience which 
Brightman did not hold. It therefore follows that 
Brightman has a legitimate defence against such critics, in 
that he can argue he did not say those things that are 
imputed to him as his weakness. Our own view is that 
w hi 1st si gnificant problems do attend Sri ghtman's view of 
experience, his philosophy was not vulnerable in the 
simpl istic way many of his critics suggest. 
We can now to return to a discussion of the unity of 
consciousness. The ability of the knower, the experiencing 
self, to begin and continue investigating and understanding 
information gained through experience presupposes a unity 
in the experiencing self from the past into the present and 
towards the future: 
'Everyman' transacts busi ness on the basis of memories 
of previous transactions and hopes of future ones. 
Unless he and all concerned take for g ranted that the 
same person who sends the order and receives the goods 
also pays the bill or authorized it to be paid, the 
structure of business becomes chaos. (43) 
Brightman defines the unity of consciousness In this way: 
[The] changing, growing, fickle, contradictory 
consciousness of each one of us Is nevertheless a 
unity, capable of knowing that its complex parts and 
conflicting desires however Incompatible they may be 
logically or ethically or aesthetically, all belong to 
one consciousness. (44) 
each Immediate field of attention occurs as a 
whole which is not a sum or collection of originally 
separate or separable parts, and that this whole Is 
uniquely connected with past and future ones, which 
together constitute one self. (45) 
By 'field of attention' Brightman means an Individual act 
of experiencing connected with past experlenclngs and 
present anticipations of future acts as the content of 
experiencl n g. 
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If we take ourselves as we are at any given moment, we 
find a flowing stream of experience (James's stream of 
consciousness, or the field of attention) which 
Professor Donald C. Williams has called the given, and 
which Is the same as Berkeley's conscious being or 
person. (46) 
Brightman argues there are two ways in which the unity of 
consciousness Is a given fact. Firstly It Is a priori 
necessary. Secondly, It is empirically required. It Is i! 
priori necessary to ensure, for example, that both subject 
and predicate of a proposition are present to one 
consciousness. (47) It Is empirically required because 
experience Is meaningless apart from a unity of 
consciousness that can unite its diverse data. The.A 
priori and the empirical are, Brightman tells us: 
... essential and Inseparable aspects of 
consciousness, neither of which can be fully 
understood In Isolation. Only In their concrete 
unity is their full truth evident. (48) 
So far Brightman has been found to stress the subject In 
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experience to such an extent that he has united experience 
with consciousness. He adds to this subjective dimension 
of consciousness a social dimension: 
The sharp separation between personal and social Is 
artificial and unreal. All personal consciousness •.. 
Is necessarily social. (49) 
What does he mean by the 'sociality of consciousness'? 
An answer Is offered in genetic terms: 
Personal consciousness In man Is certainly social In 
Its origins. Every human being Is the offspring of 
parents; his genetic relations to those two other 
persons Is unavoidable. (50) 
Such a statement Is non-contentious and no further 
discussion of It is proposed. But the other answer 
Brightman offers is sociological and bears further 
scrutiny: 
..• all the persons with whom an individual comes Into 
contact have some influence on him ••• From birth, 
these social Influences affect every person. (51) 
And again: 
Not only is consciousness largely produced by social 
means, but also it is largely directed towards social 
ends. (52) 
This aspect of consciousness Brightman makes more explicit, 
"all known consciousness Is striving for some goal", (53) 
The goals and social ends are conceived elsewhere by 
Brightman as earthly values such as social Justice, 
Individual freedom and the like, (54) 
Support for the sociality of consciousness, he believes, 
may be found from the evidence of communication. 
Brightman argues this can be on two levels, individual and 
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social. He says that, "when I tal k to myself, I view myself 
imaginatively as a society". (55) This is not the same as 
saying that one is comprised of many selves "or even two 
selves - an 'I' and a 'me'''. Rather it Is that the 
individual as a single unitary consciousness can "assume a 
quasi-social attitude towards parts of himself". (56) In 
other words the consciousness has experiences of which the 
self is seen as the object. Brightman takes this view to 
Its conclusion by saying that one has to see oneself as 
another in order that "the more objectively we view 
ourselves, the better we truly understand ourselves". (57) 
Furthermore Brightman contends that one needs to go beyond 
this 'self-communing' If one Is to understand oneself 
fully, One needs to see oneself In inter-relation with 
other experlents, This dimension of sociality Is 
inescapable; "We cannot escape the social spirit wherever 
we turn", (58) It may assume many forms, "communications of 
thought and feeling without words", (59) although much 
experiencing, much consciousness, after early Infancy is 
dependent on verbal communication. 
Throughout this Brightman Is not Intending to reduce the 
consciousness to its causal supports - either social or 
mechanical. Whilst these are the means and condition for 
the consciousness In its social and 'quasi-social' 
attitudes they are not the consciousness. For him the 
consciousness Is the experiencing self alone, 
Moving on we recognise that Brightman notes the complexity 
surrounding the history of philosophical treatment of 
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personality. He rejects linguistic solutions as valid 
means of resolving this complexity, "our puzzles about the 
nature of man are not really first produced by the names we 
use ..... (60) The complexity of personality is due to 
something more deep-seated than a confusion over the term 
'personality': 
If the source of our perplexity about personaliity Is 
not to be found In words, where is It to be found? 
Is it not in the very nature of personal experience? 
Personality is itself complex and is complexly 
Interrelated with Its environment. (61) 
Brightman rejects any theory of personality which treats It 
solely In material terms - though he never denies the 
validity of any approach as a contribution to the study of 
personality. He says it is not enough to argue, "There Is 
a man, hence a personality". (62) He goes on to say that "a 
man's personality is not his social or his physical 
environment, nor his body nor anything material. 
Personality is not what It depends on". (63) 
Brightman, calls himself a "personalistic empiricist", and 
rhetorically defines personality as, "simply what we 
experience It to be" (64); "A man's personality Is his 
conscious experience" (65); ..... all personality is 
conscious experience". (66) 
In Brightman, 'person' is synonymous with 'personality'; 
both person and personality are defined as conscious 
experience, ..... personality Is restricted to actual 
consciousness". (67) Whilst arguments from silence are of 
only limited application we might venture to say that 
Brightman's omission of any distinction between person and 
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personality indicated that he saw no need for such a 
distinction to be made. (68) 
A more synoptic description of the nature of personality 
can be offered. Its significance with regard to what was 
said earlier about experience and consciousness is obvious: 
All that we ever say about atoms or evol utlon or God 
Is based on this consciousness of ours, which we may 
call our present self, our personalilty, the field of 
attention, experience ... whatever name we give It, It 
Is the only absolutely certain fact, and is the 
foundation of all the so-called knowledge we possess. 
(69) 
He also says: 
Personality Is that part of the universe which alone 
Is Immediately present to us (70) ... within myself I 
find the universe ml rrored. (71) 
In what way does my personality mirror the universe? 
Personalism does not mean that ultimate reality Is 
just like your mind and mine with all their defects. 
It means, rather, that our Incomplete and fragmentary 
minds give rise to an Ideal of a full and complex 
personality. (72) 
Why does this approach supply an appropriate basis for an 
adequate metaphysics of reality? Brightman anSwers: 
If we start with matter as the ultimately real, 
personality Is a miracle In the universe. But If what 
we call matter Is Itself a manifestation of cosmic 
personality, as we have suggested, the attempt to 
explain personality In terms of the Impersonal Is seen 
to be as unnecessary to attempt as It Is Impossible to 
carry out. The absolutely unconscious cannot be the 
metaphysical cause of the conscious. (73) 
Earlier In this chapter we saw how Brightman defined 
consciousness In terms of two aspects, nature and will. A 
fundamental feature of persons, as defined by Brightman, Is 
their capacity to value. This valuing Is restricted: 
Our activity is directed on the content of sensation, 
and Is subject to the limits of rational possibility. 
(74) 
Thus activity Is limited by what Brightman calls the 
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passive content of consciousness and the choices available 
to hand. Selection of one course of action Instead of 
another forms, according to Brightman, the act of valuing: 
The experience characterized by II king or preference 
is what Is called valuing ... Among the major 
experiences which reasonable men have valued are 
association with others, truth, goodness, beauty, and 
worship. (75) 
[Values are] both the everyday objects of the heart's 
desi re and the Ideal values of love, truth, goodness, 
beauty and holiness ... Man strives towards ends which 
he values ... (76) 
Man's pursuit of value Is an Ineradicable trait of his 
being, the destruction of one value Inevitably leads 
to the construction of others. (77) 
Thus: 
The term 'person' Is used for selves capable of 
reasoning and Ideal valuations. (78) 
If valuing and reasoning are properties of persons, what 
may be said of those human beings who (for whatever 
reason) are Incapable of reasoning? Brightman answers: 
... there are human selves - that Is, selves born of 
human parents - so abnormal that, as far as we know, 
they can never develop any Ideal values at all ••• 
selves incapable of reflective and critical 
self-consciousness, unable to devote themselves to any 
Ideal enterprise, are not persons. (79) 
Brightman states (In the same place) that In the animal 
kingdom "Incipient personality appears below the human 
level". But even though there are signs of value-seeking 
existence "at least among dogs and horses and apes" (SO) he 
accepts that, "ordinary usage does not call every conscious 
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being a person". (81) For Brightman, "human value Is the 
highest we experience ... " (82) The fact that rational 
human beings are the subjects of this experience follows 
without further specification. If we follow Brightman 
further we discover a distinction emerges between person 
and self. This arises from the person's ability to value: 
The essential difference between person and self seems 
to be that person carries with It some estimate of 
value, whereas self (In the widest sense) serves 
merely to distinguish anything from anything else. 
If, now, we take these two words and give them a more 
precise meaning for our present purpose, we may define 
a self as any actual conscious experience, and then 
define a person as any member of the class of selves 
who Is capable of achieving value. (83) 
Thus: 
Every person ••• is a self. But not every self Is a 
person. Those selves, and those only, that are 
capable of developing Ideal values are worthy of being 
called persons. (84) 
The boundary between person and self Is not clearly defined 
by Brightman. He conceded as much; one may "recognize a 
hierarchy ••• of personal and sub-personal selves". (85) 
The point where a self may more properly be called 
according to Brightman's terms of reference, a 'person', Is 
blurred. I suggest that the blurredness of the frontier 
between person and self will create difficulties to which I 
shall point shortly. Brightman was aware of some of the 
problems facing him. He wrote, " The consciousness of a 
man may, at any given moment, well be as dull and narrow as 
the supposed consciousness of a worm." (86) And continues, 
after saying that worms are incapable of creating and 
enjoying value, how can one say that there Is any 
consciousness anywhere "which Is wholly devoid of value?" 
(87) Answering this question himself Brightman 
distinguishes between the ability and non-ability of a 
given self to apply and use the laws of reason: 
Some selves achieve their ends and enjoy their values 
thoughtlessly, or even without the capacity of 
thought; this seems to be true of worms and 
butterflies, and, Indeed of most subhuman selves, 
though not all. (88) 
On the other hand, however, "Other selves are able to 
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choose and Judge their values in the light of reason". (89) 
This species of selves apply reason to "test their values 
by Ideals". (90) Brightman concludes, "Such selves are 
persons". (91) Therefore: 
Every normal human being is a person; but some 
abnormal human beings may not be persons, and some 
subhuman beings, such as apes, dogs, horses, and pigs, 
may be persons. (92) 
Bri ghtman's stance appears very harsh, but he presses home 
his case: 
Such beings ••• [non-personal selves] ... would be 
sub-personal selves without eventual potentialities 
of any real development or redemption. Selves 
incapable of reflective and critical 
self-consciousness, unable to devote themselves to any 
ideal enterprise, are not persons. Persons are selves 
who are or will be able to develop ideal experiences 
of some kind. (93) 
Thus a self is " ... any and every consciousness, however 
simple or complex it may be. A self is any conscious 
situation experienced as a whole". (94) Thus it Is seen 
that Brightman believes that "self-experience, If not 
reflective self-consciousness, extends to the lowest forms 
of animal life". (95) Perhaps anticipating criticism of 
what he has said he writes that to " ... conceive the 
consciousness of a protozoon passes all our Imagination; 
yet there Is good reason to believe that every living being 
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experiences Itself as a self. (96) 
And developing this Into a theory of the unity of a self 
Brightman writes, "Wherever there is experience with memory 
and anticipation, there is a self ..... (97) The memory or 
the anticipation need not be rationally ordered (though In 
persons they would be). In lower selves these features may 
be unreflective or Instinctive • 
••. we use the word self to designate any conscious 
experient, from amoeba to God ••• The continuity of a 
self is Its thread of memories. (98) 
A brief comment on Brightman's position Is appropriate at 
this point. It seems that his hierarchy of selves and 
persons, with the two seemingly blending (or blurring) Into 
one another gives considerable problems of Identifying 
where one ends and the other starts. This, In Itself, does 
not invalidate what Brightman says. But If one cannot 
necessarily distinguish between persons and selves then a 
question mark Is put against a system In which the 
distinction between them Is so Important. 
Advancing his case that thinking, rationally ordered beings 
are persons (as are those who have the potential to develop 
Into persons) (99) Brightman argues that we are to be 
considered as a "fair sample of all that there Is". He 
goes on to say that one can find the "source of all In an 
order of being akin to what we Immediately experience In 
our own personalities". (100) From this It follows that: 
No view of the world or of God can be true If It Is 
Inconsistent with the evidence of personality, on 
which alone rests every possible statement about 
present, past, future, and eternity. (101) 
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... the fact of personality points to a world beyond 
our personalities, but essentially of the same kind, 
that is, of thought and action and exerlence, yet on a 
cosmic scale. To this cosmic experience, In organic 
relations with which our mind stands, we give the name 
God. (102) 
Brightman deems this 'cosmic experience' to be anything but 
an Impersonal deity: 
Every view which Is based on an Interest In one aspect 
of personaillty, taken by Itself apart from the whole 
personal life, leads to an abstract and Incomplete 
view of what religion Is and, on account of Its 
Inadequate basis, arrives at an Inadequate God. If we 
are to find the truth about religion or about God we 
must take all the evidence Into account. The evidence 
with which we start In religious experience Is not 
feeling alone, or thought alone, or will alone, but Is 
the whole self, the feeling, thinking, willing person. 
If we start by examining the full evidence of human 
personality, it may be that clear thinking will compel 
us to arrive at a conception of divine personality. 
(103) 
Brightman argues that though the personality of God Is 
revealed through the personality of man, It Is not limited 
by the human personality, "In contrast to man, (God) Is 
bound to no particular biological organism; he uses the 
entire physical universe as his body". (104) 
We shall return to all these Issues again In due course. 
For the moment they are simply Introduced. To conclude 
this exegesis of Brightman's phenomenology of experience we 
must focus on an aspect of human personality, which was 
seen by him as a development of a concept of human 
personality to a 'higher level'. To this higher level he 
gave the name spi rit. 
Brightman claims that his definition of spirit "ties It 
forever to personality, yet serves equally as a definition 
of the Inexhaustible destiny of personality". (105) This he 
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states for, on the one hand all strive for perfection (what 
Bri ghtman called the spi rtual life) - a life yearning 
towards ideal purposes and goals - yet, "man's sin, his low 
aim, his pride, and his despair, are ever ready foes of the 
spirit". (106) Brightman emphasises here, "more explicitly 
the dependance of spirit on personality". (107) Thus: 
A person is a conscious self able to develop Ideal 
values. A spl rit Is a person In so far as he has 
actually developed a conscious attitude toward Ideal 
values. (108) 
Spirit, in the sense being presented by Brightman Is not: 
... merely a commitment to Ideals, which are the 
eternal principles of what ought to be; it is a 
commitment to values, that is the realization of 
ideals. (109) 
Thus, "Only in personal soil can the spirit live; and 
persons live In time". (110) Spirit is manifested In the 
temporal. The Ideal is incarnate in the personal, It is 
visible in the flesh. Brightman continues, "Spirit, 
therefore, is meaningless, a barren and unreai abstraction, 
apart from personality". (111) 
Conclusions In a chapter such as this are not possible as 
many issues have been raised for the first time and will be 
evaluated more properly later. We can however offer a 
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very brief resume of the most important points. 
Personal experience is certain and points to a 
situation-believed-In with which the experlent reacts, but 
with which he is not to be Identified. In Brightman 
consciousness may be taken as a synonym for experience. 
His use of both overlaps and both terms are 
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interchangeable. Personality is a synonym for person, this 
being distinguished from a self In that persons have the 
potential and capacity to develop and realize a coherent 
set of worthy values. Personality finds frequent 
synonymous usage In Brightman with both experience and 
consciousness. But Brightman makes the term personality 
perform a fundamental role in his metaphysics. He puts 
upon the shoulders of personality a threefold 
superstructure which Is definitive of the nature of God (as 
the source and basis of all personality), Is definitive of 
the nature of rational, self-reflective persons (as 
distinguished from non-personal selves), and Is definitive 
of a concept of Ideal human personality (spirit) In which 
there is commitment to the actuallsation of Ideals. 
Bri 9 htman and Hartshorne 
As a postscript to this chapter some mention must be made 
of the extensive correspondence that took place between 
Brightman and Charles Hartshorne (b.1897) on the nature of 
selves. This correspondence also Included details of their 
respective theistic beliefs. (113) 
Brightman's dialogue with Hartshorne Is selected here 
because there is no other thinker who communicated with 
Brightman so extensively as did Hartshorne. No other 
thinker exposed so acutely the position Brightman held and 
defended. Prima facie one ml ght expect these two 
contemporaries, both strong In the process tradition, would 
be close. Despite strenuous efforts on the part of both of 
them thei r thought could never converge. 
In the Brightman Archive there is an almost complete 
correspondence between Brightman and Hartshorne on the 
nature of the self and experience. The correspondence 
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began in 1934 and was to last ten years. At the outset of 
this correspondence Hartshorne acknowledges the two men 
were not far apart in theology, but is worried about 
Brightman's view that other selves are inferred rather than 
given. For Hartshorne literal participation in each 
other's being is about his "strongest belief". Whilst he 
recognises that other selves are known only indirectly he 
nevertheless proposes that we are parts of each other. For 
him, souls (i.e. selves) overlap. 
Brightman is content to share Hartshorne's worry that 
other selves are always inferred and never given. He sees 
that however important the necessity of the relationship of 
effect upon its cause, this relatedness always implies 
otherness not absorption. Even though others are necessary 
to my being, this can never mean they are part of me (i.e. 
given in my experience). Both thinkers mean the same by 
'given'. Their difference lies in the use to which they 
put the word. Hartshorne for example, says that my self, 
and other selves, are both given in my experience. One is 
distinguished from the other by the degree to which it is 
given. For him, following Whitehead, this can be explained 
by linking the notion of causality as identical with memory 
plus the essentially structural character of the unity of 
consciousness. The outcome of this means that the cause 
is a part of the effect via memory, construed as a real 
preservation of the past and Into the present. 
This carries little persuasive force for Brightman who 
throughout the correspondence, in which Hartshorne 
persistently tried to convince him otherwise, held fast to 
his strict bifurcation of experience and Its object. 
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Brightman can make no sense of Hartshorne's claimed degrees 
of experience. Somethi ng is either given in experience or 
not. If another Interacts with me, then they interact as 
another. If however in their interaction they are a 'part' 
of my experience as Hartshorne would claim then Brightman 
can no longer see them as another. For him part of my 
experience, means being one with me. For Brightman the 
necessity of another for me is essential, but this 
'necessity for me' is never reduci ble to 'part of me'. 
This difference of view between thinkers, otherwise close, 
cannot be resolved by redefinition of terminology. It is a 
difference as fundamental as that of the ancient dichotomy 
between monism and dualism. But Hartshorne was pointing us 
towards a significant area of Brightman's thought which 
requires further attention. In the last two chapters a 
critique will be offered which follows the direction 
Hartshorne was indicating and which, from within Brightman, 
finds him vulnerable. 
CHAPTER THREE 
BRIGHTMAN'S ETHICAL THEORY 
An Introduction based on Moral Laws 
In this first section the early chapters of Moral Laws will 
be followed in detail. It is in these chapters that 
Brightman's ethical theory receives its most succinct and 
systematic outlay. We shall see that Brightman's ethical 
theory intertwines with almost every other area of his 
thought. 
Some initial definitions will help our exposition. The 
fi rst is that of 'ethics' itself. Here Brightman 
distinguishes between ethics and morals. Ethics: 
... refers to the theory of the good life, while morals 
means the actual practice of it (successful or 
unsuccessful). (1) 
'Morals' as here defined, are synonymous with 'conduct' 
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having as a reference, voluntary human behaviour In accord 
with the norms and precepts of ethics. 'Ethics' 
attempts to "determine what customs are good and what are 
bad ... (It) undertakes to furnish some standard for 
distinguishing between a better character and a worse one". 
(2) Since ethics is concerned to find a standard It may be 
described as a "normative science of Ideal principles", (3) 
Brightman distinguishes normative sciences from descriptive 
sciences - the latter offer facts, the former evaluate 
their significance. Upon these initial definitions 
Brightman offers a fuller definition of ethics as: 
... the normative science of the principles (or laws) 
of the best types of human conduct. (4) 
It is through rational and coherent appraisal of ethical 
science that our moral life Is lived. But lest ethical 
science Is understood as dealing with merely stating the 
value of what Is, Brightman suggests there are three 
concepts In ethics which are Its foundations: 
... value, obligation, and law; and law Is the most 
essential of the three, If ethics Is to be a science. 
If we summarize these three In the formulae: 'I 
evaluate', 'I ought', 'I universalize', we bring out 
the basic fact that the formulations of ethics are 
actual personal experiences. (5) 
Each of these carries an Injunction or Imperative as 
normative for the ethical life. From 'law' comes the 
requl rement that ethical norms should be capable of 
universalization from the particular to the general. From 
'value' emerges the requirement to evaluate, to estimate 
the worth of given situations and conduct, or to examine 
the value of possible courses of future action. From 
'obligation' arises the 'categorical Imperative' that one 
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ought to strive to realise greater moral worth In any given 
situation. 
Having defined ethics as a (normative) science Brightman 
shows how ethics constructs laws which aim towards 
universal application. He asks whether there Is something 
universal In human nature which both Justifies and requires 
the acknowledgement of such laws and outlines briefly those 
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laws he sees operating In society. 
Firstly, there is civil law. This is a form of sanctioned 
social custom, or of socia"y sanctioned changes in custom. 
Civil law Is not ethical in Its primary aim - though it 
rests on moral foundations and Is guided by moral 
principles, "however imperfectly apprehended". (6) For 
"unless society recognized that life and property have a 
right to protection, there would be no basis for law". (7) 
Civil law is universal in principle If not in practice. 
The second law is religious law. This, Brightman claims, 
may be discerned In societies "as far back as we can go In 
our knowledge of human development". (8) Religious law is 
"believed to rest on the will of a superhuman power or 
powers". And "as society develops, religious law comes to 
assume very definite forms, two of which are of special 
importance for ethics, namely, ecclesiastical law and 
theological ethics". (9) The former refers to what Is 
sometimes called canon law, and the latter, "the theory 
that moral law is to be regarded as derived from religious 
laws". The "religious law" may mean here, amongst other 
things, that "God Is the sole motive for morality" (10), 
either as a source of rewards and punishments, or because 
he Is the supreme object of love. Alternatively, the 
religious law may assert the moral law Is given through 
divine revelation. Given the variety of forms of religious 
law (in any of its species) specific definition Is 
difficult. Given this diversity, Brightman questions 
whether It can be called 'law' in the true sense. 
Nevertheless he recognises that: 
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Of undoubted significance for ethics, however, Is the 
fact that very large numbers of human beings In every 
civilized and uncivilized country of the world are 
firm believers In one or both forms of religious law 
and that rell gious law Is a social force of prime 
Importance. (11) 
Natural law, Brightman argues, Is not merely universal, but 
entirely Impersonal and above all human choice, "Natural 
Law, then, may be defined as a formulation of causal 
principles". (12) 
The logical law consists of "fundamental laws of thought 
and of the Inferences to be made from them". (13) The laws 
of logic comprise three sub-groups: the laws of Identity, 
contradiction and the excluded middle, and "constitute the 
most certain body of universal knowledge that we possess". 
Without logical law the mind would be in chaos. Logic, 
Bri ghtman tells us, Is often called the "ethics of 
thought". He continues "A consideration of logical law, 
then, Involves a transition to moral law". (14) This 
transition Brightman makes, and In answer to his question: 
'What Is a moral law?' replies, ..... a universal principle 
to which the will ought to confirm In Its choices". (15) 
Acts are moral In so far as they conform to the moral law. 
Thus "social duties ... must be Judged In the light of 
moral duties". (16) Insofar as our duties (social and 
personal) may conflict, this does not disprove the 
universality of moral law but rather asserts the difficulty 
of Its application. (17) The reason for this Is the 
difficulty experienced In working out those laws of 
obligation against which ethical activity might be 
measured: 
.•• the problem of ethics is to examine the facts of 
moral experience In order to discover what laws of 
obligation It implies. (18) 
For this reason: 
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We cannot derive ethical knowledge from any more 
remote realm Inaccessi ble to experience. It goes back 
to our actual experiences of the problems and the 
values of life. Ethical knowledge Is based on moral 
experience. Normative science rests on descriptive 
science for Its facts. (19) 
Brightman goes on to Indicate what he means by moral 
experience. In the preceding Chapter It was seen that 
experience refers to sensation, conscious activity, 
thought, will, memory linkages and Images and so on. 
Therefore: 
Moral experience, In the broad sense, Includes not 
only the act of voluntary choice, but also the 
experiences chosen - the consciousness of value, of 
obI/ gatlon and of law ••. (20) 
Brightman proposes these last three - the consciousness of 
value, obligation and law, are the 'fundamental concepts of 
ethics'. (21) We shall look at each In turn. 
Brightman concedes differences of opinion regarding the 
analysis of value experience, "Some make desire paramount 
(voluntarism); others make pleasure the essential 
value-factor (hedonism); while others make conformity to 
Ideals the chief mark of value (Idealism)". (22) These 
differences do not mask the fact that, however value Is 
Interpreted "Every human being can say 'I value'''. 
Hence: 
There is no doubt that experiences of value occur. 
An experience of val ue is any consciousness of 
attainment of desire or any experience that satisfies 
or is approved of. It may be called a realized ideal; 
for an Ideal Is a concept of a plan of action or type 
of experience which, when real ized, is satisfactory. 
(23) 
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Secondly, we move from experiences of value to experiences 
of obligation. This movement draws us "closer to the heart 
of moral life". Thus Brightman can say: 
One might enjoy values, as does the aesthete, without 
regarding them from a moral standpoint; but when one 
feels obligation, one Is distinctly In a moral 
situation even though the feeling of obligation be 
unjustified. Obligation addresses Itself more 
directly to the will than does value. (24) 
And again: 
... obligation is the unique feeling, not identical 
either with desire or with social prescriptions, which 
arises when I consider that which I take to be the 
highest value for me, or, as we ordinarily say, 'the 
best thing for me to do,' and which leads me to say, 
'I ought to do this.' (25) 
Two questions may be asked to develop more fully the 
meaning of the experience of obligation, namely, (1) 
Is the feeling of obligation analyzable? and, (2) Is It 
capable of evol utlonary explanation?' (26) 
In response to the first question, Brightman rejects what 
he calls Bertrand Russell's "facile" analysis of obligation 
as desire by saying that obligation is more than desire. 
One might desire to do something one ought not to do, and 
one might know one ought to do something without any sense 
of desire. Brightman concludes that if obligation is 
analyzed into parts the whole has properties that its parts 
do not have - in the same way that salt has different 
properties to those of sodium and chlorine when they exist 
as separate elements. 
Answering the second question, Brightman feels there Is, 
"no reasonable doubt that obligation Is capable of 
evolutionary explanation". (27) Such an explanation will 
have Its limitations. It will tell us nothing of the 
source of obligation, nothing of Its origins but only Its 
survival. Evolution speaks of the survival of the fit, not 
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Its arrival. In saying that obligation has an evolutionary 
history, Brightman means that It has adapted and developed. 
It would be Incorrect to Interpret Brightman as saying the 
'fact' of obligation can be deduced from observation of the 
evolutionary process: I.e. that the ought can be Inferred 
from the is (the natural world). Brightman argues that 
this cannot be the case, for "no consideration of 
sensations or of any type of non-moral experience would 
enable us to Infer what Is meant by obligation". (28) 
This does not mean there Is no relation between the two, 
but rather that obll gation (as moral experience) Is not 
derivable from non-moral experience. This, Brightman 
proposes, Is a recognition of the difference between 
sensory and non-sensory experience. He adds to this the 
comment that a feeling of moral obligation Is not 
sufficient to constltue a real obligation "sense and moral 
experience alike need criticism and Interpretation". (29) 
Interpretation of moral experience, what Brightman called 
the 'rational factor In moral experience', Is also what "we 
call moral law". (30) This is the third fundamental 
concept of ethics. The rational factor is necessary to 
control the irrational and direct It towards purposive 
ends, "If rational, purposive choice Is not effective In 
the control of life, goodness Is not possible." (31) 
The will Is not subject to unrestricted freedom of choice, 
nor Is It completely determined by factors beyond Its 
control. Brightman In saying both are essential to moral 
experience notes that "An Important trait of acts of w'" 
is their unique combination of necessity and possibility": 
(32) 
Some theories emphasize possibility without necessity, 
and thus have a romantic and unscientific character; 
others emphasize necessity without possibility, and 
thus ignore the central fact of moral experience. (33) 
Brightman believes that In acts of will there is both 
necessity, "implied in the glvenness of the situation, the 
psychological mechanisms involved, and the necessary 
consequences of the act", and possibility, "The highest 
moral experience would consist of a continual choosing of 
the 'best' possibilities". (34) 
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The final requi rement for rational moral experience is that 
the experiencing self be a unity of consciousness, 
"Without the personal unity of a whole self, moral 
responsibility and moral development would be alike 
impossible." (35) 
Brightman asks how our moral experience is relevant to 
human life. He argues that relevance is found In the 
capacity of the experiencing consciousness (being a 
rational unity) to build up and formulate laws. Moral 
experience is thus universalized from particular Instances 
to universal meanings: 
The task of ethical science, then, Is to construct out 
of the data of experience, a coherent system of laws 
which does not lie In the mind ready for use, but 
which needs to be created by scientific thought. As 
In all cases of the progress of science, hypotheses 
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will need to be devised for the consistent 
understanding and control of experience. When by this 
method a system has been built, however tentatively, 
It becomes our moral Ideal and has a right to 
prescribe the direction of further development. (36) 
Brightman has already prepared the ground for this by 
saying: 
... the tendency to deny law and to reduce experience 
to a series of particular facts without universal 
meanings does not do Justice to actual human life. 
Embedded In all human consciousness, as far as our 
knowledge goes, there have been universal principles 
as well as particular facts. We do not seem to be 
able to experience without generalizing. (37) 
Such universalization will need examination and/or 
correction. The tool by which this scrutiny and amendment 
Is performed will be reason. He cites von Hartmann with 
approval: 
Reason Is the highest criterion which stands at the 
disposal of man, the highest subjective court. (38) 
Appealing to reason In this way Is not to adopt a special 
faculty which exists apart from experience, for "reason has 
no existence except In the actual conscious experience of 
reasonable persons". (39) Reason Brightman tells us Is a 
"special Ideal function of experience; the function which 
surveys, orders, unifies and systemizes." (40) 
Obligation. Ideals. Values 
For Brightman, obligation was the guiding norm behind 
ethical thought and moral action. Obligation, Brightman 
says, is "simply the acknowledgement that I ought to do 
this or that". (41) From where does obligation, or better, 
the consciousness of obligation arise? 
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Brightman outlines possible alternatives and, finding each 
wanting, discounts them and proceeds to that result he 
feels best attested by the evidence. Hence he rejects the 
view that the moral life Is a systematization of group 
customs. Obligation in this context arises from desire of 
"social approval and fear of social disapproval". (42) 
Whilst acknowledging that all moral obligation occurs in a 
social situation, and that we first learn obligation from 
others, this does not mean the source and meaning and 
validity of any obligation lies in custom and current 
social praxis. Whilst obligation may be learnt from others 
(Ii kewise mathematics and logic), we can say more than this 
regarding its ultimate cause and meaning. This, in due 
course, Brightman Intends to do. 
Law likewise is rejected as that which begets obligation. 
Whilst one might see as one's duty that one ought to obey 
law (i.e. "codified custom"), one might equally see one's 
duty to change the law or oppose unjust laws. Brightman 
concludes therefore, that law is contingent upon the prior 
application of obligation. 
Brightman rejects any conception of obligation which 
reduces It to "behaviour patterns". It is rather the case 
that consciousness of obligation should explain the 
behaviour, rather than vice versa. 
69 
Could 'desire' be the source of obligation? If this was 
the case Brightman tells us that, "'I ought' means only 'I 
desi re as my chief good' " . (43) He counters the suggestion 
that desire has primacy over obligation by restating his 
view that: 
No desi re, however long-lived or dominant, constitutes 
an obligation merely because of its existence as a 
desire ... Obligation is, in large part, a principle 
for organizing and judging desires; and conformity to 
obligation ought to be a dominant desire. (44) 
He also rejects any proposition which seeks to reduce the 
meaning and value of obligation to, perhaps, a 
psychoanalytic account of the way it operates. Brightman, 
though accepting there is a degree of plausibility in the 
psychoanalytic account, says that it "does not tell us very 
much about obligation beyond the fact that it performs a 
certain psychological function ". And again: 
Obligation may perform just the function that the 
psychoanalyst claims for it and stili be just the 
unique and si gnificant experience that our theory 
asserts it to be. Psychoanalysis may tell us 
something about some of the functions of obligation; 
it does not tell us anything about its validity. (45) 
Furthermore, Brightman finds wanting any definition of 
obligation which reduces it to a compound of other 
experiences such as feel ings of compulsion and activity and 
freedom. Any combination of these might be present without 
obligation being at all obvious: 
'I ought freely to compel myself', means something 
different from 'I do freely compel myself'. The 
former states my experience of obligation; The latter 
is what I feel when I carry out the obligation. (46) 
Brightman concludes that the experience of obligation 
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cannot be analysed away. Any attempt to reduce it falls 
down because that into which obligation has supposedly been 
reduced seems to presuppose obligation. 
Now, obligation is not merely feeling, or formalistic 
theory - it is also legislative. Thus the statement 'I 
ought' carries with it universalistic implications for 
bel ief and action: 
'I ought' means 'I approve the principle by which I am 
now acting as the principle by which all rationai 
beings everywhere ought always to act when piaced 
under ci rcumstances similar to mine'. (47) 
Morality is not merely compulsion and control; it is 
compulsion and control in the light of a principle 
acknowledged to be universally binding. (48) 
If obligation is a universally binding principle and is to 
be discerned in human experience Its presence must cohere 
with other factors of experience. Obligation must find its 
place in a rational account of experience. Like all 
experience it too must be bound by the laws of reason. 
Obligation cannot be irrational or non-rational for if it 
was either it would not be universalizable. How does 
obligation reveal itself? Brightman answers: 
The experience of obligation usually occurs in a 
complex to which we give the name of conscience. (49) 
The conscience (simply defined as the feeling that we ought 
to be following a given course of action in a given moral 
situation) which grasps something of the meaning of 
obligation must like all components of the ethical life be 
part of a rational whole. If conscience was not rational 
its dictates could not be trusted to lead to the moral 
life. 
A further question may now be considered: if obligation 
posits the injuction to realise the 'closest approximation 
to the ideal of personality in every situation' what is the 
nature of those ideals so realised? The word 'value' is 
inseparable from this discussion. Thus: 
A value is a type of personal life, a form of actual 
experience that satisfies through its conformity to 
some ideal. (50) 
Obligation, Brightman argues, "commands us to judge the 
real by the ideal, to make the ideal real"; obligation, 
"mediates between our ideal of personality and our life of 
real value". (51) If obligation here was a command to 
realise the impossible, its rational foundation would be 
destroyed. Hence, as taught by Kant, 'ought implies can': 
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The moral law presupposes freedom: obligation extends 
only to the limit of our ability in the situation in 
which we find ourselves. It is therefore not our 
obligation to attain the full ideal at once; but only 
to attain as much of it as we can and such aspects of 
It as are relevant to the situation. (52) 
Brightman asks, "Are ideals of fundamental importance in 
the universe?" He suggests that at first sight we might 
wish to answer 'no' - the presence of conflicting minds, 
conflict in nature, and conflict between each of these 
indicates a negative answer. But it is these very 
conflicts which Brightman claims are clues leading us to 
acknowledge the actuality of ideals. This is so because 
there is an "ideal of unity which commands us to seek what 
we do not have and the imperative claims of which no mind 
true to itself can wholly deny". (53) By way of a 
premature conclusion Brightman proposes: 
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That there are ideals is much more certain than what 
they are or ought to be: and that they conflict with 
each other is as certain as that they are. (54) 
From the foothold 'that ideals are' Brightman begins his 
investigation of 'what they are'. He admits his study will 
be incomplete (55), but feels his task will be sufficient 
if the problems are "defined and some suggestions offered 
towards possible solutions". In one location he speaks of 
the multiplicity of ideals, "Ideals are of many kinds -
high and low, spiritual and sensual, clear and vague, 
rational and irrational". (56) And as we seek ways by 
which ideals may discerned he writes, " ... as a 
generalized concept, an Ideal is visible only to thought. 
It cannot be perceived In sense experience". (57) Thus: 
When we say of any object that Is, In any sense, 
Ideal, we are measuring our present experience by a 
generalized concept, which thought alone can 
grasp. (58) 
In its lowest terms, every ideal is vision of some 
sort of possl ble whole of experience, some 
organisation of the life of mind. (59) 
This ideal will be such that its final fruition will never 
be complete, for according to Brightman, the Ideal of 
personal ity: 
... implies very clearly that the Ideal Is In process 
of development. Ideals could justly become static 
only when the life of thought and action had become 
static and the powers of creative Imagination had 
failed. This would be a stage of senility and 
approaching death. (60) 
Ideals, Brightman argues, are not passive but when involved 
in active processes work towards the unification of 
experience. They are Involved In the "organization of any 
series of experiences with reference to a purpose ... " (61) 
This should not be taken to mean that an Ideal "prescribes 
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a certai n fixed point as the stoppi ng place of action". 
Brightman argues we can never exhaust the content of the 
ideal of truth. No finite and limited human can ever 
encapsulate truth to the extent that no further seeking for 
it is required. This suggests the sociality of Ideals. 
The quest for truth cannot be done by the individualist: 
... the antisocial egoist could not have formed his 
pitiful ideal had he not been in contact with society. 
Even the lowest ideals must grow out of social soil 
and have some social reference. (62) 
In the selection of hi gher, or more worthy Ideals, 
"Reason", Brightman writes ..... calls us to see our minds 
and our world as a whole: and to approve as Ideal only 
those ends which are rational in the light of that vision". 
(63) This definition Brightman enlarges into a more 
normative form in keeping with the prescriptive role he 
ascri bes to ethics: 
An ideal is a general concept of a type of experience 
which we approve in relation to a complete view of all 
our experience, Including all our approvals, and which 
we acknowledge that we ought to realize. (64) 
But even with this much agreed, there is no logical 
necessity commanding all minds alike to realize the highest 
ideals, or even to care for these ideals. In other words, 
the ideal of good does not actually compel anyone to be 
good. For this reason Brightman states that the 
realization of ideals rests on freedom. Therefore, 
"without free acts in this sense, rational ideals can 
neither be formed nor appropriated nor realized". (65) 
Without this free choice one can never arrive at an 
understanding of truth or error, "true ideals are 
principles of what ought to be". (66) It is only in the 
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sense that ideals are sought by the rational person that 
they are necessary and binding on us. 
In his study of ideals Brightman discovers there are three 
classes of true ideals, each defined in terms of their 
relationship to the Imperative quality inherent In the 
nature of such ideals. Thus: 
i) The ought-to-be-and-must-be. 
ii) The ought-to-be-and-may-be. 
111) The ought-to-be-yet-cannot-be. 
With respect to (i), "these are the Ideals which a mind 
ought to obey and must obey If it is to function as a mind 
at all". (67) They are "the principles which compel us to 
recognise that the present datum is not all that there is 
... and that moral obligation is binding". (68) Concerning 
(ii) Brightman says, "These are such Ideals as should be 
obeyed and realized under certain conditions, yet are not 
essential to the very existence of orderly experience". 
(69) These ideals do not make experience possi ble, but 
rather regulate changes within. The thl rd class offered by 
Brightman may be defined: 
.. these ideals ought to be obeyed; the experiences 
which they describe ought to be sought, yet those 
experiences can never be fully realised. (70) 
Brightman notes a "curious relation" between (i) and (ii). 
There Is a sense in which any worthy Ideal when pursued can 
never be fully exhausted. The difference, Brightman 
suggests, is that the former Indicated actions which, in a 
given situation, will fulfil the imperatives of the ideal 
if carried out. In the latter the dictates of the ideal 
are less fully apprehended. This is the case with the 
ideal of perfection. Brightman tells us: 
If the mind is an active and creative process, if 
ideals are principles of its activity, the very 
conception of a completed perfection is a 
self-contradiction. (71) 
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Brightman quotes Tillich with approval to support his claim 
that in the moral realm the ought can never by fully 
brought about, "What ought to be realized goes absolutely 
beyond what is realized". (72) Brightman says: 
In fact, we cannot know that any act of ours is the 
best possible for us unless we have an ideal of 
something still better than what we are by which to 
measure our attainments and our relative progress. 
(73) 
In this sense Ideals are guides, or norms, or signposts. 
Now ideals can be said to have value in so far as they are 
instrumental in bringing about intrinsic value: 
A value is an actually realized Ideal or an Ideal In 
process of realization. It is the experience which 
exists when an ideal is acted on, is obeyed and 
conformed to. The ideal is the plan; the value is the 
construction in accordance with the plan. The ideal 
is the pattern; the value is the product which 
conforms to the pattern. (74) 
Whatever for its own sake we thus prize is called an 
intrinsic value; whatever is only a means to the 
attainment of intrinsic value is instrumental. (75) 
Brightman, we find, defines ideals as instrumental values: 
Ideals are, in a sense, means, or instrumental values, 
since they are guides for the production and testing 
of intrinsic values. An Ideal is the recipe, not 
the finished bread, or pie, or cake. It is the 
architect's plan, not the finished house. (76) 
For Brightman values form a system. The inter-relationship 
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of values with respect to their nature and meaning (such 
that each is seriously mutilated if It does not include 
within itself something of the nature of the others) leads 
Brightman to propose that values are mutually instrumental 
and intrinsic values are equally essential and dependent: 
An instrumental value can be instrumental only if, by 
anticipation, the intrinsic value to which It leads Is 
already present In it. (77) 
A claim to have realised an Ideal, or fulfilled an Ideal of 
what ought to be Brightman calls a 'value claim'; "the 
value of an experience or belief is not a guarantee of Its 
truth; but the values ... should be proved". (78) And 
also, "Anything, we may say, has apparent value If we enjoy 
or approve It, or find It precious or satisfying at the 
moment of experience". (79) Apparent values (which is not 
to say they are unreal) will be tested by what Is seen of 
them in their relationship to the widest interpretation of 
experience achievable. What seems apparent value might 
then become discerned as true value. 
We saw that liking and desire are not neceJarily the best 
1\ 
means for defining ethical truth. There needs to be a 
progression from that experience of value which Brightman 
calls 'apparent value' which might apply equally to the 
lowest bodily sensations as to the out-working of the 
highest moral endeavours, to the greatest ethical capacity 
of which anyone might be capable. He acknowledges that it 
is difficult to prescribe conditions under which true value 
can be found and asks, somewhat tentatively: 
is it not true that when we assert that any object 
is really valuable, we mean, first, that it not merely 
appears valuable at the moment but would appear so to 
an 'impartial observer' who took all truth into 
account; and, secondly, that it conforms to those 
ideal imperatives which the mind recognizes as laws 
constitutive of true val ue? (80) 
Thus: 
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A true value, as distinguished from a simple 
value-claim, would be what is liked, desired, or . 
approved in the light of our whole experience and our 
highest ideals, such as the logical ideal, the moral 
ideal, the aesthetic and religious ideals and the 
total ideal of personality. (81) 
When one value is destroyed, another will take Its place, 
"Man's pursuit of value is an ineradicable trait of his 
being ... " (82) 
In The Spiritual Life, discussing the criteria by which one 
might evaluate given experiences of value, Brightman 
proposed that: 
Mere desire, mere interest, can never of itself 
determine whether a value is worthy of being pursued. 
Hence we may call our primary desires value claims, 
and contrast them with the true values which are found 
in the life of lasting and rational value experience. 
(83) 
Ideals are objective in several senses. Equally they 
imply there is an objective basis for all true values. 
Brightman goes on: 
[Ideals] appeal to a universal reason and Judge our 
emotional value-claims by an objective standard. They 
prescribe that the values Indicated by a true ideal 
ought to exist ••• (84) 
It is on this foundation that Bri ghtman suggests there is 
an objective basis for all true values. Let us summarize 
this before moving on: 
An ideal is a concept defining a value. An ideal may 
be true or false on various grounds; It is true, in 
one sense, if it defines correctly the value 
experience it is intended to define, false if it 
defines is incorrectly. In another sense, it is true 
if the value defined is rationally verifiable or 
justifiable as being coherent. True ideals in this 
latter sense, are often called norms. (85) 
How relevant is the problem of value, how close is it to 
what might be called the 'heart of life'? Brightman 
answers: 
Of all the problems of philosophy none is closer to 
the heart of life than this [the problem of value]; 
indeed it is the very problem of the heart of life. If 
philosophy is to Justify itself as an interpretation 
of life, the theory of value ought to furnish results 
of the most illuminating and practical significance 
for the understanding and the guidance of human 
civilization. (86) 
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For this reason values need to be seen in their relation to 
the whole human life. In this matter they will form a 
system, coherent with the experience of persons. By a 
'system Bri ghtman meant something 'rich and concrete and 
living'. (87) In any such system where It is defined by 
him as a 'concrete organisation of the real', all the parts 
are "thoughtfully related, and directed toward planned 
ends". (88) 
Brightman concludes that when a value takes Its place In a 
coherent system, fulfilling the conditions of coherence, 
then It is treated as a true value. (89) Coherent norms 
can be developed as ideal for Judging experiences. 
Brightman argues that: 
If the truth did not conform to the Ideal of truth and 
also describe what is objectively real, It could not 
have genuine truth value. If art did not embody Ideal 
structures and meanings which minds can see to be 
coherent and harmonious, It would fail as art. And if 
the experient of natural beauty did not find In the 
objective world a source of joy-giving harmony, he 
would certainly not be speaking of the beauty of 
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nature. Hence there is an objective reference both in 
the beauty of nature and in the beauty of art. The 
religious experience of the holy is an attitude toward 
the objective source of value, tested by our highest 
ideals ... the good will, as plainly as the love of 
truth, beauty, and holiness must be subjected to ideal 
norms; it is an attitude toward every possi ble object 
of will in other persons and in nature; it is an 
aspiration to transform the given subjective 
experience into something more meaningful and better 
grounded in the objective structure of the world. (90) 
Thus values, though subjective, have worth because of their 
reference to an objective norm by which they are tested and 
have been discovered: 
It now appears that we have to say that values are 
subjective in their existence but objective in their 
origin and testing. If values are subjective, ideals 
are objective, and there is some sort of objective 
value-producing power. (91) 
This terminates our exegesis of Brightman's ethical theory. 
Material from this chapter will be used to substantiate our 
discussion and critique of Brightman's account of person 
and experience below. We are now In a postion to consider 
his metaphysics of reality. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BRIGHTMAN'S METAPHYSICS OF REALITY 
In this chapter, after a general introduction to the nature 
of categories, we shall consider time and cause, as 
particular categories which have prominent place in 
Brightman's metaphysics. A consideration of the category 
of substance will then be given. 
Categories 
How does Brightman define a category? 
Wherever ... we discover a state of affairs which is 
necessary to the very being of a universe of 
discourse, we may speak of that state of affairs as a 
category for that universe of discourse. This 
preliminary definition is not the usual one, nor is it 
to be taken as more than a preliminary suggestion. 
But it can easily be seen to fit concepts historically 
taken to be categories, such as time and cause. If 
time be denied, the universe of the discourse that we 
call a physical world of nature is denied. If cause 
be denied, only chaos remains, and there is no order 
of nature. Without either category, the pertinent 
universe of discourse ceases to be. (1) 
From this Brightman develops a more concise working 
definition: 
A category is a principle the denial of which would 
make the entire universe of discourse to which It 
applies either Impossl ble or fundamentally 
incoherent. (2) 
Brightman links this definition to his empirically based 
e pi stemolog y: 
A category ... is a principle that is empirical in its 
rootage, but necessary in Its reference to that 
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empi rical rootage. If you take away all experience 
you take away all categories, for the categories must 
refer to experience. Delete experience and sheer 
meaningless zero is the remainder. But if you take 
away knowledge of the categories, the fact of 
experience remains. Understanding of experience will 
have been lost; but as long as experience continues, 
the potentiality of reason remains and categories will 
be rediscovered. (3) 
Categories therefore are a priori in so far as they are, 
"essential to an empirical whole". (4) Brightman 
tentatively divides those categories which apply to all 
"possible realms of being" from those "that apply only to 
some limited or specific realm". Though full claslfication 
of the categories Is impossible ("Some new realm of being 
may be disclosed of which nothing is now known"), some 
categories can be singled out as more significant than 
others. Time is one. 
TIME Time, Brightman proposes, is, "the most fundamental 
category of all possible being". (5) For Brightman, time 
is "empi rically universal": 
Were there any being Independent of all experience, 
either it would endure or it would not endure. So far 
as we can tell, If it did not endure at all, it could 
not even be, and If it endured it would be temporal. 
(6) 
Time therefore pervades all experience, "time is essential 
to personality". (7) Even the experience of the mystic, 
though perhaps not conscious reflection upon time, takes 
place within a temporal continuum, "Thinking is a process 
of inquiry ... and it takes time". (8) Brightman expands 
this: 
Personality, society, physical processes, the 
evol ution of I ife, the emergence of novelties, the 
experience of creativity and of freedom are all 
examples of real duration In which experiences of 
identity of meaning and of being are united 
organically and Inseparably with experience of 
change. (9) 
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For our universe therefore, "time is Ineradicable ..... "the 
universe Is a history or a series of histories". If we 
deny time, we "deny experience itself". (10) Brightman 
again: 
A universal temporalism such as is Implicit in the 
category of time strongly suggests a universal 
personalistic Idealism, that Is, that whatever is real 
Is constituted by enduring unities of experience. To 
say that time Is objective is to say that there is 
time order in the universe beyond every human 
experience. But to go so far as to assert that this 
time order Is beyond every possible experience, as 
some realists do, is to Invite serious difficulty. 
A time independent of all possible experience Is not 
only In principle unverifiable; it stands in no 
coherent relation to actual time experience. (11) 
Two features of the temporal process are 'permanence' and 
'change', "Experience requires us to acknowledge both 
permanence and change as inherent In all knowledge and all 
being". (12) 
Whilst it Is true "that change Is not literally in time, if 
time be viewed as something Independent of change, in which 
change occurs ..... nevertheless ••• "change Is by its very 
nature a temporal event; change and time are Inseparably 
involved in each other". This is not to say that time can 
be derived from change, for "where change is, there is 
already time". (13) 
Brightman, in addition to these considerations, notes a 
close relationship between human purposing as willing and 
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temporal change. He states that "no experience Is entirely 
<O"- .... d ia t-id"'-
devoid of purposive .. 'M .... or striving". (14) And 
again: 
... all purposes are temporal - applying either to 
finite stretches of time, like an architect's 
blueprint for a house, or else to all times like the 
Ideal of rationality. (15) 
The passage of time is a "real duration composed of many 
pasts-presents-futures". Brightman says: 
When one grasps a time-span In a shining present, the 
situation Is one of pure Immanence. But when one 
'remembers' a past shining present, that Is, what was 
once 'my' present experience, the situation Is a 
reference from what Is now present to what Is not now 
present - that Is, to an Illuminating absent, a 
sltuatlon-belleved-In. (16) 
Each temporal Instant Is transcended by the experience of a 
passage In time. Memory II kewlse Is a transcending of any 
given shining present by a recalling of past shining 
presents. This Is not to say that the past Is made present 
but rather that the mind has a capacity for objective 
reference to other times. The self who experiences all 
these features is a "unity of all ... past (remembered) and 
future (anticipated) shining presents". (17) 
Important for an understanding of Brightman Is a grasp of 
what he means by the term 'eternal'. His treatment of the 
way Borden Parker Bowne viewed the relationship between 
time and eternity is very revealing. 
Brightman tells us "there is a marked antl-temporal/stlc 
trend In Bowne's personalism". This, he continued, was 
influenced by the, "strong eternal/sic tradition In 
philosophy and religion". (18) Bowne assigned only a 
phenomenal reality to time, Brightman differed, ascribing 
time a "personal ontological reality", (19) 
Brightman notes that "Bowne's timeless ontological reality 
is sister under the skin to Kierkegaard's 'absolute 
qualitative difference between time and eternity''', (20) 
Brightman's belief Is that eternal Ism when defined this 
way, "saps the foundations of activity", It seems that 
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what Bowne means by eternal, Brightman means by timeless, 
Timeless "usually means lacking all properties of or 
relations to time; but it may be stretched to mean 
unaffected by the passage of time", (21) 
From what has been said we must recognize that for 
Brightman, if anything Is devoid of temporality It cannot 
exist, If, therefore, the eternal Is defined as having no 
temporal relations that to which It refers will on 
Brightman's terms have no existence either. If the eternal 
is timeless, for Brightman it is nothing, Brightman's aim 
is to redefine eternity (qv, the 'eternal') as 'eternally 
temporai', He argues that the "eternal must be a function 
of time". (22) 
To say that one day there will be an end to time, Brightman 
argues, is to argue that time has the potency to cause Its 
own end, to bring about non-temporality (i.e. nothing). 
Similarly It follows that for Brightman the conception of a 
creation out of nothing is meaningless and without 
empirical foundation, Brightman substitutes the formula, 
'Ex nlhilo - nihil fit'. To support his case for unbegun 
temporal process he cites Melissus of Samos with favour: 
... if (the eternal) had come into being, it needs 
must have been nothing before it came into being. 
Now, if It were nothing, in no wise could anything 
have arisen out of nothing. (23) 
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The alternative, "is to try to think the unthinkable - an 
unbegun, nontemporal eternity Initiating a temporal series 
and still remaining nontemporal". (24) The eternity of 
time, I.e. the eternal continuity of time, may be affirmed 
in accordance with a coherent picture of our experience, 
"since a real begining would mean an effect without a 
cause, and a real end would mean a cause without an 
effect". (25) 
The eternal therefore is not non-temporal, or time-less but 
rather, 'omnitemporal', or 'trans-temporal'. For the 
reasons given above it Is false to argue for the 
timelessness of God. God, if he exists, "must be real 
duration". (26) Likewise God cannot be unchanging; "does 
the supposedly unchanging not change the moment It produces 
time?" (27) 
CAUSE Along with time Brightman contends that empirical 
analysis Indicates another category, "common to all shining 
presents". This is 'cause', "a label for a wide variety of 
important problems - a variety, nevertheless, connected by 
a thread of unity". (28) For Brightman, science defines 
cause as: 
... an event or condition of a certain sort that is 
al ways followed or accompanied by another event or 
condition of a certain sort known as the effect. 
Briefly stated, 'empirical' or 'phenomenal' causation 
as it is called, means uniform sequence. The 
mechanistic world-view, with all its implications, is 
an extension of the law of cause and effect. (29) 
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Consistent with already familiar statements, the sole data 
for any theory of causation "must be found in the shining 
present". (30) As might be expected of Brightman he goes 
on to say that the "cause of any shining present in human 
experience must, at least partly, lie beyond that present 
and therefore be an 'absent'''. (31) Whatever theory of 
CCltA Sa { 
cause one adopts an examination of any c._ situation 
must i ncl ude: 
... an analysis of its parts both 'material' and 
'formal', an analysis of Its antecedents, a selection 
of Its uniform antecedents, search for Its consequents 
and its 'goal' or 'end' (if any), inquiry into the 
nature of the power or energy at work in it. (32) 
A casual law must have at least two traits If it Is to be a 
valid principle of casual sequence. For example, it must 
be based on "empirical observation of fact and be 
formulated so as to permit verification". (33) 
Observation of the uniformity of sequence of sensory 
phenomena suggests that phenomenal cause is most generally 
recognized and is relatively simple. (34) Even though 
related to sensory data and necessary to the universe of 
phenomenal discourse, phenomenal cause does not yield the 
fullest possible philosophical Interpretation of causality. 
A further aspect of cause not included in a purely 
phenomenal account is that of 'activity'. By 'activity' 
Brightman means "the initiation and control of change". 
Such activities are choosing, deciding, purposing and 
controlling. (35) When one talks about change one is led 
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to ask what changes; and when one talks about activity one 
implies an agent who causes change: 
Change presupposes something permanent and Identical 
with reference to which the change can be understood. 
We cannot avoid the question, What changes? And when 
we speak of activity, we presuppose an agent. (36) 
Brightman's definition of activity equates It with 
"efficiency", perhaps better expressed as, "efficient 
cause". (37) Change is observable, whereas efficient cause 
is not. Efficient cause is present in an immediacy of 
experience rather than In a realm of observation: 
Wherever there Is voluntary, concentrated attention In 
the shining present, efficient cause Is actually 
present In Its Immediacy. The experience of voluntary 
choice Is unique. It Is not sensation or merely given 
content of any kind. It Is an ultimate form of 
creativity In that no given content can compel It to 
be, and no given content can prevent It from being -
save such content as would Inhibit the normal powers 
of the shining present. Efficient cause, then, Is 
actually experienced with what we commonly call free 
acts. These acts do not occur as uniform consequents 
of sensory sequences, although they have uniform 
consequents. A truly efficient cause, then, Is a 
choice among posslbilltes given by the rest of the 
universe. (38) 
For Brightman the presence of choice In the universe 
suggests an active agency who has the capacity to 
Instantiate the range of possibilities from which the 
choice might be made: 
The order of sensory phenomena Is an order which human 
wills must discover, reSist, control, or use; human 
wills do not Invent It. The discovery of this order 
Is the sign of an efficient cause other than human 
will. (39) 
In Moral Laws Brightman writes: 
There must be something which originates change. The 
mechanistic assumption Is that this something Is 
always ultimately external to the present situation; 
while the freedomlst assumption Is that In cases of 
choice it is ultimately internal to the situation. 
(40) 
Referring to mechanical causality (what he calls 
'phenomenal causality' in Person and Reality) Brightman 
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says, "given certain antecedents, certain consequents will 
follow". (41) It is the case that we view this type of 
causality as universally valid. This 'universal causation' 
is easily Identified In cases where mechanistic laws can be 
applied or verified. (42) 
Such considerations cannot be applied to situations 
involving efficient cause, i.e. choice and selection. 
Brightman offers two defects of the solely mechanistic 
approach. The first is the "tautologous" nature of 
mechanical causation which explains "the present 
combination of existing elements In any state of affairs by 
the fact that it followed a previous but different, 
combination of these same elements". (43) And secondly, 
mechanical causation makes 'novelty' inexplicable. 
Brightman argues it is not possible to account for 
'emergent evolution' by novei combinations of elements. If 
it could then Brightman would describe the occasion as 
"utterly magical" and "sheer miracle". 
Free purposive choice, however, may be cited as the 
"desired type of causation". Brightman tells us that 
"Freedomism does not hold to uncaused events, but to events 
non-mechanically caused". (44) The notion that choice Is a 
causal agent attests that It contains within Itself "the 
power of choice instead of being determined by what Is 
external to it". (45) I can find within myself the 
capacity to effect change through my purposeful effort. 
+1.,." t w'1.; I.e. 
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Whilst Brightman would agreel\the field from which I choose 
is determined my ability to choose is free. This he would 
argue to be the case even though I might be the victim of 
coercion or of 'circumstances beyond my control'. (46) 
Since freedom Is not wholly "a function of the 
circumstances " , It may be proposed as that which "accounts 
for the factor of novelty I n the development of character 
as determinism cannot". (47) By this means Brightman 
affirms the uniqueness of each moral situation, "an act of 
choice finds the person somewhat different from what he was 
when he previously made a similar choice". The Importance 
of these issues in Brightman's metaphysics should not 
minimized. The relationship of mechanism and teleology is 
the 'most crucial problem' of metaphysics, (48) The 
teleological principle is the articulated outworking of 
free selection, or synonymously, choice, The choosing of 
moral ideals and attempting to realize them Is the desire 
for a more worthy telos to human living. 
Cause arises In Brightman's thought for, "It Is an account 
of change, If everythl ng were changeless, there would be 
no need for a theory of cause", (49) The essence of all 
questioning about causality is the search for a "sufficient 
reason" or reasons why cause should be as It Is and not 
otherwise. The search for this is the need for, "a 
complete and coherent account of what is essential to Its 
being", (50) Thus, "It must Include the necessary and the 
contingent, the novel as well as the familiar", (51) 
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In nature Brightman sees the constituents of conscious 
life. Causal activity in nature is seen as the active will 
of a Supreme Cosmic Experient. Mechanical causality in 
nature is therefore more than can be explained by 
phenomenal factors alone. There needs to be reference to 
will. In describing what he means by this he seems at the 
very least to be courting criticism of his position. 
Brightman draws an analogy from personal volitional will 
and its effect, to cause and effect In nature as the 
operative activity of the Divine Will. He is opening up a 
novel, though not necessarily original universe of 
discourse on causality. Can we use 'efficient cause' as 
predicatlve both of divine and human cause? For Brightman 
the answer is in the affirmative. 
Efficient cause, as the Divine Will, operates in the 
illuminating absent. Its activity is known by analogy from 
our experience of the way our own will effects change in 
the illuminating absent. The difference between phenomenal 
(i.e. mechanical) and efficient (volitional) causality is 
that volition contains the decisive causal factor within 
itself in the power of choice instead of being determined 
by what is external to it. (52) The identification of 
efficient cause with volition leads Sri ghtman to the thesis 
that every efficient cause is also a final cause: 
Having seen that efficient cause is agency, we must 
now note that agency involves choice and purpose. 
Choice and purpose require conscious reference to an 
end chosen or purposed, and this is precisely what is 
meant by final cause ... DeCision, acts of control, 
freedom, are all examples of final causes in the 
shining present, and empirical models of efficient 
final causes in the illuminating absent. (53) 
In due course we will discuss further the implications of 
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Brightman's view of cause. We will look at the way the 
person who wills relates to the activity of his body, and 
look critically at the relationship which Brightman 
perceived between them. We will then rework Brightman's 
account of the relationshi p between them. 
For the momentJ however, a study of the category of 
substance is necessary. Substance is "the most perplexing 
of all" categories. (54) The Importance of a thorough 
understanding of Brightman's account of substance will 
become obvious in due course. Analysis of it in later 
chapters wi II constitute one cornerstone of our critique of 
Brightman. In what follows now, Brightman's own treatment 
of the category in Person and Reality, will be followed. 
SUBSTANCE Li ke all other categories Brightman sees the 
category of su bstance as a "function of the search for 
empi rical coherence". (55) In answer to the question, 'how 
does substance function in experience?' Brightman replies 
that "It is to correlate enduring permanence with change". 
(56) Each without the other is false to our total 
experience. 
As a concept substance is "bare and empty". (57) The 
person's search for permanence in experience requires that 
this permanence be rationally ordered (Brightman uses the 
word 'logical'). Permanence also requires to be causal. 
'Causal efficiency' in turn, presupposes a time-span in 
which the cause-effect sequence can take piace, "Substance 
is inseparably related to continuity; in fact, it is causal 
92 
continuity", (58) 
He recognises that within my experience are 
discontinuities; sleep, unconsciousness, unrelated sounds 
and smells and sights, disconnected thoughts of ambition, 
love, preference, memory and so on, If these were all the 
data we had in our experience, "experience would be chaos", 
(59) Brightman's proposition is that these discontinuities 
"exist as members of a continuous whole of experience", 
The fact that we know these discontinuities Is a feature of 
a coherently structured mind, ..... knowledge of 
discontinuity requires a continuous, reasoning self". (60) 
He offers a passing summary, "The union of continuity and 
discontinuity is what the mind is looking for when It seeks 
for the meaning of substance". (61) 
The same is true of the illuminating absent. There is 
discontinuity and there is continuity. But the former is 
understandable only in terms of the latter. When the 
illuminating absent is compared to our own shining present 
Brightman concludes that "we are able to think a world 
which is more coherent and thus more intelligible than our 
shining present taken as it appears". (62) He also offers 
discrete hints In his narrative of the theistic pOSition 
towards which he is working: 
The 'other' substance beyond the shining present 
'must' be some sort of causal agency more continuous 
than our shining presents are. 
Brightman is not arguing for absolute continuity in the 
illuminating absent, compared to the shining present. 
Rather he is comparing the two and finding 'far more' 
continuity in the illuminating absent. The continuity 
of the Illuminating absent must be such as for example, 
"provides for and includes the major discontinuities 
between private persons (shining presents) and the 
continuities of communication and Interaction between 
them". (63) Brightman summarises his task: 
... the Investigation of substance ... would suggest 
what may be called an organic Interactive pluralism as 
a reasonable metaphysical hypothesis, a pluralism In 
which continuity and discontinuity are related after 
the model of actual experience. Self-experience thus 
becomes the key to all substance. (64) 
This in turn leads Into a working definition: 
Substance ... may be defined as an Interacting system 
of relatively Independent substances (for even God 
cannot be wholly Independent of his creatures). But 
if relative substances exist, as our shining presents 
do, then ... (a) the universe Is not one substance and 
(b) that It is a plurality of many Interacting 
substances, which, because they need to Interact In 
order to exist, do not constitute a sheer plurality 
but form some sort of Interpenetrating organic 
plurality. (65) 
The Implications behind this quotation will be drawn out 
more fully later. For the moment we must examine what 
Brightman means by substance as efficient cause. Given 
his understanding of substance In an Interactive universe 
It Is no surprise to find Brightman linking substance to 
activity; "the substances of an Interacting world must, 
then, be active". (66) Whatever Is not active Is found by 
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abstraction from a world the norm of which Is activity. In 
the mind Is activity. It Is the activity of volitional 
will. And he expands on this: 
Substance, then, is efficient cause, Is activity, Is 
volition (plus whatever given and Inactive content Is 
revealed by experience) ... volition does not occur as 
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bare activity but as the act of choice and spontaneous 
initiative of a complex unity of consciousness which 
includes the active choice, the effects of the other 
efficient causes acting on it, and the given 
experiences of rationai validity and brute fact 
content of sensation and related experiences. (67) 
Substance for Brightman Is the hallmark of his idealism. 
It is not separate from experience. All substance is 
related to personal experience In some way; what is absent 
from one's own experience is present to some other's. 
Substance, ..... stands revealed In experience as 
active-passive personal unity of consciousness. It is 
experienced efficient cause." (68) 
Brightman defends the view that that substance which 
constitutes an Illuminating absent for me, is a shining 
present for an other; maybe another human person, maybe 
GOd. When he offers this position (see especially 'Kinds 
of Substance' in Persons and Reality, pp.186 - 190) his 
argument is difficult and is heavily overlaid with a 
concern for countering the arguments of his opponents. 
Nevertheless, however awkward his argument, the conclusion 
he arrives at is clear: substance is unitary. Thus: 
... personalism Is the assertion that there are not 
two kinds of substance - one present in, and one 
absent from conscious experience. The distinction is 
epistemlc, not ontlc or metaphysical ... for 
personalists, what is absent from my experience is 
present, actually or potentially, in other experience. 
The absent is always other experience ... All 
substance, then, is some shining present, although 
shining presents are absent from each other. (69) 
Challenging this forceful conclusion will not be easy. 
This Is particularly so as Brightman sets up possible 
objections to his stance and tilts at them with somewhat 
hasty, but relentless vigour. In due course, our own 
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argument will show, not so much that Brightman was wrong in 
what he said, as Insufficiently empirical. 
Postscript 
This chapter has brought together several themes and areas 
of thought from Brlghtmans work. Certain of these received 
greater treatment In his works than others - time for 
example. The category of substance, though Incipient In 
the early Brightman, did not receive extensive treatment 
until its appearance in the posthumous magnum opus, Person 
and Reality. Though the manuscript of this book which 
Brightman left at his death was a well-developed fledgling 
(only minor editorial redaction appears In the published 
text) those chapters on substance would have fared better 
had Brightman had comment from his critics prior to 
publication. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
NATURE, PERSONS AND GOD 
This chapter will examine the relationship presented In 
Brightman's philosophy between each aspect of the triad, 
Nature, Persons and God. It will be divided Into three 
sections, the first of which will have three subdivisions. 
(a) Nature and Persons 
i) Physical nature and the knowing person 
Ii) Mind and Body 
ill) Brightman In Context 
(b) God and Nature 
(c) God and Persons 
(a) Nature and Persons 
I) Physical nature and the knowing person 
In A Philosophy of Ideals Brightman asks the question 
which this section will seek to answer: 
We undertake, therefore, to face the problem, What do 
I mean when I perceive and describe nature? And, 
Inseparably connected with It, the other problem, What 
Is the place of mind In nature? (1) 
This task Is "the theme of the greatest philosophers" and 
concerns the relation between "physical nature and 
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psychical nature". (2) Brightman's own approach to the 
problem was that "all sound philosophy" should somehow, 
"transcend the differences between the physical and the 
psychical and thus ... work toward a unified view of the 
world". (3) 
Brlghtmanian first principles argue that the only Immediate 
datum we possess Is our present consciousness; all else is 
mediated - Including our knowledge of nature. Thus 
knowledge of nature comprises reasoned and reasonable 
Insights and hypotheses based upon the Interaction between 
our present experience (remembered, actual and anticipated) 
and nature as the object of our experience. The 
distinction made between present consciousness and nature 
Is eplstemlc, not valuative. Nature, viewed In this way, 
is not accorded an Inferior status, subordinate to that of 
mind. 
In the discussion below we shall consider two Important 
but compact, essays by Brightman; 'Do we Have 
Knowledge-by-Acqualntance of the Self?' and 'The Self, 
Given and Implied'. (4) In these he reflects on the 
relationship between experience and Its object, between 
knower and known. Their relevance to this dissertation 
will become evident. 
In the first essay Brightman defines 'acquaintance' as 
direct experience. So, following his epistemological 
bifurcation of knowledge and experience there can be no 
"knowledge-by-acqualntance of anything". (5) It Is a 
"first principle of Idealism that direct experience Is not 
knowledge ... direct experience is 'innocent', or 
'problematic'''. (6) Interpretation of, and reflection 
about this 'innocent' or 'problematic' experience (i.e. 
acquaintance) will establish, "its status as a self, and 
correiate evidence with reasoning in such wise as to 
produce knowledge". (7) 
Thus, when one reflects on an object, at the moment of 
reflection the object is not "given" In experience, but Is 
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present to experience. The "given" Is always a "conscious 
experience", not the object of the experience. This 
Influences the way I view my relationship with my body: 
The physiological organism, on this view, Is not the 
self nor any part of the self. It Is rather, a 
constant environment which causes and Interracts with 
the self. (8) 
And he goes on: 
The self, then, is not its body or Its objects, 
except that the self, In knowing Itself, may become 
Its own object; or, more exactly, one moment of the 
self may become object to another. (9) 
As Indicated In Chapter Two Brightman Is saying that If the 
cause of our experience Is in our experience then there Is 
no logical reason for making any distinction whatever 
between our own self and nature. It is Brightman's view 
that epistemological analysis of experiencing and knowing 
posits a dualism between the two. They therefore are 
distinct In that the known is not in the experience of the 
knower. But this is a view that we shall have to 
challenge. This challenge will be made by asserting that 
within the human person are essentially two components mind 
(what may be also called experience or consciousness) and 
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body. We shall argue that the body is so closely united 
with this person that it is more empirically sound to see 
the bod y as a part of that person. Further we shall show 
that, even accepting this, one is not thereby committed to 
the sort of absolutism against which Brightman so 
forcefu II y con ten d ed. 
The essay, 'The Self, Given and Implied - A Discussion' was 
a response to another paper by D.C. Williams, 'The 
Innocence of the Given', Brightman continually maintained 
that "the given, as given is never known .. , the given is 
truly 'i nnocent'." (10) 
Brightman goes on to present the finely balanced point that 
"givenness will constitute not only a knowledge, but at the 
same time a datum which a knowledge is about", (11) 
Brightman's explanation of this is that, "the given may be 
" 
known; but the knowing is not the known - Lloyd Morgan's 
experiencing is not the experienced". (12) It is in this 
sense that "Given experience ... is just what It is, 
namely, acquaintance, even though it be acquaintance with a 
knowing process, The meaning of the verb 'to know' can 
never be wholly present in the given", (13) He continues, 
referring to the given, "it is always in some sense a 
reference to or a description of something which is not now 
given", Brightman outlines four "personalistic truths" 
which delineate his position: 
(1) If a thing is known by a self, it does not need to 
be a present ingredient of that self. (2) If a thing 
is not a present ingredient of a self, It may 
nevertheless be known. (3) If a thing Is a present 
ingredient of a self, it may be felt or willed without 
being known, provided the word 'known' Is not a loose 
equivalent for 'bel ng an ingredient of present 
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awareness'. Not all awareness is knowledge. (4) 
Even though a thing is not known, in the sense of 
being described or understood, it may, notwithstanding 
its being unk~wn, be a present ingredient of conscious 
experience; there may be acquaintance without 
knowledge by description. (14) 
In this essay Brightman discusses his differences and 
agreements with Professor Williams and whilst their 
dialogue is of no particular significance for the present 
essay, Brightman's own conclusion with respect to the 
position he held is relevant for us: 
I reject the proposition that acquaintance with my 
given self is knowledge of that self, for knowledge is 
description and is mediation (sic), dualistic in 
structure. (15) 
So far, we have focussed upon Brightman's epistemology; his 
account of the knowing process and the distinction between 
knower and known. What did he have to say about the 
knower, the person? 
Brightman's most complete definition of personality ("or 
person or personal self") appears in Nature and Values. 
(16) It indicates the sort of relationship between person 
and nature which by now one might expect: 
A personality is a complex but self-identifying, 
active, selective, feeling, sensing, developing 
experience, which remembers Its past (In part), plans 
for its future, interacts with its subconscious 
processes, its bodily organism, and its natural and 
social environment, and is able to Judge and guide 
itself and its objects by rational and ideal 
standards. (17) 
The interaction of nature upon the person is Indicated, 
though not actually described or defined: 
The body, in turn, is acted on by the whole natural 
envi ronment which thus affects the person at every 
moment, and other persons ... act on the Individual 
through events in nature and (perhaps) through 
telepathy. (18) 
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Brightman says that nature Is, "believed to exist because 
persons trust their sensory experiences as disclosing a 
physical world". (19) In this same context Brightman adds 
the puzzling statement that "the world of personality Is a 
larger world than the world of nature". (20) By larger 
Brightman does not mean 'greater In power' or 'older' or 
'greater in space'. Rather he feels one should understand 
'larger' in the following 'special sense': 
.•. personality may In a sense be said to be spatially 
'larger' than nature, for Ideally a person might 
comprehend In his knowledge all the space of nature 
and Infinite Imaginary or geometrical spaces ••• 
Personality Is larger than nature In the sense that It 
Is more comprehensive. It covers a wider and broader 
scope. (21) 
Seen conversely "Nature is a limited realm based on selected 
evidence". Brightman summarises: 
The real world must Include nature and be larger than 
nature. It must Include all of the personal world, 
and all that is necessary to explain and understand 
It. (22) 
We are now in a position to examine the way Brightman looks 
at the mind-body problem. This will serve the dual purpose 
of bringing together a number of 'loose threads' from 
earlier chapters as well as advancing the course of the 
present chapter and preparing the ground for the more 
critical chapters below. We shall also consider other 
authors with similar concerns to Brightman so that we might 
more easily place him In context. As we shall see these 
other authors were not led to the same concl uslons as he. 
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ii) The Mind-Body Problem 
For Brightman the reciprocal influence between mind and 
body is axiomatic (23). But how might their interaction be 
explained? Brightman accepts that some find It easy to 
"identify a person with his body, and psychologists find it 
useful to deal with the (so-called) psychophysical 
organism". (24) Whilst Brightman does not underestimate 
the value of psychological or other scientific insight into 
the nature of personality he claims that the philosopher 
has to probe, "deeper than popular thought or scientific 
convenience". (25) 
It is the case however, that even though psychology deals 
with the nature of personality more explicitly than many 
(or most) sciences Its task and results will still be 
different to those of the philosopher upon the same 
subject. (26) The difference between the two lies in the 
all-encompassing, synoptic remit of the philosopher. 
Philosophy, "criticizes, unifies, and supplements science". 
(27) 
Brightman's approach to the mind/body problem Is a 
philosophical study with which, if the study is sound, the 
more limited results of scientific investigation should 
cohere. Such a result will show that the philosophical 
search has been synoptic in Its method, and also that there 
is no disparity between particular fields of research and 
the universal approach of philosophy. 
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Firstly then, we have seen that Brightman contends that 
mind and body Interact. Since this seems obviously the 
case why not say the two are one? Brightman rejects this 
su 9 gestion. He mal ntal ns: 
To Identify the mind with the body is as unreasonable 
as it would be to say that the refreshment we feel on 
drinking cold water Is actually nothing but cold 
water. (28) 
Brightman uses this illustration to demonstrate how a cause 
cannot be Identified with its effect: 
If we are to Insist that the causes which are 
essential to the existence of personality are all a 
part of It, then the body, the subconscious, the air 
we breathe, the life giving sun, In fact, the whole of 
nature, must be parts of every person, and every 
person is ali bodies, all minds, all things. (29) 
To avoid the absorption of mind Into body and vice versa we 
must "take our personality to be Just what we experience it 
to be" - namely our own personal consciousness. 
Furthermore one can "reasonably Infer the Interaction of 
personality with its surrounding world of body and nature 
and God, as well as their Interdependence". (30) Thus one 
concludes that Brightman when speaking of a self or a 
person, does not refer to the physical aspects of that self 
or person vlsl ble to the observer, "the physiological 
organism is not the self nor a part of It": 
••. quite literally the self has a body, but It Is not 
a body, not even In part. (31) 
Brightman admits that the self sometimes causes and is 
caused by bodily processes, "but the self Is no part or 
process of the body, and no part or process of the self Is 
the body". Brightman offers similar considerations with 
regard to the subconscious and the person. He hesitates 
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to .. regard the subconscious as the identical with himself 
or even as part of himself". (32) And he says that though 
the subconscious (like the body) may well interact with the 
self: 
.•. by definition the subconscious is 'sub', and so is 
excl uded from the unity of my consciousness and 
therefore from myself. It seems most reasonable to 
regard the subconscious as a complex of relatively 
transient or relatively permanent other selves which 
are related to the normal self by interaction, without 
being part of it. 
He argues therefore that: 
Whatever is or can be (directly or indirectly) 
remembered to be part of the unity of consciousness is 
a part of me. Whatever does not and cannot fall 
within the unity of my consciousness is no part of me. 
(33) 
Brightman tells us that in recent times there have been 
three main approaches to resolve the mind/body problem. 
These are 'the illusory power of the hyphen', 'The 
physical analogy', and 'The biological analogy'. 
By the fi rst of these Bri ghtman means that a relation 
previously not understood (In this case the mind/body 
problem) is not resolved by linking the two terms with a 
hyphen. Whilst such an approach recognizes the spatiality 
of the one and the non-spatiality of the other, rather than 
resolve the problem the hyphen ci rcumnavi gates it. 
Afterwards the problem still remains. The hyphenated pair 
'psycho-physical' is as much in need of explanation as the 
hyphen in 'mind-body'. (34) 
Brightman is similarly brief (perhaps curt) in his 
treatment of the behaviourists. He argues that they employ 
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an "illusory physical analogy" to say that "consciousness 
is to the body as roiling Is to a ball". (35) He considers 
the behavlourists' position an improvement over the 
psycho-physicalists (wrongly, I suggest) on the grounds 
that the behavlourlst at least "recognizes the contrast 
between spirit and matter". But behaviourism errs "by 
denying the existence of spirit". A similar approach is 
made with respect to the biological analogy: 
It Is employed by those who assert that a spirit Is 
related to a body as a flower is to a plant; it is 
its outgrowth and function. (36) 
Whilst the biological analogy has, he claims, the advantage 
of "suggesting the unity of evolutionary process" it also 
suggests that both body and mind are physical. This, for 
Brightman, is where the analogy falls down. Whilst there 
is physical, chemical and biological exchange between plant 
and flower, no such interchange exists between matter and 
spirit. In Person and Reality Brightman adds linguistic 
confusion as a further cause of misunderstanding In the 
mind/body problem: 
Nor should It be forgotten that the ordinary use of 
words involves utter confusion between the shining 
present and the illuminating absent - as evidenced In 
the frequent identification of mind and brain, when 
actually brain Is always a situation-believed-In and 
mind a situation-experienced. (37) 
To those who believe 'mind Is brain, for brain causes mind' 
Brightman says that "Never does a human being find any 
brain in his mind". To put this at Its most stark, 
Brightman Is saying that the Identification of mind with 
, 
brain would be tenable on the "a priori empirical" 
principle that an effect is always Identical with its 
cause. (38) Brightman adds a footnote: 
That effect has to stand In some sort of common 
system with cause, ontologlcally, does not entail the 
Identity of effect with cause, for then the child 
would be Its parents. (39) 
Bri ghtman frequently uses this style of parody of an 
opposing position in order to bolster his own case. 
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Regrettably and too often, this seems more like political 
polemic than constructive critique based on secure 
philosophical analysis. 
Where has this discussion taken us? Once more It Is found 
that we are left with Bri ghtman's trenchant dualism of mind 
and body. This dualism seems unavoidable for him given his 
phenomenology of mind (as person, experlent, 
consciousness). In due course we shall see that this 
position forms the basis of a metaphysic about which we 
shall have some considerable reservations. Our critique 
will focus upon his definition of person and see whether It 
Is . adequate. 
iii) Brightman In Context 
At this point a detour will help us locate Brightman In the 
Intellectual milieu In which he wrote. This is not 
intended to detract from our exegesis of Brightman but to 
Illuminate it by comparison with others who worked with 
similar problems to those he Identified. 
H. H. Price Is well known and highly respected for his work 
on the existence of other minds. Price has one very 
important essay (40) which makes comparison between him and 
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Brightman extremely revealing. A brief look at this essay 
will help us see Brightman in sharper relief and will 
enable us to Identify other Issues that Brightman had not 
taken into account In his own analysis. 
Price descrl bes what he calls the 'analogical argument' for 
other minds. This can be stated simply. I observe others' 
bodies. Generally speaking, they resemble my own In most 
If not all respects. I conclude by analogy, that since my 
own body is animated by my own mind, others bodies are 
similarly animated by their minds. Crudely put, this Is 
the view that Brightman held. Price however considers that 
this view has been abandoned as a result of a "good deal of 
criticism". He describes the Intuitive Theory of other 
minds. Advocates of this theory claim one can have 
'extrospectlve' experiences of other minds, a direct 
experience of another's experience. This might constitute 
a primacy of experience of another's mind prior to 
experience of one's own mind, or perhaps a social 
consciousness In which a 'we-experience' Is primary and the 
distinguishing of this Into my experiences and your 
experiences derivative. Price accepts some Insight Into 
the minds of others Is possible (he calls this 
'extrospectlve acquaintance'). Arguments for It may be 
plausible but not conclusive. However we know In some 
circumstances what Is In another's mind and therefore that 
such acquaintance requires explanation. 
Obviously Price Is at variance with Brightman on this 
point. The latter's own extreme dualism of mind and body 
forbids him to go down the path Price treads. Price's own 
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Justification of extrospective acquaintance Is "derived 
primarily from the understanding of language". (41) The 
word 'language' is understood broadly and 'communication-
-situations' offer evidence for other minds. A 
communication-situation descrl bes that occu~ence when 
another's utterance about a state of affal rs possesses a 
symbolic value for me with regard to that state of affairs. 
I hear what is said, understand its symbolic value, and 
then would normally seek to verify what has been said. If 
the other's statement Is correct according to my own 
observations and if such occu(ences repeat with respect to 
other situations with similar verification I reasonably 
posit they have a mind Ii ke my own. Thus far Price's 
argument seems little more than an extension of the 
analogical argument we saw him reject earlier. 
How does he develop his own particular perspective? He 
addresses this task by considering those situations where 
It seems that one person's thought influences another to 
speak In a certain way? Such has been Identified In 
seances, and we would also suggest, between those In close 
loving relationships. Equally we may 'hear' a voice In our 
own consciousness which gives us totally new Information 
which we could not have known beforehand. Due experience 
verifies what we heard to be true. Price suggests this 
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shows that "a foreign act of thinking is occur:ing, or has 
recently occurred". (42) Equally one may, or may not, 
observe the source from which that utterance arose. (43) 
How do we know such communication-situations are the 
product of another mind rather than some sort of sixth 
sense of our own? Such a question can be answered by 
reference to a complicated utterence about a verifiable 
state of affairs of which I had no prior knowledge. 
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Price's example of this is of the location of a crashed 
motor car. Here, moving further away from analogical 
arguments for the existence of other minds, Price suggests 
that telepathy can also offer such evidence. A condition 
of such a situation being evidence of a mind other than my 
own is that it conveys new (and perhaps complex) Information 
that can be verified later. Repetition of information as 
in the case of a recording, a parrot or an echo Is not 
evidence that each of these Is animated by a mind In their 
own right. 
The mechanism by which the symbolic representation of 
communication-situations provides verifiable evidence "for 
me" of the existence of other minds may be described this 
way. In a communication-situation perception of an object 
corresponds to a sound pertinent to that situation, for 
example 'here is a cat'. Introspection and extrospection 
will Indicate whether the sound originated from within my 
own mind, or as Price would argue If applicable, from 
another mind. Introspection and extrospection function as 
"instruments to a certain sort of mental act". (44) In 
some situations the mental act is my own. In others It Is 
that of another mind. These may be distinguished by 
inquiring how the symbols came to me; some may originate 
within me in a spontaneous sense (I see the cat, and I hear 
myself saying 'there Is a cat In the garden next door) and 
some may be Imposed upon me {in various sorts of complex 
messages which I may never have heard before, but the 
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combination of which still performs a symbolic function 
giving me data which I may then choose to verify or not as 
the case may be). 
It is the case that others' spontaneous thinking and 
utterences come to me In such a way that I perceive the 
symbolic value of what I hear and that Information Is 
Mt-
communicated to me in a way that would"make sense If the 
communication-situation had been entirely within my own 
mind. Thus, if our reading of Price is correct, what he Is 
saying is that the fact of rational, understandable 
communication makes the evidence of another mind like my 
own more likely. In other words the evidence, though never 
foolproof, is stronger. To quote Price: 
The rule is, that symbolically-functioning noises 
combined in symbolically-functioning combinations are 
produced In the course of acts of spontaneous 
thinking; and the instances In which It Is already 
known to hold good have been presented to me by 
introspection. (45) 
We need say little more about his position except that he 
supplements the Informative view of symbols outlined above, 
by reference to emotive as well as volitional symbols in 
given communication-situations. The considerable 
similarity between Price and Brightman in the task each 
engaged is considerable. Price even wrote to Brightman in 
1938 saying as much, and developing the Implications of his 
own mind/body phenomenology: 
••• another thing which occurs to me is that the Mind 
with a capital M (or Thought with a capital T) which 
the Idealists were fond of talking about, is really a 
misleading name for the fact that minds In the 
ordinary sense of the word (with a small m) 
communicate with each other by means of symbols ••• 
Mind with a big M, In other words, is a logical 
construction out of a number of acts of communication 
... It is a matter of reJoIcing when two searchers 
after truth find that they have arrived at the same 
place. (46) 
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The significance of Price for our present study is that he 
could arrive at conclusions avoiding the extreme dualism 
that characterised Brightman. H. D. Lewis, a more recent 
commentator, also articulates a strict epistemological 
dualism of mind and body again without the extremes of 
Bri ghtman's Cartesian dualism. 
Lewis is anxious about any tendency to consider the person 
as only the "actual course of our experience". And he 
asks, "What am I beyond the course of my experience and how 
am I to be identified as a particular person?" (47) His 
thrust is to inquire into the question that, over and above 
the features of experience I am now having, 'what is it for 
me to have them?' In part this question Is answered by 
reference to my Immediate acts of experiencing. 'It is I 
who am In pain now'. Obviousiy we do not have this same 
access to the experience of others, Lewis tells us. 
Observation of their bodily behaviour will Indicate, quite 
considerably however, the sort of experience they are 
likely to be having for perhaps quite considerable periods 
of time. 
Thus far It seems Lewis and Brightman are agreed. But it 
is at this point that Lewis Insists on a level of precision 
in presentation that takes him a different way to that of 
Bri ghtman. For example, Lewis warns of the dangers of the 
use of words such as 'own' and 'belong' In relation to 
experi-ences. Words II ke these pertain to relations of 
Items in the material world ('the spoke belongs to the 
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wheel', for example) and are not so readily applicable to 
the self and Its Identity. Lewis deliberately phrases a 
question that exposes what he considers would be a serious 
weakening of his position: 
Our central question could well be put In the form of 
asking what is the relation of the self to Its 
experiences, and at once we are on the slippery slope. 
For we are already thinking of some describable 
relation of the subject to passing mental events. 
This relation •.. is a quite unique one for which there 
is no proper parallel, and we must be very careful not 
to give the Impression of the self as something 
altogether apart, subsisting In splendid Isolation •.• 
related to certain experiences. (48) 
For all intents and purposes Lewis is rejecting here the 
very approach Brightman took. Lewis's preferred method of 
Identifying the self is to avoid whenever one can "any 
pictures or models for the unique situation we are 
handling". It follows from this that there is no wedge 
between myself and my pain, and that though I have my 
experiences (such as pain) I am not exhaustively identified 
with them. At the same time however he is able to say, 'I 
am my pain, yet not it'. Within this paradox one can be 
identified with one's experiences, but there is also a 
sense in which the experiences do not exhaustively identify 
who one is. The same sort of reasoning applies to those 
who would identify me in terms of my bodily appearance and 
behaviour patterns. Either way, for Lewis, there can be 
no bifurcation between the inner and outer self. 
It is my memory which remembers the self I am as having 
been in any number of situations In the past. The self is 
reconstituted (metaphorically) in "the same awareness of 
oneself as the distinct irreducible subject of experience 
that we find ourselves to be now". (49) This memory and 
the experience of which it Is a part establishes "at least 
a general principle of one mind, one body". (50) 
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Exceptions such as disembodied existence, telepathy and the 
II ke are not ruled out by this. Rather they must be 
examined against the norm of a mind-body continuum of 
experience. In cases of split-personality (schizophrenia 
and the Ii ke) the normal assumption would be that clinical 
treatment would assist passage to "the normal balance of a 
united personality". 
Lewis is uncompromisingly committed to a mind-body dualism. 
He rejects any attempt to reduce the mental to the physical 
whether at the hands of the behavlourlst, materialist or of 
the most sophisticated of double-aspect theorists such as 
Brian O'Shaughnessy. Equally Lewis Is no Idealist, who In 
an absolute sense, would reduce the physical to the mental. 
His insistence that the physical and the mental are both 
ultimately real and that one cannot be understood without 
the other presents one with a tantalising paradox. 
Perhaps we can agree with Lewis that to be safe In a 
Cartesian harbour Is a sound philosophical position, and 
that one can secure such a position without the extremes to 
which Brightman felt himself led. In due course we will 
show how Brightman's own philosophy can be reworked to lead 
to a description of the self, or person, as a continuum of 
mind and body. The conclusions we shall arrive at are 
neither those of Price nor Lewis, but an understanding of 
thel r position offers a sympathetic Introduction to the 
critique we shall outline. In addition such an 
understanding helps give shape and purpose to remaining 
pages of this dissertation. 
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(b) God and Nature 
It is disappointing that Brightman's early writings fall to 
offer a substantial treatment of the relationship between 
God and nature, In A Philosophy of Ideals, for example, 
the second chapter Is entitled 'Nature', Yet In this 
chapter there is only scant mention of 'God', and though 
Brightman's intended aim was to "consider what Is meant by 
nature" (51), what results Is an examination of the way or 
ways by which nature might be viewed, Brightman simply 
enumerates the methods by which nature might be studied, 
The theme of God and Nature appears In Brightman's essay, 
'A Christian View of Nature" in 1943 and the more extended 
Fondren Lectures of 1945, Nature and Values, In 'A 
Christian View of Nature' he says that "Personalism Is the 
belief that the universe is a society of persons and that 
Nature consists of personal consciousness and of nothing 
else", (52) Brightman's pOSition In this essay Is quite 
clear, "let us frankly posit that Nature Is wholly within 
God ", (53) It Is "an organization of the divine 
consciousness an integral part of the divine 
personality", (54) The pages of Nature and Values develop 
this: 
Nature has no existence of any kind apart from divine 
personality, Nature Is In divine personality, as 
parts of its conscious experience, 'All the choi r of 
heaven and furniture of earth,' with Its Inexhaustible 
variety of the organic and Inorganic, is contained 
within the unity of the Divine Personality, (55) 
115 
Progression in this argument is made with unashamed 
teleological reference and moves "from nature to God ": 
Man's experience starts In confusion and far too often 
remains In confusion. But a/l progess - all religion, 
morality, government, science,and invention - has been 
a movement from confusion to order, or, as the 
ancients wisely put it from chaos to cosmos. (56) 
For Brightman the Biblical narrative offers no metaphysical 
theory apart from positing a God who controls an uncreated 
chaos, for it "proposes no definition of the nature of 
matter save that it is created". (57) Brightman's enquiry 
into the nature of matter tells him that nature is "the 
experience of an ordering, Creative Mind other than any 
human mind. Yet It Is only one realm of experience within 
that Mind". (58) Nature, within God as a created order of 
reality, has its "ultimate being in the mind of its 
creator". The relation of the two is analogous to that of 
symphony and composer. The physical aspect of humans 
(thei r bodies) with all aspects of nature share this 
immanence in the Divine Creator. Nature, viewed this way, 
"is a combination of the active (volitional) and passive 
(Given) aspects of his being". (59) 
Nature exhibits a/l the signs of pain and delay as part of 
Its purposive evolution towards a goal more worthy than Its 
present state. God's willing of nature towards this telos, 
and his capacity to bring it about proposes a view of God 
who is an active agency towards realising the good. 
This affirms, "God as the empirically rational basis for 
the order and purpose of the world of Nature and of 
persons". (60) Brightman's personalistic hypothesis Is: 
... the supposition that Nature is one area of Divine 
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Experience, exhibiting God In action, God controlling 
the Given, and God communicating and Interractlng with 
other persons or selves. That area is an Incomplete 
expression of God, not merely because God is 
Inexhaustible, but because God's being must be seen in 
the light of the relation of natural (sensory) 
experiences to what we have called supernatural 
(supersensory) experiences". (61) 
Brightman's conclusion concerning the relationship between 
God and Nature is to be found In Person and Reality, which 
su~eeding Nature and Values Is his most mature and complete 
account of the subject. He says that having examined the 
meaning of nature he has "found It to be best understood as 
one realm of being In a Being Ineffably greater than 
Nature". (62) He says also: 
There seems to be no reason for regarding physical 
nature as anything other than the conscious will of 
God In action. There Is no ground, or very little 
ground, to suppose that physical nature has any Inner 
life of its own apart from the God who controls It. 
(63) 
Whilst Brightman can cite Berkeley with approval, "Nature 
is a divine language" (64), he also adopts what he calls 
the 'commonsense' view that it, "seems most useful to 
follow Kant's clue and to define Nature as the order 
revealed through the senses". (65) To this Is added a 
suggestion, the substance of which we shall address In 
remaining chapters: 
Nature, for a personalist Is one realm of God's 
experience - a realm discovered by scientific, 
epistemological, and metaphysical Interpretation of 
sense data; this Includes the human body, but 
excludes the personality. (66) 
(c) God and Persons 
In this section I shall consider the relationship Brightman 
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saw between God and the Person. Enough has already been 
said to enable us to begin at a point where Brightman 
affirms God and persons in intimate relationship. 
Man Is blind, willful, suffering; but In It all, his 
kinship to God is the most revealing and vital aspect 
of his nature. (67) 
Brightman claims that his personallstjc view of human 
nature "reaffirms the conception of man as a child of God 
In all the Iliad and the Odyssey of his soul's wanderings". 
(68) 
How does Brightman describe human existence? It is "partly 
tragic, partly comic, partly drab and neutral", (69) He 
warns us, though, that over-emphasis on man's incomplete 
creatureliness is, when carried to extremes, "both 
inadequate and morbid", (70) Now while there is tragedy in 
the human life, "tragedy is no more the ultimate word for 
human nature than Calvary is the ultimate word in the 
Christian drama", It Is Brightman's contention that there 
Is no tragedy beyond endurance. 
Because persons have to strive against obstacles in the 
pursuit of realizing values Brightman describes the person 
as, "'a citizen of two worlds' - the world of obstacles, 
tragedy and sin, and the world of aspiration toward the 
divine", In the face of thesis and antithesis there "is 
everywhere creative growth toward the synthesis", and he 
adds, " - if you give God and man time", (71) Brightman 
locates these struggles both in the divine and in the human 
persons: 
In such a world of dialectical tensions, man's 
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struggles are somehow always involved in God's 
struggles, man's plans in God's plan, human nature in 
divine nature. (72) 
Thus all that thwarts the realization of the good is "not 
merely the lot of human nature, but also of the eternal 
divine nature". (73) Brightman is not saying here "that 
man is God or that human nature is divine nature". His 
purpose is rather to demonstrate what he believes is the 
incoherence of a "picture of man 'apart from God'''. 
In a personalistic universe, man is constantly 
surrounded by, constantly sustained by, constantly 
affected by God. Without God's continual activity, 
both Nature and human nature would vanish. (74) 
Now while Brightman says there Is, "very little ground to 
suppose that physical nature has any Inner life of it sown 
apart from the God who controls it", the case Is different 
with persons. With persons we "know by experience" 
[presumably our own immediate experiencing] that a "person 
has an inner life, or, rather, is an inner life". (75) 
Brightman's belief is that God has so created the world 
that "there shall be consciousness in the world other than 
his own; that there shall be wills which are 
self-determining; and so, In this supreme act of his 
creative power, he limits his control over the universe". 
(76) By this Brightman means that In creating persons with 
free will God has allowed this will to be really free. 
Persons, then, can choose and will and do that which might 
well be contrary to God's own creative purpose. 
Furthermore God has so limited his capacity by creating 
free human persons that his own will is actually thwarted 
by the malpractice of humans who thereby inhibit God's 
attempts to realise ever greater levels of value in his 
universe, 
As a finite creation, humanity is not only a limitation 
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upon God's activity but Is a limitation upon its own 
activity, Though persons are given freedom by God, human 
choice and freedom exist within limits, Equally God, seen 
by Brightman as a Divine Person, or a Supreme 
Consciousness, is a person whose will Is limited by certain 
constraints which Brightman calls The Given (a description 
which should not be confused with what he says about the 
given in experience), The Given constitutes a 'cosmic 
drag' upon the creative will of God, 
At the same time, though the truths of reason set limits 
upon human capacity they are "also themes of perpetual 
investigation and therefore areas of growth", Brightman 
continues, "The very limits of human nature thus drive us 
to consider Its potentialities", (77) And again, "Freedom 
within limits is man's contribution to the creativity of an 
endlessly creative universe", (78) 
It is through the concept of freedom that Brightman 
develops further defining features of the capacity of the 
human person, He tells us that there are "at least three 
aspects" of freedom, Firstly there is choice, It is here 
that one discovers the "root of morality and sin", He 
continues, "Here alone - in free obedience to a freely 
chosen Ideal - Is moral goodness", (79) "Sin, then, 
presupposes knowledge of an Ideal and choice to reject it", 
(SO) 
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Secondly, Brightman isolates 'achievement' as a 
characteristic of freedom. Achievement gives meaning to 
human choice for if the universe were such that plans and 
actions were always fruitless or thwarted, freedom would be 
"purely formal and empty". As Brightman puts It, the 
universe Is "plastic and responsive to man's choices". (81) 
Brightman's third aspect of freedom Is responsibility; 
"Every free act creates responsibility". Since his 
consideration of It is so brief we shall quote him In full: 
The free man lays an autonomous responsibility on 
himself; he enters Into responsible, contractual 
relations ... with his fellow human beings; and, by 
sharing the prerogative of creation In the light of 
the I deal, he enters I nto a sacred and responsl ble 
relation to the eternal Creator of creators and the 
eternal realizer of the Ideal - God. No free man can 
choose without Involving himself In relations to his 
human comrades and his God. (82) 
In what way Is the human person an analogue of the divine 
person? Brightman writes: 
Just as my personality Is a clue to the understanding 
of other human persons very different from myself, 
yet possessing certain powers in common with me, and 
Is also a clue to the vaguely understood Inner life of 
animals, which Is very different from ours, so too It 
may be a clue to the nature of ali energy, all power, 
ali being, subhuman or superhuman, earthly or divine. 
(83) 
To support this Brightman argues that certain of the 
categories, though found In persons, are nevertheless keys 
which help unlock the nature of reality: 
If space and time and mathematics are regarded as 
characterizing the whole physical universe beyond man, 
without being condemned as purely subjective or 
anthrc5fnorphic merely because they are found In man, Is 
it not possible that the principle of personality Is 
II kewise a universal and cosmic principle found in 
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man? (84) 
The suggestion that personality is this cosmic principle is 
one which means that man is, on Brightman's terms, 
'cosmomorphic'. Far from being anthropomorphic Brightman 
does not seek to make God in his Image but rather to affirm 
that, having made man in his own image, God has made man 
"theomorphic": 
This sketch of the meaning of personality for 
personalists has, It would seem, shown at least the 
possibility that personality Is Indeed cosmomorphlc, 
and man theomorphlc, when man's personality Is rightly 
interpreted, and hence that personality may be the 
'key to reality'. (85) 
By 'cosmomorphic' Brightman means that personality as found 
in humans is a "microcosm reflecting the macrocosm". (86) 
Sharing in this common attribute of personality with the 
cosmos, human persons can enjoy the capacity to learn the 
universe's Innermost secrets for they share a common 
denominator in their being - personality. By 'theomorphlc' 
Brightman means that God has made human persons in the 
image and II keness of his own person. Human and divine 
share a similar being In thei r own respective personality. 
Now while there is a sense in which the person is a 
microcosm of the macrocosm Brightman adds a very sl9,!ficant 
qualification to his case: 
The universe is no copy of you or me on a larger 
scale. It Is far more than an expansion of our rather 
vague and confused minds. (87) 
In part Brightman is meaning that one should not identify 
"my present tasks and preferences with the eternal purposes 
of the universe". But this notwithstanding, if one was 
to bracket from personality those aspects of it which are 
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unique to the human person and consider personality in 
its "essential nature", Brightman asks (rhetorically) if 
there is not in this some form of universal essence in 
which all persons share. In this Brightman Includes both 
divine and human persons. (88) With the aid of hindsight 
we can see the same theme heralded In The Finding of God: 
Any sort of communication between any two minds, human 
or divine, Implies something In common between them. 
Communication requires a common language of some sort 
which is mutually understood. (99) 
From Brightman's writings It is seen that reason Is this 
'common language'. Reason is of "great metaphysical 
importance": 
If a being can learn to think, even slightly, It Is a 
person. If It cannot learn to think at all, It is a 
subpersonal self. This rational aspect of personality 
is of great metaphysical Importance, for It means that 
within each person are potentialities tying It to 
universal truth and to wholeness; for reason Is both 
an apprehension of universals and a grasp of the 
meaning of wholes. In every person there Is the urge 
to wholeness which signalizes its kinship with the 
cosmos. (90 ) 
Much was said in an earlier chapter about reason as that 
which distinguishes persons as a distinct class among 
selves. Here we are observing Brightman describe reason as 
a predicate of both human and divine personality. 
Perhaps to give historical pedigree to his position he says 
that, "long before Tertuillan, Plato had taught that God 
was a rational spirit". (91) And again: ..... (God's) 
eternal nature includes reason, never-ending activity In 
time". (92) 
Brightman rebels against that "voice of religion" which 
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posits "something above and beyond reason In the reasonable 
God". (93) He counters such an assertion by saying that 
religion "needs reason" In the "very Idea of God". (94) To 
this he adds, "irrationality or Ignorance would disqualify 
him as an object of, worship ". 
Rationality as an attribute of God means that God Ideally 
has to be "self-consistent and coherent, to take everything 
Into account and to perceive the Interrelations of all 
thi ngs". (95) Furthermore he says that "If you undermine 
reason, you undermine confidence in God as a cosmic fact". 
(96) Brightman offers the proposal that reason sets us 
"the ideal of a perfect conSistency, a perfectly coherent 
interpretation of all kinds of experience In a complete and 
adequate system". He notes also that this definition of 
reason "sounds strangely like a definition of God". (97) 
God, postulated as the embodiment of the universal ideal of 
reason, is for Brightman no hypostatlzatlon from the human 
situation. It is not to say that God ("and his world") Is 
a "mere replica of human experience". (98) Analogy, rather 
than replication or hypostatlzation, Is a better means of 
expressing the relationship between man and God: 
Creative activity, complete and unerring reason, and a 
content of experience which Includes the whole range 
of divine sensation - all suffering, all obstacles to 
reason and purpose: such would be the structure of 
God's experience if It bears any analogy to man's. 
(99) 
While God "must have powers and properties which man cannot 
even conceive •.• there Is no definite reason for supposing 
that any of God's unknown attributes are anything other 
than forms of conscious experience". From an earlier 
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chapter we recall that 'conscious experience' Is synonymous 
with 'personality'. In the present situation Brightman Is 
positing it as an analogue, a common denominator of some 
sort, between God and persons. This predication of 
conscious experience in God and persons Is the basis upon 
which all knowledge of the world Is founded, and upon which 
the nature of the universe Is ultimately modelled: 
Is it more rational to I nfer the existence of concrete 
human persons from an eternal being that Is 
essentially Impersonal law, or to Infer both rational 
law and also the existence of concrete human persons 
from a being who is essentially a rational person. 
(100) 
The importance of Brightman's theism for our understanding 
of his whole philosophy, and our subsequent critique of It, 
will become clearer as we now investigate his concept of 
God. 
125 
CHAPTER SIX 
BRIGHTMAN ON THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD 
In this chapter we shall consider Brightman's concept of 
God. In particular we shall note the influence of 
evolutionary thought on his position. We shall then 
introduce and present Brightman's resolution of what he 
called 'the problem of good-and-evll' and his concept of 
The Given as a limiting factor In the nature of God. 
Introduction 
To understand Brightman's theism, recognition of the 
influence of evolutionary thinking upon him is of 
paramount importance. He wrote, concerning evolution, that 
the "most conspicuous and pervasive trait of [the] world is 
its evolution In time". (1) And again: 
The world Is a world of events. If there Is no time, 
there are no events; no time means no change, no 
activity, no evolution. (2) 
To support his case Brightman refers us to Professor 
Leighton, "the perfect harmony or unity of the universe is 
a dynamic ideal, not a static fact" (3); and to Hastings 
Rashda" whom he described as an "able exponent of the 
reality of time on the basis of progress". (4) 
Bri ghtman rejects re"glous knowledge which Is seen as 
"Immune to the processes of decay that go on In the world". 
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(5) He feels that: 
It is one of the anomalies of history that anyone who 
has believed in God could have been satisfied that his 
belief was in need of no essential Improvement or 
revision. (6) 
It follows therefore that a God who reveals himself will do 
so In a way which acts as a: 
... stimulus to further thought and life, a starting 
point of motion ... It serves the purpose of leading 
men to move nearer the real God, and this may be 
accomplished even when the Ideas believed to be true 
are not wholly correct. (7) 
This view Brightman summarised as "teleological and 
functional". He believes that the person guided by such a 
view "must acknowledge both the need and the possibility of 
learning more about God, if there is any God at all". (8) 
He goes on to ask whether under evolutionist influence in 
modern times anything new or important has been learnt 
about the Divine Being. His contention is that there Is 
much that can be learnt, and the learning and presentation 
of new and different ways In which the nature of the deity 
may be expressed is a more effective method of meeting 
challenges to religious beliefs than the reassertion of 
long standardized Ideas of God. Brightman says of God: 
... It would be worthwhile to try to discriminate 
between the really permanent contributions which are 
embodied In the traditional idea and the respects in 
which It needs revision In the light of modern 
thought. (9) 
Such discrimination he goes on to suggest is actually more 
than just worthwhile, "the clear apprehension of God Is the 
most fundamental task of religious thought". (10) Having 
set this as his task he admits that the work to be done 
will be Inadequate in Its treatment of the subject In 
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question: 
While we are considering .•• the kind of God in whom 
we may believe, we should constantly keep In mind the 
fact that the Idea of God is a comprehensive one that 
refers to the nature and value of the universe as a 
whole. It would be absurd to expect complete 
demonstration of any such Idea. (11) 
Before proceeding we must note that In his early work 
Brightman asks what sort of God one may suppose to exist 
before he examines whether there Is a God at all. Thus: 
In presenting a temporallst view of God, I shall 
assume that there Is a God and that he Is a person 
( 12) 
Throughout this chapter (sic) we have assumed that 
there is a personal God and have Inquired what sort of 
personal God we may reasonably believe In. The 
following chapter (sic) will examine our right to 
assert the reality of a personal God. (13) 
Brightman later reversed this order In A Philosophy of 
Religion offering firstly his evidence for the existence of 
God, and then expanding upon the nature of that God In whom 
we may believe. We believe there Is no substantial Issue 
to consider In this reversal of operations. The present 
dissertation adopts Brightman's earlier sequence. 
God and Time 
"Experience", Brightman argues, "Is always duration". 
And he continues, "since Bergson's exposition of 'duree 
"" reelle' and Heidegger's of 'Oaseln' and Whitehead's 
emphasis on process, there can be no doubt of this". (14) 
Time Is fundamental In experience for "An experience which 
is at no time and contains no temporal sequence is a round 
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triangle ••. time is the universal warp and woof of every 
experience". (15) It follows therefore that if we are able 
to develop a concept of God which is true to experience It 
cannot, following Brightman, be abstracted away from 
temporal connections. 
Brightman notes that many have "believed they could find a 
timeless order In the universe which Is for them the most 
cogent evidence for God". (16) As examples of such 
timeless entities or essences he cites Platonic 'Ideas', 
mathematical truths, and logical principles, and argues 
that apart from temporal particulars they can have no 
existence: 
.•. any proof of God based on timeless universals must 
fall within our thesis that all the evidence for God 
Is In time ... [Therefore] ... we must either carry 
time Into the timeless ideas of the Absolute, or else 
have an Absolute without intelligible relations to 
experience. (17) 
It is the changing flux and temporality of particulars 
which suggests to us the universal ideas or Ideals which 
they instance. All these universals are affected by time, 
so Brightman argues, In so far as their particulars are 
affected: 
Activity, change, duration, are the essence of the 
real. The real endures; the real changes; the real 
grows ... Is there then nothing eternal? In answer, 
It must be said that nothing real is timeless, In the 
sense of being out of all time, atemporal. Eternity 
is a function of time, not time of eternity. (18) 
And he continues: 
Reason finds evidence of eternal form which the 
changes never violate. Religious faith would add that 
in this form are included certain moral and Ideal 
prinCiples, which are valid at all times. (19) 
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Brightman has therefore little in common with Idealists 
"like Bosanquet and Bradley [who] find no place for 
progress as an ultimate idea". (20) Brightman, however, 
sees the march of history as the arena for divine activity: 
If the ongoing of history reveals God, It reveals one 
for w hom events happen and for w hom the order of 
events Is of real Importance. A bow of promise 
derives Its meaning from its relation to a flood which 
precedes it. The divine Immanence In history can be 
understood only if time is real for God. (21) 
Brightman concedes that many will view any ascription of 
temporality to God with suspicion. Characterising this 
viewpoint he feels people see that: 
The temporal is the transitory, the perishing, the 
unspiritual, the merely phenomenal, the unreal. As 
applied to God, time seems a scandal to reason in the 
eyes of many, for it seems to Imply a changing and a 
developing God, who began at the bottom and worked his 
way up until he became manager of the business. (22) 
And again: 
We are naturally offended by the Idea of a developing 
God; but should we not be even more offended by the 
idea of a God who has nothing further to do, for whom 
creation is ended, and who Is resting forevermore? 
Either this Is essentially a creative and progressive 
universe or it Is not. If it is, God is limited by 
the temporal structure of his experience. 
In developing his exposition Brightman Invokes Samuel 
Clarke and Immanuel Kant who held, "that teleology cannot 
prove an infinite and perfect cause of the world". (24) 
Brightman claimed that both men erred by discrediting the 
evidence for a God who might lack omnipotence, because such 
evidence "did not demonstrate God to be the kind of being 
that they had supposed he was". (25) 
It is Brightman's view that much interpretation of Kant's 
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teaching on the ideality of time has stressed its purely 
subjective and phenomenal aspects. Time is thus seen as a 
quality of phenomena - not of 'things in themselves'. 
He finds Bradley similarly guilty of relating "time to 
appearance and, finding the Absolute in a realm above 
relation". Bradley asserts that time "can afford no 
presumption that the universe is not timeless". In the 
same location Brightman says that J. M. E. McTaggart 
"teaches that time is a 'reflexion, though a distorted 
reflexion, of something in the real nature of the timeless 
reality'." (26) Brightman also challenges those who might 
support Borden Parker Bowne when he said: 
The absolute Intelligence and will must lie beyond all 
temporal limits and conditions as their source ... The 
cosmic process is not in time, but by its incessant 
change it produces the form of time ... God is 
timeless. (27) 
Brightman, however, supports those who, like the ambiguous 
Bowne in the following quotation, affirm the reality of 
time in the divine life: 
God is 'the founder and conductor of the world-process 
... This process is a developing, changing one, and 
hence Is essentially in time. Hence the divine 
activity therein is essentially temporal'. (28) 
Bri ghtman's view was that "The temporal is just as 
necessary to the eternal as the eternal is to the temporal. 
Without both we have a mere abstraction, no explanation of 
experience as a whole". (29) 
Experience speaks to us of a world changing and evolving, 
so Brightman argues. Evolution means that "time and change 
are of fundamental Importance In the universe". (30) He 
agrees that "doubtless the universe must be guided by 
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certain unchanging laws" (31) - reason being one such law. 
However If such a conception leads us to deny temporality 
In the divine nature our view Is 'abstract and unreal' for 
from it is squeezed all relation to experience. 
Brightman goes on to argue that God cannot secure his ends 
directly but is working under limitations, Including those 
of time. Such a God Is one who Is In Intimate relationship 
to temporal procession. A lengthy quotation will 
Illustrate Brightman's view: 
In short, any view of God which elevates him entirely 
above time and process and renders him an eternal nunc 
stans - a standing present - pays tribute to his 
excellence without relating his being to the actual 
facts. The only God worth believing In, however, In 
the light of eVidence, is a God In living relation to 
the facts of cosmic and human history. He Is a God 
Into whose very being time enters; we need a 
temporalistic rather than a purely eternalistlc view 
of God. God Is the one who works; one to whom the 
passage of time means something; to whom the events of 
a progressive creative evolution are significant; for 
whom change is profoundly Important. (32) 
It Is seen then that Brightman does not deny eternity to 
God, but only an eternity conceived as timeless. What then 
does Brightman mean by the term 'timeless'? 
To be timeless means to lack all of the attributes of 
time, to have no before or after, no change, no 
activity, no past, no present, and no future. (33) 
Such a timeless entity could not therefore "stand In any 
causal or significant relation to the world of time". (34) 
If It did, then either In effecting change, or being 
affected by causal sequence, It would Itself be changed or 
acted upon in the course of a temporal sequence. To 
Illustrate this Brightman offers the mathematical 
conception of a triangle as a timeless entity. This he 
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juxtaposes to a real triangle, as made of wood, metal, 
chal k-marks etc. The mathematical triangle Is timeless and 
powerless. The latter, the 'real' triangle is temporal, is 
caused, and Itself causes. Brightman goes on to say: 
Now, if we say that God is timeiess as mathematical 
triangles are, we have ascribed a definite meaning to 
his eternity, but a meaning which cuts him off from 
any effective relation to real experience, and Indeed 
from existence itself. (35) 
The truth therefore of mathematical concepts (such as that 
of triangularity) is correct independent of any reference 
to an instance of the concept in actual existence. Thus 
though an idea may be correct this does not entail its 
necessary existence, "for to exist means to be in time or 
space or both". (36) 
In all of this we can see how Brl ghtman viewed the Intimacy 
of flux and fiow, the progression of evolution, and the 
purpose of God somehow bringing his 'will to expression'. 
God as Unchanging and God as Changing 
Brightman says: 
... there must be respects in which a God will not 
change; In his principles, his purposes, his goodness 
there is no deviation from eternity to eternity. 
But is not a personality always a concrete synthesis 
of change and identity? How could God be a person if 
change were utterly foreign to him? (37) 
There is therefore a two-fold problem before us: in what 
sense Is God affected by change, and In what sense Is God 
unchanging. Brightman attempts to maintain both sides of 
this problem In dialectical tension. In addressing the 
Issues Involved here we shall focus especially on the 
question, 'in what sense Is perfection an attribute of 
God?'. Through this we shall be in a position to Judge 
whether Brightman's conception of God was a coherent 
synthesis of both permanence and change. 
Thus, God is the "ens perfectissimum" (38); there Is no 
higher Ideal possible than absolute perfection. But 
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Brightman warns that "The meaning of the word 'perfection' 
can hardly be determined by a mere comtemplation of the 
abstract Idea of the perfect". (39) He goes on to say: 
The presence of an ideal of perfection within us is 
not to be regarded as a proof or a mere assertion; it 
is to be regarded, rather, as a plan of action, the 
initiation of a search for perfection. (40) 
He says if one does attempt to define God's perfection as 
completion, that: 
... the evidence that God has completed or ever will 
complete all that he can purpose and Imagine Is so 
slight that the actual Importance of the Idea of a 
completed perfection in God Is negligible. (41) 
Thus God, as the most perfect being, would be such a God: 
... as is revealed In evolution - a God of eternal 
active change, yet a God of unchanging laws and 
principles. He would be a living God, an 
inexhaustible creative process. (42) 
Hence: 
There is no perfected person whose being is completed 
and whose perfection is finished; but there may be a 
person whose will is unfailingly good and whose task 
is eternal and inexhaustible. Such a person would be 
divine; his perfection would not be an Infinite 
completeness but an Infinite perfectibility. (43) 
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Perfection In God Is therefore seen by Brightman as the 
capacity for endless perfectibility, rather than the 
present attainment of complete perfection. 
God as Finite-Infinite 
First of all, it is important to note that as Brightman's 
thought developed from The Problem of God (1930) In which 
his concept of a 'finite God' received Its first major 
airing to Personality and Religion (1934) he came to see 
increasingly that finite and Infinite are not mutually 
exclusive terms but are complementary and that any 
conception of God as finite must also carry with It the 
concept of God as infinite. In the following Brightman 
defl nes the word 'Finite': 
Finite Limited in some way. As applied to God, It 
may mean (as in Plato) that he is limited by something 
external (e.g. The receptacle or the Ideas), or that 
his will is limited by other eternal but unwilled 
aspects of his personality. (44) 
Brightman notes that In defining God as Infinite, "we are 
obviously dealing with a thought for which a corresponding 
object can never be presented In experience". (45) But at 
the same time he is aware that the ascription of Infinity 
to a deity Is an aspect of "most highly developed religious 
faiths". How then does Brightman articulate and define God 
as Infinite? 
To say that God Is infinite is to call him boundless, 
unbegun and unending, subject to no limits save those 
of his own being. (46) 
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By 'Infinite', Brightman means the exact opposite of 
finite, i.e. unlimited, without limitation. The 
conception of infinity seems to take on what amounts to a 
necessary status. This we see, continuing our exegesis of 
the same passage: 
That there must be something infinite in this sense 
follows from the fact that anything whatever is; for 
an absolute and spontaneous beginning of anything 
whatever out of nothing is incredible and irrational. 
There must be something eternal, which is therefore 
seif-sufficient. This is true whether the eternal Is 
or is not a God. (47) 
Thus the concept of infinity Is not necessarily (In logical 
terms) a predicate of the deity, though "the believer in a 
personal God holds that this eternal infinite is God". 
From the existence of anything whatever, a rational 
mind must infer that either something has existed 
forever, or else that this is a universe so 
nonsensical and chaotic that all thought about reality 
is Impossible or at least futile and self-defeating. 
(48) 
In another location Brightman develops this by admitting 
that whilst the idea of an absolute beginning is at least a 
starting point for imaginative speculation, it is 
'impossi ble for thought'. In saying this we can, with 
some justification, see him contrasting the more poetic 
(perhaps romantic) side of the mind with the more rational, 
iogical and scientific side. (49) 
Developing his thesis, Brightman quotes Locke whom he 
believes, proposes a position very similar to his own: 
There is no truth more evident than that something 
must be from eternity. I never yet heard of anyone 
so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a 
contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly 
nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, 
to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and 
absence of all beings, should ever produce any real 
existence. (50) 
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Thus, In the steps of Brightman and Locke, we can say there 
was never a time when there was nothing. These linguistic 
paradoxes are for Brightman real contradictions. This is 
not to say that the physical universe, as we know it, is 
eternai. That it had a creation, and may have an 
exhaustion of its physical existence in no way suggests the 
same beginning and fate for God. 
The concept of infinity though seeming at great distance 
from our experience, Brightman argues, is in fact at ciose 
proximity to human experience. The rational procession of 
time, without which our experience would be unordered and 
jumbled, leads us not only to Infer the infinite; but to 
posit It as the "source of all change". From the 
regularity and reliability of change we Infer a rational 
ground of interaction among things and persons. Brightman 
says: 
From time we must necessarily Infer the eternal, the 
unbegun and the unending, if we are to avoid the idea 
of an uncaused, Irrational beginning. (51) 
He continues, illustrating his thesis: 
The creative, poetic imagination In man Is another 
symbol of the inexhaustibility of the Divine, as Is 
the endless ongoing of evolution ... (52) 
Almost by way of parenthesis we must regard Brightman's 
rejection of the actuality of a second force that has 
existed through all eternity; a force whose aim Is to 
contest the power of God. This "dualistic infinite" 
whether It be called "God plus Devil" or "God plus matter" 
he suggests, 
... raises so many questions about the Interrelations 
between God and what is not God, the nature of their 
interaction, and the possibility of any rational 
control or cosmic order, that most believers In a 
personal God reject all such dualism ••• (53) 
137 
Brightman In his conception of God wishes to maintain this 
rejection of dualism, and concerning it contends that: 
•.. the truth and value of divine Infinity can hardly 
be questioned, and it Is not questioned even by those 
who call God finite, when the finiteness supposed Is 
within God and not Imposed by anything external to 
him. (54) 
Such an imposition would return us to the dualism which we 
have just observed Brightman discount. To supplement the 
above, he ad ds: 
A real Infinite must be definite; although the word 
means 'boundless', a real infinite must have bounds. 
To say that the real God Is infinite, then, means that 
he is the self-existent source of all being; but It 
also means that he contains and recognises 
limitations. (55) 
Such then Is Brightman's concept of Finite and Infinite and 
thei r application to his concept of God. Perhaps that area 
which has most drawn commentators to Brightman is his 
account of the Problem of Evil, or as he subsequently came 
to call it, the Problem of Good-and-Evil. To this we now 
turn. 
The Problem of Good-and-Evil 
In Brightman's life two distinct periods can be identified 
when his treatment of the problem of good and evil 
differed. For convenience these may be called the earlier 
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and the later periods. There was no sudden transition from 
the one to the other, though we may cite the period 1930 -
1931 as the Identifiable watershed when ideas emergent from 
the late 1920's were given sustained systematic expression 
in The Problem of God and The Finding of God. In the 
thirty or so years from The Finding of God until his death 
Brightman consolidated the presentation he made In these 
two works. In the 'earlier Brightman' we find him speaking 
of the problem of evil, and In the 'later' the problem of 
good-and-evil. We shall trace the course of his thought 
through these two stages. 
In Religious Values,(1925) representing the 'early' period 
Brightman wrote: 
Religious faith may speak In many tongues about 
suffering, but what it says, being translated, has 
always one and the same meaning. This Is the meaning: 
suffering is not the brute mystery that It seems to 
be; It serves some purpose, even though we know not 
what; it will be overcome, even though we know not 
how. Religion, then, meets the suffering of the 
individual with faith, a faith that comes to concrete 
and practical expression in various forms, but always 
as an act of Implicit trust. What other resource than 
this In the face of suffering is not presently 
exhausted and baffled? Does not religion, based on 
faith in the Eternal, give to life its only 
indestructible refuge in hours of agony, and rescue It 
from despair or suicide? (56) 
In his An Introduction to Philosophy Brightman concedes the 
impossibility of a theoretical solution to the problem of 
evil in favour of one to be discovered In the practical 
reason: 
For many of the ills of life there is no clear cut 
theoretical solution. Yet If man meets those Ills 
that he cannot understand with the best there is in 
him, he is capable, within limits, of making all 
things work together for the good. (57) 
139 
But even in the realm of practical reason a solution of the 
problem of evil is unlikely to succeed, if only because of 
limitations placed upon It by theoretical questions. 
And so in a further passage he writes, echoing to a degree 
his earlier thoughts of Religious Values: 
The problem of evil admits of no final, no completely 
enlightening solution. For every honest mind that 
seeks to reconcile the evidence for purpose In the 
universe with the facts of evil, there remains the 
confession, 'I do not understand it all'. (58) 
But if the riddle of evil cannot be solved, meaning may be 
given to it, or found within It, so Brightman argues. 
He was of the opinion that faith In Immortality might 
provide a meaning: 
... it is only the faith In Immortality that can find 
a rational meaning for evil. Evil, considered by 
itself, has no meaning; It Is a brutal frustration of 
value or a power that vitiates the very sense of 
value. Yet evil, like everything else In human life, 
may have a meaning and a value beyond itself In what 
it leads to, in the end which its serves, the whole to 
which it belongs. If all humanity Is to fall Into the 
grave and rise no more, neither evil nor good has any 
final meaning. But if the human race is comprised of 
deathless persons, there is the eternal possibility 
that evil may be overcome, that It may serve Its 
disciplinary and refining end, and that through it a 
meaning may be achieved. (59) 
To this early Interpretation of the meaning of evil might 
be added Brightman's theory of multiple meanings: 
Let us not blink the fact that if God be immanent In 
all nature, every motion of the murderer's hand, and 
of his weapon, and all Its deadly effect, down to the 
subtlest tremor of the most minute electron, was all 
the deed of God's will, whose purpose Is supreme 
value. By one and the same event, man means eVil, God 
means good; just as by a handshake between two human 
beings, one man may mean friendship and the other 
treachery. (60) 
Although this quotation is drawn from An Introduction to 
Philosophy Bri ghtman had, by the mid-1920's, begun to 
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become uneasy with his 'theory of multiple meanings'. 
Having set out to face the problem of evil, he had like 
many others he criticized denied its reality as evil by 
subsuming it within God's purpose for good. 
The second period of Brightman's evolving thought regarding 
the problem of evil was heralded in the late 1920's firstly 
in an article, 'Personalism as a Philosophy of Religion' 
(61) and secondly in a short essay, 'Has God Anything to 
do?' (62) In the former Brightman enlarged upon an earlier 
'diffident suggestion' - that God's will is limited by 
factors within his own nature (63). The fact of evil: 
indicates that the Supreme Self is achieving value 
in the temporal order under difficulties. These 
difficulties are partly to be found in the 
self-imposed conditions of reason and goodness, and 
partly In the obstacles caused by human freedom. I 
have ventured the suggestion elsewhere that within the 
divine nature there may be a resistant or retarding 
factor, akin to sensation In man, which, without 
diminishing divine goodness or wisdom, constitutes a 
real problem to divine power and explains the 'evil' 
features of the natural world. (64) 
We must recognise that Brightman's consideration of good 
and evil was no armchair theorizing. Having seen his first 
wife die cruelly he lived through the depression and in 
this came to view much traditional theology as unable to 
explain the presence of evil in a world moulded by a 
benevolent and omnipotent creator. (65) 
But this notwithstanding, against the evil of life 
Brightman maintained that good must struggle and must 
strive to overcome. As was noted at the outset of this 
chapter the promoting of good is both religious and 
practical: 
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Religion is fundamentally practical, rather than 
intellectual or even emotional. The aim of religious 
personalities Is to become good or to do good in spite 
of all the evil in the world. (66) 
This does not deny a theoretical dimension to the religious 
life. In the same place, Brightman writes that "The 
intellectual interpretation of belief in God Is primarily 
philosophical rather than a religious enterprise". The 
difficulty of believIng in a good God In the face of so 
much evil in the world Is for many impossible: 
While there is doubtless some value in the life of 
every normal human being and a predominance of value 
over disvalue for a large number, It Is nevertheless a 
patent fact that the quantity and dlstri bution of 
evi Is make difficult the belief in a good God who can 
be trusted to conserve values eternally. For many 
that belief is impossible. (67) 
The problem here Is ancient; if God intends to thwart evil, 
but cannot, he is impotent; if he could, but does not, he 
is malevolent; if he has both the power and the will, from 
where does evil come? Is it possible one might ask, to 
explain away good and evil as subjective phenomena and that 
everything objective is neutral with respect to goodness 
and badness? Brightman rejects such 'explaining away' for 
there is, he believes, an undeniable (causal) relation 
between subjective experience and objective reality. 
Even if good-and-evll be strictly subjective, a 
solution of the problem must show the reason why such 
subjective experiences occur. Nothing can be 
experienced subjectively which does not have some 
relation to and basis in objective reality. (68) 
Alternatively is the problem of good-and-evil resolved by 
showing that evil is really good? Here there is some 
affinity both with Brightman's earlier view and his belief 
that the process and progress of the universe is 
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explainable in terms of evolution towards a greater 
perfecting of creation. But the argument which proposes 
that all evil is the expression and result of good purpose 
only, Brightman feels: 
carries teleological explanation so far that It Is 
In danger of breaking down ••• To prove that all evil 
Is really good - a perfectly good creation of a 
perfectly good purpose - Is to destroy every ground 
for a distribution between good and evil, and thus 
eventually undermine logiC, ethics and religion. (69) 
For Brightman the most adequate solution to the problem of 
good-and-evil begins when one acknowledges the fact and 
reality of evil as evil, and the good as good. In response 
to many of his critics who accused him of merely restating, 
rather than resolving, or solving, the problem of 
good-and-evil, Brightman wrote: 
Ail that rational thought can do is to face the facts 
and then give an account of them that Is ali-Inclusive 
and coherently systematic. When this Is done, an 
explanation Is reached that needs no further 
explanation. Explanation Is needed, not when reality 
runs counter to our desires, but only when there Is 
contradiction or Incoherence between our theories and 
the facts which our theories are supposed to describe. 
(70) 
Brightman judged two possible alternatives as plausible 
theodlcles. These two alternatives are, 'theistic 
absolutism' (what Brightman calls 'optimism') and 'theistic 
finitism' ('meliorlsm'). Concerning these he wrote: 
The two forms of theism agree in the proposition that 
God is an eternal, conscious spirit, whose will is 
unfailingly good. The difference between the two may 
best be brought out by saying that theistic absolutism 
Is the view that the will of God faces no conditions 
within the divine experience which that will did not 
create (or at least approve) whereas theistic finitism 
is the opposing view, namely, that the will of God 
does face conditions within divine experience which 
that will neither created nor approves. (71) 
143 
The vlabil ity and worth of both these Brightman had to 
test. We shall follow his Investigation. Whence, inquired 
Brightman, arose theistic absolutism - something he equated 
with belief In an infinite God? By way of answer he argues 
that it arose from an outworking of a certain religious 
experience. In the face of the unexplainable, religious 
man has In the past recognized a state from which he needs 
to be saved. Brightman, caricaturing the position of his 
opponents, speaks of man having trusted In an Ideal against 
the measure of which all evil can be relatlvlsed. In the 
light of this ideal real evil becomes apparent evil. 
Ultimately this apparent evil is a disguised form of the 
good. (72) Brightman describes this 'Ideal': 
It Is the ideal of the best and greatest that man can 
think, and Includes perfection of power and knowledge 
as well as perfection of goodness. (73) 
It is this type of religious experience which Brightman 
believes leads to the affirmation of an absolute deity. 
At least on speculative grounds Brightman recognizes that 
arguments for such a deity can claim support from logic: 
The search for truth Is a search for completely 
coherent thought about experience. Complete 
coherence Is an unattainable Ideal - perhaps forever 
unattainable by man. Yet no one could deny the 
validity of coherence merely because he could not be 
coherent. Now, If the true and the real are 
coherent, there arises before the mind an Ideal of 
completely coherent value, power, and eternity. 
Thus logic leads to the absolutist's God ••• (74) 
But Brightman does not find the strength of these arguments 
convincing. He does not find that ali religious or even 
ali Christian believers have found the concept of an 
absolute and omnipotent and Infinite deity adequate. (75) 
David Hume and J. S. Mill are two giants In the history of 
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philosophy who have argued against the omnipotence of the 
deity. More recently the theists Hastings Rashdall and 
William James have argued for a similar view of God. For 
the most part however Brightman's claim that people have 
not been satisfied with the concept of an absolute deity is 
an appeal more to the exceptions In Church History than to 
the rule. 
Central amongst Brightman's objections to theistic 
absolutism is the Irreconcilability of ultimately 
unexplainable surd evils (see note 83 below) and an 
omnipotent deity: 
... an upholder of [theistic absolutism] must find the 
ultimate source of all surd evils In the will of God. 
(76) 
We are now In a position to consider more fully that thesis 
for which Brightman became best known - his concept of God 
as limited by a factor within his nature but against which 
his will has continual struggle, something Brightman called 
The Given. The basis for Brightman's belief In a God so 
limited may be presented In this manner: 
Many species die an untimely death, entire species 
perish and are known only through their fossil 
remains, many forms of life are seemingly triVial, and 
others, such as disease germs and parasites, are 
destructive and exclusively harmful. In the light of 
these facts, It Is Impossl ble for me to say honestly 
that I can regard ali this as the deliberate purpose 
of an all-powerful and good God. (77) 
The dilemma posed for religious belief Is that the 
wastefulness of evolution reveals a non-purposive and 
dysteleological aspect of evolution - which might Imply, In 
turn, chance and hazard rather than system or order. But 
at the same time unless species arrived which were capable 
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of coping with, and multiplying their numbers in the face 
of this waste, then any survival of the fit would be 
impossible: 
If organisms are the product of a power that is capable 
of foresight and purpose, the possibility of the origin 
of new types of life, related to the old, yet better 
equipped to survive, and adapted to lead on to still 
higher types becomes less opaque and accidental, more 
intelligible and rational. (78) 
Brightman rejects what he calls "the view of traditional 
theism", namely that The Given, "this element of opposition 
is a product of the creative will of God" and rejects also 
any view which places this element of opposition as 
"something externai to God". (79) Brightman's preference 
is for an approach to God which explains opposition to the 
will of God in the creative process as: 
.•. due to factors within God himself, which are 
eternal aspects of his nature, but not products of 
his will or choice. 
And he continues: 
That there is eternal will follows from the purposive 
ongoing of things. That there is an eternal Given 
element In divine experience which Is not a product of 
divine will is evident from the difficulties under 
which the divine will evidently labors in expressing 
perfection in the world. (SO) 
Again, in The Problem of God, Brightman offered a 
definition of God which is pertinent to the present 
discussion: 
God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely 
valuable and supremely creative, yet limited both by 
the free choices of other persons and by restrictions 
within his own nature. 
Concerning these "restrictions" he went on to write: 
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... there is in God's very nature something which 
makes the effort and pain of life necessary. There is 
withi n him, in addition to his reason and his active 
creative will, a passive element which enters Into 
everyone of his conscious states, as sensation, 
instinct, and Impulse enter into ours, and constitute 
a problem for him. (81) 
Thus the Divine Personality consists of an 'active creative 
will and a passive element'. By this passive element, 
Brightman meant, "all that is eternal and uncreated In the 
divine nature, other than the actual will of God". (82) 
Now, we have seen Brightman propose the existence of 
'dysteleological surds'. By using this term he draws an 
analogy with mathematical surds. Just as these latter are 
quantltltes which cannot be expressed In rational numbers, 
so dysteleological surds are evils which cannot be 
expressed as purposes or values. (83) 
If one explains what seems evil as an ultimately good 
purpose, then one may Indeed preserve God's omnipotence. 
But the more Brightman considered the evidence the more he 
felt unable to accept belief in the omnipotence of God. 
Whilst there is an abundance of evidence for a God who Is 
good, there is also, on the other hand much evidence which 
suggests that God's good will Is hindered by some retarding 
factor. The evidence suggested to Brightman a God who 
attains good only after a struggle: 
The extra-human factors which delay or thwart the 
realization of what Is ideally best must ultimately be 
ascribed to God In all detail - either to his will or 
to his nature. Tornadoes, earthquakes, tidal waves, 
volcanoes, idiocy, insanity, hysteria, cancer, 
infantile paralysis - all these ills somehow come from 
God. Traditional theism has ascribed them to his 
will. I revolt against this as a hideous doctrine and 
ascrl be the evils not to his will, but to his struggle 
with The Given. They occur in spite of his will; but 
his will is adequate to extract value even from the 
most adverse possible circumstances. (84) 
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Thus the conclusion that God contains factors in his nature 
which limit his will is for Brightman unavoidable. If it 
is said that this limiting factor is external to God, then 
either God or another creator must be posited as its 
creator - a devil perhaps? Brightman finds both untenable 
for they do not solve the problem of apparent (if not 
actual) limitation in the deity but only put its resolution 
one stage further back. So the limiting factor In God's 
nature which renders evil unavoidable is uncreated and 
unwilled by God: 
If The Given is external to God, then either he 
created it or he did not. If he created It, one needs 
something within the divine nature to explain why he 
should create that sort of thing. If he did not 
create it, the presence of two ultimate powers in the 
universe - God and The Given - raises the problem of 
thei r interrelation and engenders many of the 
difficulties to which other forms of dualism are 
subject. (85) 
Now in the sense that Brightman claims The Given Is not 
created by God It cannot be said to be rational in that It 
is not derived from rational premises or purposes. It is 
"given to reason" so that "an understanding use may be made 
of it, and through the conquest and shaping of it meaning 
may be achieved ". (86) 
Thus, referring again in the same location to The Given, 
Brightman says, "God can make an Increasingly better 
conquest of it throughout eternity without ever wholly 
eliminating It". Even death, he ludicrously agreed In 
private correspondence, "may conceivably be increasingly 
overcome". (87) What implications arise as a result of his 
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concept of The Given? He says that because of The Given: 
There would be a definite surrender of the omnipotence 
of the divine will and probably of omniscience, at 
least as far as foreknowledge is concerned. God 
wouid remain personal, ethical, and rational, but the 
temporal process would be more significant for him 
than it was on the oider view. (88) 
A further consequence resulting from Brightman's concept of 
The Given revolves around his denial of omnipotence to God. 
The question might be asked whether a God who is not 
omnipotent, one who Is limited, one who has to strive 
against hindrances is a God who is "worthy of worship"? 
And in reply to this self-set question replies, with 
reference to his own conception of God: 
If the worshipper confronts a being who is at once the 
supreme good and the supreme power in the universe, 
and if that being in the long run can find a meaning 
in every situation, a good beyond every evil, a value 
for every phase of The Given, then the worshipper has 
all that his experience could Justify him in hoping 
for, even if he has to grant that his God is not 
omnipotent. (89) 
Brightman's close colleague Albert C. Knudson (1873 - 1953) 
was a trenchant opponent of Brightman's denial of 
omnipotence to God. Knudson in his own personalistic 
theism accepts that there may be limitation in God, but it 
is a limitation which God's own will has ratified and it 
may thus be called a self-limitation. (90) 
Knudson's view that limitation in the Divine Being proposed 
an inadequate object of religious faith was a position 
Brightman chalienged with force. Brightman after The 
Problem of God could not accept that by trusting God and 
believing In his omnipotent power one would be comfortable 
in the assurance that, for example, God has ends in view of 
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which the human person Is unknowing. Of this he wrote: 
If the dysteleological facts are disposed of, as many 
theists would dispose of them, by appeal to human 
ignorance of the Absolute will of the Almighty, then 
by the same logic the teieologlcal facts have also 
been disposed of. If we do not know enough to judge 
that an evil is an evil, then we do not know enough to 
judge that a good is a good ... From our ignorance no 
concrete metaphysical truth can be inferred, certainly 
not the proposition that God's in his heaven, all's 
right with the world. (91) 
We will have a little more to say about this particular 
debate shortly. Another criticism levelled by Knudson was 
that si nce God had the choice either to create or not to 
create then any evils incidentJto creation must be 
"justified by the total outcome". Otherwise, God would 
have not created in the way he did, if at all. Brightman's 
case is that whiist the 'good' products of creation do 
Justify the creating process with God as the architect and 
builder of the creation, 'evil' does not Justify either the 
creation, nor yet the goodness of it or in it. 
Neither man nor God can rightly call evil good ... But 
the fact that evil must enter into any possible 
creation does not mean that the act of creation is 
evil. Creation means only that God Is responsible for 
exercising redemptive love; It does not mean that he 
is either responsible for or acquiescent In the evils 
which his will does not create, but finds. (92) 
Brightman then, argues that the will of God Is In a 
struggle with The Given. This struggle Is unending. 
Only if an Increase In value were to stop would The Given 
triumph over God. For Brightman, God's willing of 
goodness is sufficient to guarantee the continuation of 
God's control of The Given. 
It is in this sense that God is a "reasonable object of 
worship". In the life of God there must be both an 
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explanation of, and a sharing In human suffering, for God 
to be a good God. If God only shared in human suffering he 
would be neither "worthy nor capable of saving the 
worshipper". And, on the other hand, "if God transcended 
but did not share human suffering, his relation to human 
experience would be so remote as to be In question". 
Brightman draws a passing conclusion: 
The conception of a God limited by The Given within 
his own nature, yet wresting meaning from it by the 
achievements of his rational will, seems to account 
more adequatel y than other ideas of God for the 
paradoxical assertion of religious experience that its 
object is both a Mighty God and a Suffering Servant. 
(93) 
And so God exercises his eternal capacity "for bringing 
meaning out of what seems meaningless" in a struggle with, 
though never baffled by, The Given. It is Brightman's 
claim that: 
The Given would account for natural evils and the 
'mistakes' of evolution, would give God an eternal 
reason for activity, would render him more sympathetic 
with the limitations of man, would give more 
si gnificance to the temporal process, and yet would 
not unduly impair the divine dignity, but would 
maintain God's transcendence and, by providing, for 
the mysterious and irrational along with the moral and 
the rational in his nature, make him a more worthy 
object of numinous worship. (94) 
This concludes our present section. Brightman's concept 
of God as Limited can also be considered from another 
perspective, namely God and free-will. 
God and Free Will 
Brightman ponders what might be meant by the 'Will of God' 
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and asks whether If he so willed God could make "a round 
triangle, a two which multiplied by two will produce six, a 
time prior to his own existence", (95) His conclusion 
resounds, "Manifestly not!", God's nature Includes reason 
and never ending activity which limits the range of 
selective potentiality available to him, In his will, 
therefore, God Is limited, Brightman says of 'will' that 
It Is "selection, control, responsibility, creativity .. , 
Will Is a self-determination within given limits, choosing 
from the given field of choice", (96) And again, "Purpose 
cannot function without will", 
It Is the purpose of God to direct the universe to moral 
and good ends, so Brightman argues, But the will both 
limits and is limited, Time Is one such limiting factor; 
so is reason; so is the freedom of human choice which may 
act in accordance with - or be contrary to - the will of 
God, Of this Brightman says: 
If our temporalistic view of God be true, and God is 
not utterly above and beyond all time, he cannot be 
thought of as knowing in advance what a free person 
will choose, (97) 
In making human freedom a limiting factor in the 
foreknowledge of God Brightman rallies John Locke to his 
aid: 
I cannot make freedom in man consistent with 
omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as 
fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most firmly 
assent to, (98) 
To Locke's apparent acceptance of contradiction Brightman 
calis for an honest appraisal of the evidence and asks why 
God's omnipotence and omniscience should not be questioned, 
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"Why not be consistent and acknowledge that God is limited 
in his foreknowledge?". 
Brightman says that when a person decides and selects, 
limits are immediately imposed and determining factors come 
to bear on later choices and selections, "we choose and 
are determined in the same act". (99) The act of deciding 
has before it fields of possible action which Brightman 
would call the 'passive content of consciousness' - "every 
state or process of consciousness of which we know is a 
combination of active with passive factors". (100) He 
says the same of experience "All experience that I have 
undergone ... seems to have an aspect which Is 
predominantly passive and an aspect which Is predominantly 
active". (101) The passive content of experience is 
normally viewed as due to the influence of the world 
external to us and the active as due to ourselves. 
Brightman translates by analogy the thesis of active and 
passive elements In human experience to God: 
... our hypothesis is that the divine life is 
constituted in the way in which all known experience 
Is constituted, namely, as a union of active and 
passive elements. (102) 
The active part of a being's nature Is its capacity to 
select, decide, evaluate and choose - namely its will, 
" ... its will Is not a separate faculty or power ... " (103) 
Thus the will limits Its own activity by choosing and 
selecting, and thereby Imposing restrictions upon the range 
of future choosing. The will Is limited by the content of 
that which is available to its selective activity. 
Brightman is claiming this is true both of human persons, 
and thence by analogy, of the divine person. 
153 
A lot depends on the analogy of divine and human. We have 
seen elsewhere that Brightman argues the human person is a 
mirror of the universe, or as Brightman says here: 
... that the small segment of the universe which we 
call ourselves Is truly a sample of what the whole 
universe is. (104) 
This does "not mean that human experience produces the 
universe", but rather that all ... 
... we can think or Imagine about God Is based on our 
experience, and there is no definite reason for 
supposing that any of God's unknown attributes are 
anything other than forms of conscious experience. 
(105) 
But Brightman Is prudent and adds the warning: 
This, of course, does not mean that God and his world 
are a mere replica of human experience. The Eternal, 
the Creator, the Source of the enti re cosmos, must 
have powers and properties which man cannot even 
conceive. Man, for example, can experience only those 
colors between violet and red; the divine spectrum 
would extend Indefinitely beyond ultra-violet and 
infra-red. (106) 
And thus if the nature of the divine Is anything analogous 
to our human nature, the active, divine will will have to 
operate within conditions Imposed by the "passive factors 
in his experience, namely, the given principles of reason 
and the given eternal facts of divine sensation". (107) 
There are thus limiting factors In God's nature which 
obstruct his will. But to say they are in God's nature 
neither says they are a part of,1\or a product of, his will: 
The limiting conditions must be within God, if we are 
to avoid an unintelligible dualism; but they must be 
limits to his will, not products of It, If his will is 
good. (108) 
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Indeed God's will, so Brightman contends, attempts to 
overcome these retarding factors, or at least dl rect them 
towards purpose: 
Thus emerges the paradoxical truth that, though God Is 
infinite, his will is finite, being limited by that In 
him which Is not will. (109) 
And again: 
... just as human will finds within experience factors 
which restrict Its choice and Its activity, so the 
whole world of nature appears to be a struggle of 
purpose against obstacles which necessitate waste ••• 
suffering ••. futility. (110) 
In God then, there Is this duality In which the active will 
is in tension with Irrationality, pain, evil and all that 
from the passive side of God's nature attempts to thwart 
his realisation of the ideal of love. This retarding 
factor In the divine nature Brightman often calls "cosmic 
drag". Its more technical name, as we know, Is The Given. 
The consequences of such a 'struggle' between the active 
will and the retarding nature In God is not the 
preservation of an unproductive status quo. Brightman 
says that: 
.•. all reality is full of opposition and contrast; 
everything that is stands in contrast with something 
else; every thesis implies some sort of antithesis. 
This means that the nature of God is to contain 
opposition and tension. But every opposition leads 
on to a higher ievel of life; every struggle points to 
a higher meaning or synthesis. (111) 
And: 
•.. the divine life consists essentially of struggle 
and victory over opposition, a victory for which a 
price has always to be paid even by God himself. 
The traditional view almost inJfevitably engenders the 
idea that God's task Is an easy one; that he stands 
apart from the struggle in spotless white. Our view 
sees him as the greatest sufferer In the universe and 
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through this the greatest victor; his nature is not 
mereiy goodness but also dialectic struggle, or, 
rather, his goodness is not merely an abstract quality 
but the constant victory of constant effort. (112) 
The way of God's salvlfic process Is not the subject of 
this dissertation but one observation made by Brightman in 
this respect offers a suggestive pointer to his thinking. 
Brightman refers to his concept of a limited God: 
This view is at once nearer to the facts observed by 
science and to the Christian faith in a God who can 
save only through the shedding of blood. (113) 
Perhaps not surprisingly Brightman's theism, and the 
subjects discussed in this chapter, have been those areas 
upon which commentators have focussed most attention. 
In many expositions of Brightman's thought extensive 
attention has been given to his account of a 
finite-infinite God, the Given and to the problem of 
good-and-evil. Much of this attention has come from 
conservative and evangelical sources anxious to challenge 
what they perceive as a threat to Biblical truth. Sadly 
many of these responses fail to take Brightman seriously 
and to offer sound internal critique. The present author 
believes it Is not sufficient to countermand Brightman's 
position by offering an alternative view to the one he took 
and then assert that because of this alternative's greater 
BI bllcal fecundity Brightman's view falls. 
Other Responses to Brightman's Work 
A doctoral thesis by Floyd Ross (114) submitted to Yale 
University, compares Brightman with Bowne and Knudson. 
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The analysis is very penetrating and Ross finds Brightman's 
theism in~evitably leads to dualism within God, with evil 
having an independent origin. It is interesting to note 
that most doctoral theses submitted to Boston University 
compare Brightman with a wide range of other figures, 
including Nels Ferre, Sartre, Kierkegaard, Edward Carness, 
C. 1. Lewis, S. E. Toulmin, Tillich, Aquinas, Descartes, 
Lotze, Whitehead. Again, many of these lack the rigour of 
Ross's work. One exception however is a thesis by Gustave 
Todrank, The Empirical Evidence for Brightman's Cosmology. 
Todrank (115) discovers that the relationship between the 
empirical evidence Brightman offers, and the theistic 
cosmology that results from it is coherent. But the 
demands of coherence require an examination of three 
fundamental problems: the nature of substance, the 
mind-body relationship and the explanation of the cause of 
natural evil. By examining the first two at least 
Todrank's own concern is not far removed from our own. A 
difference arises when he proposes a reoriented cosmology, 
as an attempt to resolve these three problem areas with a 
more coherent solution than that offered by Brightman. 
His solution involves a discussion of 'cosmos, chaos and 
consciousness'. The two basic characteristics of cosmos 
(the total physical envi ronment) are permanence and change 
or substance and causation. Todrank sees these pairs as 
respectively synonymous. An entity called an "onton" is 
posited as "the most basic constitutive element in the 
cosmos". (116) The nature of the onton is unknown but it 
is inferred to be simple, eternal, and Immutable. To 
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explain cause and change an efficient activity called 
"theon" is posited. (117) Equally the nature of theon is 
unknown but it is inferred to be the unifying causal power 
that apparently pursues a goal through the integration of 
~ 
the ontons into structural hierarchies. 
Chaos refers to disorderly change in the cosmos. Chaos is 
accounted for by the onton which limits possibilities, by a 
tendency to revert to unstructu redness, by the 
unpredictabiity in many complex formations of ontonic 
groupings (e.g. free will in humans) and finally to the 
structural relations between any or all of these which 
either obstruct or destroy some aspect of theonic 
causation. 
Consciousness is awareness of an organism. This Todran k 
sees as a biological relation between the ontonic cells of 
the organism. His approach is speculative and to a degree 
persuasive but we must ask whether Todrank has sufficiently 
argued his case to ground securely an internal critique of 
Brightman. Whilst his conclusions concerning the 
relationship between mind and body, and the outworking of 
God's mind in human body are ones with which we would wish 
to associate, Todrank has not adequately recognised that 
his position is still open to the Brightmanian response 
that in his critique he fails to understand the nature of 
experience as Brightman presented it. The same can be 
said of Todrank's conclusions with regard to the nature of 
the su bconsciousness. 
Whether we need to posit the notion of an onton or of a 
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theon as part of a reworked and plausible metaphysical 
world view is also something we would question. Our own 
view is that Brightman provided sufficient vocabulary and 
definition to allow us to criticise what he said and to 
draw alternative conclusions from the ones he offered, but 
nevertheless based upon on the same material. There is no 
need to propose further speculative concepts to enable this 
to take place. 
Another sympathetic, and independently critical, analysis 
of Brightman's theism comes from Rannie Baker. She 
was a close friend of Brightman and worked extensively on 
both him and Hastings Rashdall. The Archive contains notes 
she prepared on Rashdall's view of the problem of evil as 
compared with Brightman's, sent to Brightman for comment. 
(118) Baker was an ardent personalist and sought to 
rehabilitate Brightman's theism within a personalist 
framework from which she felt he had unwittingly departed. 
(119) This framework involved a closer adherence to Bowne 
than Brightman was otherwise prepared to admit. 
Baker's main aim in her book is to explore confusions she 
saw in recent schools of philosophy which sacrificed 
aspects of God's wisdom and power In view of evi Is, 
sufferings and imperfections of creation. In this respect 
she is addressing the heart of Brightman's theism. 
In turn, she addressed three areas of Brightman's work: his 
view of the self or reality, his epistemology, his theory 
of God. She argued he is guilty of moving with rapid and 
bewildering ease across three theories of reality in his 
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understanding of self (120). This gives Brightman problems 
when he comes to speak about the notion of partial selves, 
and of states of subconsciousness and unconsciousness and 
their relationship with the continuity of self. There are 
important issues here and we shall develop these more fully 
in a later chapter. 
In her discussion of Brightman's epistemology Baker was 
very brief and less secure. As her book was published in 
1933 it predates Brightman's important work on the 
Categories. In his later work Brightman underpinned his 
epistemology more fully than had perhaps been the case 
prior to 1933. Even though Brightman never acknowledged 
(either privately or publicly, as far as we are aware) 
Baker's work it is uncertain whether the very lightweight 
treatment Baker gave Brightman in this area would have 
prompted him to tighten his system to ensure others would 
not follow with similar simplicity of criticism. (121) 
Baker's exegesis and commentary on Brightman's theism is 
more sUbstantial. It is here that she argues he has 
departed from his personalist roots. He faces a "double 
dilemma": 
If God is to be a good God, he cannot have evil within 
his own nature; if God is to be ground of all being -
universes, evolutions, creations - he cannot be 
developing with these or dealing In them with anything 
that he did not create. (122) 
Whilst Brightman's theism may well contain many problems, 
and although Baker presented considerable evidence in 
support of her position, the present author does not agree 
that on the basis of Brightman's "double dilemma" she 
succesfull y demonstrated her concl usion that: 
... it is only be, departing from his particular theory 
of a limited Go'Zl, that Brightman is able to speak of 
God as bei ng either good or a Creator. 
But this notwithstanding the outcome of this double 
dilemma, Baker concluded, is that Brightman has violated 
the unity of Spirit. Far from being 'One' as Brightman 
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claims he has argued the Spirit is, Baker proposed that he 
abstracted aspects from Spirit such as reason, feeling 
and thought and given each the potency of living Spirit; 
this is the "error of Phenomenalism". (123) It is this 
'error' which Baker sought to correct in her volume. 
In this book Baker made a number of important points, some 
almost in passi ng. She correctl y identified numerous 
examples, where Bri ghtman moves between differi ng 
terminology when referring to the same subject or object 
and by doing so masks important distinctions that others 
would wish he should make. One example has already been 
noted in Brightman's understanding of the self. Another is 
in his understanding of limitation in God. 
Limitation can be expressed in a number of ways. Knudson 
identified two important definitions of limitation. One 
"denotes imperfection or diminution of reality". The other 
"denotes definiteness and concreteness of being". It is in 
the latter sense that Knudson accepts limitation in God, 
" giving direction to the divine will the divine nature may 
be said to limit it ... without such a limiting nature God 
would not be God ... limitation in the sense of definitness 
of nature is of the very essence of being". (124) 
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Brightman replies, "Thus far we are one. [Knudson] grants 
that there is an uncreated limit to the divine will. We 
differ only about the nature and function of this limit". 
(125) In other words Brightman is ignoring the distinction 
between the two senses of limit which Knudson so carefully 
made. Brightman, by blurring this distinction, is imputing 
that Knudson accepts both when Knudson in fact very clearly 
rejects any notion that limitation in God "denotes 
imperfection or diminution of reality". And Brightman 
misses the whole thrust of their disagreement by the 
apparent gloss, "We differ only about the nature and 
function of this limit". Baker summarises this, 
"[ Knudson] is talking about a definite concrete Spirit 
expressing itself 'perfectly and completely' and the other 
about a check, an opposition, an obstacle to the expressing 
of such Spirit". (126) 
On this point Brightman is guilty. His frequent method, 
(particularly in An Introduction to Philosophy and A 
Phi losop hy of Reli gion) is to I ist and set up the positions 
of his opponents, tilt at them, find them at fault, and 
thus having - so he believed - cleared the way, go on to 
present his own alternative. As was seen in an earlier 
chapter in the correspondence with Quine, and in the 
present exchange between him and Knudson, Brightman's 
method and results are not always convincing. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EVIDENCES FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 
Foreword 
In The Problem of God Brightman lists six arguments from 
which God's existence may be postulated. He calls them 
'evidences' for the existence of God. They are: the 
evidence of the rationality of the universe, the evidence 
of the emergence of novelties, the evidence of the nature 
of personality, the evidence of values, the evidence of 
religious experience, and the evidence of systematic 
coherence. Of these the second Is Incorporated below under 
'The Evidence of Evolution'. The third and fourth are 
included respectively In the sections, 'The Evidence of 
Personality' and 'The Valuational Evidence'. The 'Evidence 
of Religious Experience' is a consideration of "the 
testimony not only of mystics but of ordinary believers of 
many faiths". This evidence Is supplementary to the rest 
for whilst it Is true that religious experience, by Itself, 
"cannot well be used as evidence for the existence of the 
divine object toward which it is directed", it can, "when 
taken In connection with the rest of experience and with 
our total world view", be regarded as, "strong empirical 
confirmation of belief in God". The first and last of the 
six evidences Intertwine throughout the others, and are 
presupposed by them. 
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The Evidence of Evolution 
As the principle of a developing creation was at the heart 
of Brightman's metaphysics both of nature and of God this 
section will examine the evidence for God's existence based 
on a prospect of the world developing towards a telos. 
Bergson's Creative Evolution Is cited with approval by 
Brightman as a modern classic of the view that the world 
"Is not a finished product but is in the making, being 
created constantly". (1) If this Is so how may the 
evolving creation be seen as evidence of God? Brightman 
derives the answer to this from the way he conceives 
creation. Thus: 
If creation be something utterly remote, utterly 
unli ke anything that we have experienced or known, all 
that may be said on the subject Is mere elaboration or 
ignorance. (2) 
But, 
If ... creation be revealed as a fact of our conscious 
experience and of the world In which we live, then we 
have some clue to the creative Spirit of God who 
brooded on the face of the waters. (3) 
It Is Brightman's contention that If reality was solely a 
collection of atoms then an "eternally active creation" 
would be "unintelligible and miraculous". (4) Brightman 
argues that if one sees nature In this way, then one 
effectively denies the possibility of new or more developed 
forms of life in the world for the properties of "atoms are 
so defined as to make novelty Impossible". (5) Brightman 
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is saying that novelty, new forms of life in creation, 
could not come about were it not for an ordered creation: 
... there is far more continuity and plan in the 
novelties that arise than could possibly be accounted 
for by blind chance. (6) 
While there are novelties which seem to suggest disorder 
and disharmony in nature, Bri g htman argues that the 
overriding impression one gains of creation is of an entity 
in which there is order and there is purpose. Brightman's 
position distils to a choice: 
The fact of emergent novelties, then, compels us to 
choose between divine mind and impossible mystery as 
the explanation of this outstanding trait of the real 
world. (7) 
To bolster his position Brightman cites Whitehead with 
approval, "apart from God there could be no relevant 
novelty". (8) Any philosophy which claims a secure 
foundation inexperience must take into account evidence 
which may th reaten its position and must respond to the 
challenge thereby posed. There is a serious objection to 
Brightman's position which has been often rehearsed in many 
locations. Kant, for example, highlights the dichotomy of 
which Brightman was well aware, namely that experience 
points to "the combination of ineffable wisdom in the 
development of life with an enormous amount of waste, 
suffering, and seemingly unsuccessful experimentation". (9) 
Kant says: 
One cannot avoid a certain feeling of disgust, when 
one observes the actions of man displayed on the great 
stage of the world. Wisdom is manifested by 
individuals here and there; but the web of human 
history as a whole appears to be woven from folly and 
childish vanity, often, too, from puerile wickedness 
and love of destruction: with the result that at the 
end one is puzzled to know what idea to form of our 
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species which prides itself so much on Its advantages. 
(10) 
Kant In a later passage develops this observation in the 
form of a question: 
What Is it to glorify and commend to view the 
splendour and wisdom of Creation shown In the 
Irrational kingdom of nature, if, on the great stage 
where the supreme wisdom manifests itself, that part 
which constitutes the final end of the whole natural 
process, namely human history, is to offer a standing 
objection to our adopting such an attitude. (11) 
How does Brightman meet this objection? An Initial answer 
would be that if one concentrates attention upon Isolated 
events in creation one ends with an aggregate of variously 
dislocated and disjointed happenings some of which may be 
labelled 'good', some 'bad' but none of which attest an 
ongoing and increasing goodness in creation. Brightman 
argues that if one examines the 'wholeness' of the creation 
a different interpretation may be discerned: 
No study of separate cells In our organism will 
explain the co-ordinated behaviour of our organism as 
a whole; no study of separate sensations In our minds 
will explain the properties and purposes of our minds 
as a whole. You can understand a painting or 
appreciate the beauty of a mountain only when you have 
a view of the whole to supplement your study of the 
parts. (12) 
Behind all this Is the belief in Brightman that a more 
synoptic Interpretation of creation will yield the view 
that events, which in themselves seem to be devoid of any 
direction subserve a wider purpose. But there is stili a 
challenge remaining which Brightman has yet to meet. 
Namely, if evidence for the existence of a creative orderer 
of creation can be discovered In evidence from evolution, 
to what extent does evidence of dysteleology and evil 
negate any attempt to posit a creative orderer? Brightman 
faced this challenge by incorporating dysteleological 
factors into an overall and all-encompassing teleological 
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schema, all 'subservlng a wider purpose'. He argues that: 
The same processes of law In nature are sometimes 
teleological, sometimes dysteleologlcal; not two 
beings or two hostile laws are at work ... There Is 
only one order. (13) 
He continues, developing his argument: 
... a theism founded on teleology alone flies In the 
face of dysteleologlcal facts; an atheism or diabolism 
founded on dysteleology alone flies In the face of 
teleological facts; and all the forms of dualism In 
ultimate thinking fly In the face of the unity of 
scientific law and the experienced rational 
p rescri ption of coherence. (14) 
When I squarely faced It (sic), I saw that all the 
experience I have myself and all that I could conceive 
must have the same structure that I found In 
evolution: an energy which strives, In accord with 
rational law towards ends, yet contends against limits 
set by reason Itself and also against empirical limits 
set by non-rational purposeless facts In experience. 
(15 ) 
As was noted In an earlier chapter, "perhaps the most 
crucial problem [presumably of philosophy] Is that of 
mechanism versus teleology". (16) Mechanism is defined: 
... the view that explains everything which happens as 
a necessary consequence of past conditions. 
Teleology, on the contrary, holds that explanation In 
terms of previous conditions Is never the last word, 
but that ultimately all mechanisms and all reality are 
to be Interpreted as the expression of purpose. (17) 
Now whilst modern thought has "been awakening to the 
central Importance of such facts as change, variation, 
growth, and freedom" (18) - all central features of an 
evolutionary perspective upon creation - and while, 
"evolution is a correct description of the prinCiples of 
the survival of the fit", he argues that evolution Is "no 
explanation of the arrival of the fit". (19) It Is 
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teleological explanation which best interprets an 
evolutionary theory of creation, this theory In turn being, 
..... widely accepted at the present time ..... (20) 
Brightman lists the empirical evidence which he offers as 
support for a teleological Interpretation of creation: 
The facts of biological adaption, the direction of 
evolution, the function of consciousness, the values 
revealed in experience are among the data that point 
to a teleological explanation. (21) 
Brightman goes on to say: 
.•. evolution is not merely a recombination of 
pre-existing elements, but Is the scene of the arrival 
of new qualities which could not possibly be explained 
merely as forms of what had been there before. (22) 
The results of evolutionary process produce new emergent 
qualities (23) as well as genetic aberrations which seem 
almost devoid of quality. These latter constitute a 
'cosmic drag' hindering the purposive process of creation. 
Brightman includes this 'cosmic drag' In his definition of 
the divine nature, as something which God's will did not 
create but against which It continually strives to direct 
towards good ends. He speaks of: 
... the combination of ineffable wisdom In the 
development of life with an enormous amount of waste, 
suffering, and seemingly unsuccessful experimentation 
... If there is a retarding factor (much more like 
sensation in us than like will) In the divine nature, 
then the slow processes of evolution are seen to be 
necessary and not arbitrary. (24) 
He tells us quite explicitly in this location that he 
arrived at his belief through studies In evolutionary 
thought. Brightman supplements this position by 
describing the sort of God that is attested by the evidence 
of evolution: 
The constant conservation of the energy of the 
universe points to a will that is eternally creating. 
Hence creation implies the immanence of God in all 
things. In particular, it means that the law of 
evol ution is God's method of creation. (25) 
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The conception of a God arrived at in this way is one who 
is a creative will as opposed to a one-time creator. 
Brightman can summarise his argument by concluding that his 
study of emergent novelty has led to God, "as the most 
reasonable explanation of the facts of experience". (26) 
We can see from the above that Bri ghtman has adopted a 
number of ~ priori axioms (such as 'Nature Is In process', 
'is purposive') with certain broad generalisations about 
nature and about scientific inquiry. Whilst these 
generalisations may be confirmed by the results of given 
scientific data they are not arrived at by process of 
scientific research. In the context we are now 
considering, this means his teleological interpretation of 
an evolving creation is an interpretation arrived at 
without consideration of particular scientific data either 
to support or refute his metaphysic. In this sense, one 
could be forgiven for suspecting that Brightman belongs 
more to the speculative idealist tradition than to the 
empirical Idealism we have seen him claim. 
Indeed one has to ask what level of dysteleologlcal 
evidence would convince Brightman that his position had 
died the 'death of a thousand qualifications'. Brightman 
offers no clues by way of answer; all dysteleological 
evidence is drafted into his teleological schema. 
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The Valuational Evidence 
A beginning can be made with a quotation from The Problem 
of God: 
In man's experience we find not merely the facts of 
sense and of self-consciousness, but we also find 
values; both the everyday objects of the heart's 
desire and the Ideal values of love, truth, goodness, 
beauty, and holiness. Realization of these values 
through a growing and active experience constitutes 
the purpose and Justification of life. (27) 
And continuing: 
In every man there Is the divine spark, the 
recognition of the worth of life when rightly lived, 
the demand for something better than yet Is. This 
aspi ration is the source of all science and knowledge 
as well as of religion. The existence of value, like 
the existence of personality (and inextricably 
connected with It), Is a fact to be explained. (28) 
An explanation of what this value is can be found by 
drawing an analogy from the model of personal experience: 
... the world of nature behaves like human nature In 
this respect; it acts as though It, too, were living 
for some purpose. Man strives towards ends which he 
values; nature strives toward ends, such as the 
development of law and order, life and mind, which it 
seems to value. Thus we may consider values In 
nature in connection with values In human personality. 
(29) 
Over against his own theistic Interpretation, Brightman 
looks at corresponding atheistic interpretations. On the 
one hand, the apparent purpose of the universe might be 
explained by saying It Is the result of chance. Of this 
he says that it "is equivalent to saying there is no 
explanation". Brightman proposes that the atheist In 
advancing his claim relies too heavily on coincidence for 
his argument to be plausi ble. On the other hand, the 
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atheist could contend that the abundance of evil "so 
outweighs the good, purposelessness so exceeds purpose, 
that the world cannot be regarded as the work of a God who 
is good". (30) Whilst Brightman does agree that the 
problem of evi I is the "strongest argument and most 
concrete evidence against a God", there are sound reasons 
for holding to belief In purpose In the presence of the 
evils of life. These reasons form six propositions: 
Fi rst, much natural evil Is a wholesome discipline; 
suffering purifies and obstacles strengthen the soul. 
Secondly, moral evil Is a necessary consequence of the 
abuse of the divine gift of freedom. Thirdly, much 
that seems evil to us may be due to the fact that 
God's purposes are unknown to us and Include the good 
of other beings than the human race. Fourthly the 
conception of a finite God ... accounts for much of 
the delay and suffering of the world on Its road to 
the Ideal for which It strives. Fifthly, It is as 
rational for philosophy to assume that beyond and out 
of every apparent evil there is a good to be attained 
as It is for science to assume that every unexplained 
fact in the world has a cause and can be explained. 
Sixthly, the atheist has no explanation of the 
existence of good; he disregards the problem of good 
while insisting on the problem of evil; whereas the 
believer in God rests his belief on a consideration 
both of the good and of the evil In life. (31) 
And he goes on to conclude: 
For these and for many other reasons, theism gives the 
most rational explanation of the facts of our value 
experience, both of Its evils and of Its goods. (32) 
In his essay 'A Personalistic Philosophy of History', 
written almost twenty years after The Problem of God, 
Brightman's valuational argument for the existence of God 
finds almost Identical expression: 
From a personalistic and from a religious point of 
View, the most important problem is whether history 
has a meaning, that Is, whether there Is a Single, 
unified purpose or value or set of values toward which 
history Is tending, by which It Is guided as well 8S 
Judged. (33) 
But behind this Brightman is identifying a more ultimate 
question, namely whether: 
... the many conflicting purposes are all dominated by 
one universal purpose; and whether the validity of 
ideal norms Is more than human aspiration and also 
represents the power and purpose of the creator and 
sustainer of the universe. (34) 
And he continues: 
Whence all this good, if not from a common source, 
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with a common aim? Why have so many shared the faith 
In a coherent universe? How could a Paul say that 
'all things work together for good to them that love 
God', and find so many to beiieve him? How could a 
Hegel think of 'the guile of reason' that somehow 
resembles the Hound of Heaven and gains the victory 
for meaning and purpose, no matter what happens? How 
could so many human beings of all sorts and conditions 
be sustained by an illusion? The universality and 
coherence of values, despite conflict, sin, and 
suffering, require a doctrine of overruling 
Providence, such as personalists assert: an 
overruling, but not an all-predestinating Providence. 
(35) 
And to this is added: 
... the future Is free and open on the one hand, yet 
di rected and guided on the other. For personalism, 
then, there Is no history without God; the notion of a 
godless history as redeemer is not merely absurd - it 
is impossible. God is participant in all history; no 
history is godless. Man without God is either a 
purely psychological fact of disbelief or a 
theological abstraction; it is never a metaphysical or 
historical reality. (36) 
Considerable mention, so far without explanation, has been 
made of purpose in this chapter. This omission must be 
rectified. Firstly, Brightman states that purpose Is a 
personal experience. Within personal experience are 
factors which, "may be called Given", in that they are not 
produced by will. The Given comprises both rationai and 
non-rationai factors. By the former is meant the laws of 
reason and the principles of ideal norms. Brightman's 
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concept of the Given was introduced In the previous 
chapter. How is this related to the argument for God's 
existence from valuational evidence? Brightman offers an 
analogy: 
The rational Given, found Incompletely in human 
experience, Is evidence of the existence of the fully 
rational Given in God - God's eternally valid 
knowledge of unchangeable logic and unchangeable 
norms. It Is the realm of Platonic Ideas. Yet the 
efficacy of the rational Given Is not automatic; It 
depends on the action of will both divine and human. 
As furnishing goals for action, It Is tellc. (37) 
The non rational Given may be described as those features 
in experience which thwart its purposing will: 
... they are not rationally necessary, nor are they so 
constituted or so distributed in nature and history as 
to be perfect means to the perfect end of love ... 
They are non-rational brute fact. (38) 
If these are viewed as components of the eternally ongoing 
experiences of God they are termed by Brightman, 
non-rational rather than irrational sufferings. As 
non-rational they are "controlled by divine providence for 
the purposes of love". (39) Purpose Is Impotent without a 
willing of love: 
Purpose cannot function without will. Will Is 
selection, control, responsibility, creativity. 
These words describe the very stuff of history and of 
Its realization of purpose. Will Is a 
self-determination within given limits, choosing from 
the given field of choice. It is freedom to good or 
to evil. (40) 
And again: 
Purpose Is an act of the total personality - the 
active will, devoted to the norms of the rational 
Given and actualizing its potential by controlling the 
non-rational Given. Despite Its complexity of 
structure, It Is al ways the act of a unitary person (a 
unitas multiplex), an interaction with other persons 
In a society. Unless the basic potentials were 
somehow common to all, history would be a complete 
chaos. As it is, there is tragedy enough, but the 
tragedy of the cross In all history is a purposive 
tragedy in which logos and agape are the ruling 
principles. (41) 
To this Brightman adds his conclusion: 
... it follows that there can never be a final 
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eschaton in time: no last event, no end of all God's 
world when time (and purpose) shall be no more, or 
when, in Hindu fashion, man is finally and completely 
merged with God, losing Individual personality. The 
eternal purpose which history Is actualizing Is that 
of inexhaustible creativity, Including endless variety 
In control of the Given, endless growth In Individual 
powers, community and love. (42) 
An earlier chapter noted the way Brightman stands 
four-square with Kant In his affirmation of the autonomy of 
moral norms. The awareness of ethical imperatives is 
prior, In both thinkers, to awareness of religious claims. 
Morality in the ordo cognoscendi does not rest on religion. 
Brightman argues that In the ordo essendl the ultimate 
basis and meaning of axiology lies In the nature of the 
divine person. This can be demonstrated from those parts 
of Brightman's work where he makes specific reference to 
ideals and norms. (43) He relates 'norms' and 'Ideals' to 
'values': 
Norms are the Ideal purposes of God, and •.• his 
realization of those norms Is an objective area of 
value In the universe. (44) 
Brightman Is not giving, as might be thought, his 
conclusion in advance of his argument. We can trace the 
pathway his reasoning took: 
.•. ideals and values are not merely human standards 
and human experiences, but ••. they reveal the 
objective structure, or, perhaps, the conscious 
purpose, of the universe, Just as human sense 
experience and human standards of scientific method 
reveal the laws of nature. (45) 
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Brightman advances his thesis more specifically: 
goodness and truth and beauty are imperative 
ideals for the universe Independent of man, as well as 
for man and that when man is seeking to realize them, 
he is working toward the very goals for which the 
universe is strivi ng. (46) 
And again: 
The ideal world is a set of purposes regarding the 
present, concrete real world. Hence every norm 
implies something about the structure of the real and 
defines metaphysical features of the real. (47) 
Granted that for Brightman 'every norm Implies something 
about the structure of the real' In what way can this be 
seen as evidence for the existence of God? Brightman's 
position must be detailed further by way of answer. 
In so far as sense perceptions are trusted as a means of 
interpreting the nature of physical reality our moral 
perceptions should similarly be seen to have objective 
validity. Thus, when a person recognizes a moral 
imperative to do a given action It Is normally Judged that 
all persons in "ke situations ought to obey the 
Imperatives of that particular obligation. In other words 
the particular 'value experience' posits a universally 
valid norm against which Its worth might be measured. (48) 
Brightman says: 
... the laws of value In the moral sphere are as 
objectively valid as the laws of causal connection In 
nature, although they are very different and 
differently apprehended. (49) 
Whilst value-claims are In some sense dependent for their 
validity on the Judgement of a valuer, true-values (Ideals) 
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have an intrinsic worth in their own right, it may be said 
they have an objective value. Brightman's position is that 
a parallei, albeit dissimilar, relationship pertains 
between sense-experience and value-experience. Both point 
to a realm beyond their subjective experiencing to an 
objectively real order of being. 
How is this objective value related to the argument for the 
existence of God? Firstly Brightman says that "The 
meaning of obligation is the imperative command to make the 
ideal real". (50) Hence, ideals are normative in personal 
living. If this is the case, in what locus is there an 
absolute standard of right and wrong, which is as 
independent of this or that person's desires as the facts 
of material nature are independent of man's senses? The 
answer Brightman argues is found in a realm beyond the 
human. He says: 
... we may speak of the objectivity of norms most 
coherentl y ... w hen we th ink of them as the true 
ideals known by an all-knowing mind. Norms 
(metaphyslcaliy speaking) would be God's 
acknowledgment that love and Justice, truth and 
beauty, ought to be. God's values would be his own 
obedience to and realization of these norms in acts of 
love and Justice, truth and beauty. Our values would 
be our realization of norms. (51) 
But for God true val ues are: 
... known and acknowledged by God as his own guiding 
principles. They are not arbitrary creations of his 
will but rather are part of the eternal and changeless 
structure of his personality. God's activity is 
incessant and creative, but his acts would be mere 
chaos were they not guided by unchangeable devotion to 
truth, goodness, beauty and holiness. (52) 
To this may be added: 
When we discover a new and true ideal, we discover a 
divine purpose. (53) 
... the norms are internal to the very structure of 
divine reality, which ... Is the personal 
consciousness of God. (54) 
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The thrust of Brl ghtman's position will by now be clear. 
We must summarise the present section and outline 
Brightman's conclusion. We can also offer some 
observations. In an Illuminating passage In The Spiritual 
Life Brightman writes: 
An ideal or a norm Is a goal toward which a person 
ought to aim, an end acknowledged to be Imperative. 
In so far forth, It Is possible that Ideals are Just 
as subjective as values, In spite of all we have been 
saying about their objectivity. After all, purposes 
and ends are consciously entertained only by persons 
as plans of thel r action. If an Ideal Is objective, 
and retains anything of Its empirical character, It 
must be objective as a purpose. It has no other 
function. Since the Ideals which we Judge to be true 
ideals are not taken to be the private purposes of any 
one person or society, they are acknowledged to be 
superior to a" society. Hence they point to a 
system of purposes in the universe beyond man. That 
system of purpose Is what spiritual thinkers have 
called the mind of God, the Holy Spirit. (55) 
This may be concluded: 
If the theory thus roughly sketched corresponds to the 
real world, the Ideals of man's spiritual life, In so 
far as they are rational and true, are the purposes of 
the Cosmic Spirit, God, the Holy Spl rlt. (56) 
What comment can be made? Firstly we can locate 
Brightman's philosophy within a philosophically popular 
movement in philosophical thinking In the first half of the 
twentieth century. In the unpublished correspondence 
between Brightman and his pupil Rannle Baker the latter 
sends Brightman some notes entitled, 'Rashdall's View of 
the Problem of Evil as Related to Brightman's'. (57) 
Although these comprise a number of quotations from a 
variety of locations In Rashdall's works the following can 
be selected as pertinent: 
Evil exists, though (if our moral ideals contain any 
revelation of the Divine) it can only exist for the 
sake of the good ... How much good is destined to be 
realised we cannot tell. Enough for us to know two 
things: (1) that enough good will be realized to 
justify its being willed by a righteous and all-wise 
Mind; (2) that our cooperation is required in 
realizing it. (58) 
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It is also important to recognize as we pursue Brightman's 
understanding of that which gives us ground for belief in 
God, that he explicitly denied the possibility of a 
stricti y rational, in the sense of logically secure, proof 
of God's existence. The hypothesis of God Is an attempt to 
overcome a potentially difficult antinomy. This antinomy 
is associated with the argument that If all value is 
experience of persons, there would be no values were there 
no persons to experience them. 
How does Brightman deal with the possible accusation that 
vai ues have no objective basis but are manifestations of 
wholly subjective desires? Brightman could answer such a 
charge saying that if all values were subjective In this 
way there would be no reason why anyone should seek, or 
feel morally bound by, any values at all. But, for 
Brightman, values are not subjective In this way. He 
argues that the fact we do experience moral norms, 
obligations and so on, actually Indicates their 
objectivity. Since these values cannot have an objective 
basis when located in the experience of human persons their 
objective basis resides (however defined) In a person who 
is other than human. For Brightman this must be the case 
for all values are the experience of persons, and If human 
persons cannot be the guarantors of objective values 
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(ideals, norms etc), then a non-human but nevertheless 
personal, guarantor has to be posited to affirm the 
objectivity of those ideals and norms which are the 
standards against which our own limited and subjective 
value-experiences are measured. In this way value has its 
objectivity in personality, but not human personality. 
Bri g htman concl udes that: 
... thought drives us in the direction of the 
hypothesis of a supreme mind or person as the ultimate 
reality of the universe and the home of values. The 
hypothesis, known as personalistic Idealism or 
personal ism, is true if it be, as It appears to be, 
the only thoroughly coherent solution of the antinomy. 
(59) 
The Evidence of Personality 
Bri g htman's argument for the existence of God from the 
evidence of personality is one based largely upon analogy: 
Sensations appear in our personal consciousness; as is 
the strucure and sequence of our sensations, so is the 
structure and sequence of nature. (60) 
Brightman is not making both sides of the analogy Identical, 
for we find him saying: 
Only a few other animals bear any close resemblance to 
a human organism, and If they are conscious, their 
consciousness is doubtless very dissimilar to ours. 
The inorganic world seems unlike both our minds and 
our bodies, although analysis reveals common elements 
throughout nature. (61) 
And from this Brightman argues that: 
If the creative being at the heart of the universe is 
a person, science makes clear that the Cosmic Person 
is greatly unli ke human persons. (62) 
Far from disproving the existence of God this suggests 
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rather that the search for evidence of God's reality has 
only just begun. Brightman in two important quotations 
marks the point from which this search begins: 
The person, then, is an experient. Within him is all 
the evidence there is for whatever may be beyond him. 
The esse of every sensory awareness as well as every 
thought Is within the person's experience, wherever 
its causa may be. (63) 
... all the evidence for nature, society, or God that 
we have or ever could have Is to be found In each 
self, his personal being as experient. (64) 
These words are almost a repetition of some from 1939. 
There are individual persons, and their experience is 
repiete with signs of other reality. Perhaps the 
other reality is itseif wholly personal; perhaps there 
is nothing In the universe except interacting 
empi rical situations. (65) 
The relationship a person has with the universe and with 
other persons Is far more rational and far more precious 
than the person's own private or personal self could ever 
be alone. Brightman continues: 
No wonder that Anaxagoras, Greek discoverer of Nous, 
saw rational self as the ruling power In all things! 
No wonder that the Greek sophists declared that the 
human self is the 'measure of all things'! Nor Is 
it surprising that Plato and Wordsworth found in the 
self traces of eternal and heavenly truth, so that the 
soul came 'trailing clouds of giory', or that the 
Indian genius has seen in every self a spark of Cosmic 
Self, Brahma. (66) 
Brightman argues that the human person's kinship with the 
divine is a postulate of religious belief. This does not 
- it must be stressed, following Brightman - indicate the 
one is reducible to the other but rather that if there is 
no kinship (no analogy) between human persons and the God 
of religious belief then the existence of God becomes 
meaningless. In speaking of divine-human kinship Brightman 
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says: 
No anthropomorphism is necessary; the organon of man 
need not resemble the divine organon. But 
anthropopathism is essential. Some truth, some 
beauty, some love, some reason must be in man, akin to 
the divine; otherwise the divine is groundless, and 
meaningless for man. Man is somehow an imago dei. 
Such kinship must have an objective source; but this 
truth is overemphasized by theologians who find 
predestination and divine sovereignty to be the whole 
truth. The fact of this divine kinship is the 
inevitable idealistic element in all religion. (67) 
How is the 'anthropopathic task' to proceed: 
God is utterly unlike the physical objects and 
processes which may be observed by scientific methods. 
God is not an object visi ble to the senses, and his 
existence is not capable of experimental verification 
in any such sense as is a scientific hypothesis about 
the physical world. This does not mean that God is 
unrelated to our sensations or that he is not present 
in physical events. It means rather that, so long as 
we confine ourselves to observing what our senses 
reveal, we cannot perceive God. (68) 
In other words a 'synoptic approach' is needed for 
discovering evidence for God's existence in personality. 
This is so because of the nature of God's encompassing all 
reality apart from the human mind. (69) The synoptic 
approach is demonstrated: 
God is a property of the universe as a whole, and not 
of its observable parts taken separately. Just as 
the life in an organism cannot be perceived or 
understood by a skeleton or of a 'pound of flesh', so 
God cannot be perceived at all until we are able to 
frame some idea of the living whole. This by no 
means implies that God is the whole, for a being that 
contained all of the ignorance, error, and sin of man 
would be too chaotic and incoherent to be a God at 
all. But it does mean that God, if he exists at all, 
is a being whose purposes and ideals are concerned 
with the whole, and (If personalism is true) that his 
will is the power at work in all the events which 
involve what physics calls matter and energy. Now, 
no thought about separate parts of the world would 
give us a view of God. Only he can find God who 
looks at the physical and the astronomical, the moral 
and the ideal, the true and the beautiful, as a 
connected whole. (70) 
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If the nature of this Cosmic Being, God, is personal, It 
follows that one has the justification to begin from 
personal experience In forming an understanding of God. 
Indeed as has been stated, there can be no other beginning 
but the personal beginning. From this, on Brightman's own 
terms, the conclusion would be a view of all else as 
personal: 
If ... personality is the eternal reality in the 
universe and what we call matter and energy and their 
laws are simply the functioning of a cosmic 
personality, then the relation between matter and 
spi rit is a relation between spi rit and spi rit, and 
our conscious existence is reasonably connected with 
the rest of the universe. (71) 
In his 'An Empirical Approach to God' Brightman reinforces 
his view of the worth of a synoptic approach to 
understanding that reality as attested by experience: 
When we speak of God, we are speaking of a supposed 
being, perfect In some sense, and In some sense 
dominant in the universe as a whole. God, If there be 
a God, is a metaphysical object. What is true about 
God can neither contradict the special sciences, nor 
yet be derived from them alone. (72) 
The nature of God as the object of this metaphysical 
understanding of reality is spelt out in the same place: 
The idea of God symbolizes a unity or harmony between 
existence and value; coherence between the structure 
and function of persons and the structure and function 
of things; an end for human and for cosmic endeavour, 
individual and social; a synthesis of mechanism and 
purpose. 
The existence of God, Brightman argues should not be taken 
as so self-evident as to require no investigation. He 
asks therefore, "Is verification of the idea of God 
possi ble?" (73) 
Initially the way in which the verification might proceed 
should be clarified. The ostensive definition or 
verification of data in science is not a model applicable 
to verification of the idea of God, " ... a proposition 
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about God is not primarily concerned with tangible, public 
'things'. God cannot be defined ostensivelY". (74) 
The metaphysical approach to an understanding of God Is an 
approach that Brl ghtman considers most consonant with both 
our experience and understanding of reality. Propositions 
about God therefore are propositions concerning the whole 
nature of reality. If, then, these propositions are 
propositions that can be made about reality In general upon 
what basis Is their verification founded? 
Firstly, it is taken as axiomatic both for science and 
metaphysics that the search for truth In each "presupposed 
the rational coherence of truth". All verification 
furthermore "must begin and end In the present experience 
of a verifying person". 
Secondly, both the scientific and the metaphysical belong 
to a system, a coherent whole which might Involve prior 
purposing, and (or) the testing of hypotheses. In each the 
essence of the verification process "Is not merely that 
facts be observed, but that the systematic relations of 
facts be perceived". (75) 
A thi rd Ii keness is the hypothetical character of that 
which is to be verified. All verification in this respect 
will be partial for there can never be complete 
understanding of all "systematic relations". But the 
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inquirer nevertheless does have certain data, or evidence 
which " like all hypotheses can be tested by their 
systematic adequacy In organizing all the data". 
In 'An Empi rical Approach to God' Brightman argued that the 
metaphysical hypothesis of a personal God provides the most 
coherent account of experience and all the knowledge we 
construct on it (Including belief In God). The core of his 
presentation is constantly related back to the personal 
analogy: 
An experient, then, is an actual complex of awareness, 
including content, form, and activity. It always 
interacts with other experients and the world, 
although it is often not aware of this Interaction as 
such , not of the forms implied by Its experience. (76) 
... all experients and all entities, as far as we know 
or imagine, have three properties, which we shall call 
action, content, and form. (77) 
Brightman speaks about these properties: 
In so far as this is a world of interacting process, 
all of its constituents are active, and In every 
experient there Is the phase of action. In so far as 
an experient Is aware, it must be aware of content -
of qualia, essences, subsistents, sensa, or whatever 
one may please to call the Immediate content of 
consciousness. In so far as an experient conforms to 
law, or is a member of a rational order, or Is aware 
of the rational relations of Ideal values, there is in 
It the phase of form. (78) 
Concerning action, content and form Brightman argues that 
not only, "every moment of actual experience" but also, 
"every concrete real object to which our experience can 
refer, Is a complex which can be analyzed into the same 
three factors". Now it follows that If we are to propose 
evidence for the existence of God, "If God Is the supreme 
experient, his content would include awareness of all 
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qualities in the universe; his form would Include all 
possi ble relations; and his activity would select from 
among the qualities those of Ideal value and would direct 
the cosmic process toward their realization". (79) 
It Is therefore on the common structure of activity, form 
and content In both human and divine persons that an 
analogy based on the evidence of personality can be made 
concerning the existence of God. 
Some observations and general comment on Brightman's 
argument for the existence of God from the evidence of 
personal ity must be made. 
It could be said that Brightman's conception of God 
suggests a superhuman person of such staggering magnitude 
that one has to ask whether the somewhat elusive model of 
human personality Is the best model upon which to construct 
such a grand metaphysics of reality. For example, If one 
reasons by analogy, one begins from what Is experienced of 
reality in ourselves to reality at large. And If reality 
is to be faithfully reflected In our thinking It must be 
understood according to given criteria that make It 
intelligible. One could say our thinking must have both 
Internal coherence and external reference. An Interna"y 
coherent metaphysics would not be sufficient as a guarantee 
of the validity of any epistemological postulates - these 
postulates must also be tested by their external relevance. 
In other words If our experience is a microcosm of a wider 
macrocosm It follows that what we experience of reality In 
the microcosm must also pertain to wider reality in the 
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macrocosm. Much depends on Important issues here. 
Namely, at what point Is the analogy so stretched that it 
breaks down? Or, does the analogy tolerate considerable 
difference between divine and human persons such that it 
will always hold no matter what differences there are 
between divine and human persons? 
In the following chapter we shall reconsider Brightman's 
human-divine analogy in the light of an analysis of his 
metaphysics of experience. In that location we shall go 
some way towards answering the questions Just posed. 
However before this present chapter Is ended, we must, for 
sake of completeness, simply note a further 'evidence' for 
God's existence. We do so with some hesitancy for 
Brightman's 'Dialectic of Desire' does not readily fit with 
his other evidences. Both for this reason, ~nd because we 
also question its philosophical credibility, we shall not 
explore it in any depth. The 'Dialectic of Desire' is to 
be found in A Philosophy of Religion (80). 
The dialectic Is a curious argument resembling the 
classical or 'traditional' ~ priori arguments more than any 
of Brightman's 'evidences', (81) The dialectic starts 
from the simplest, pre-reflective desire (Brightman says 
this is 'pleasure'), and rises through alternating stages 
of thesis, antithesis and synthesis to Its ultimate goal, 
'the conception of a Supreme Person', (82) In this 
conception the dialectic of desire has found the same 
solution as did Saint Augustine when he declared the "soul 
is restless until it finds rest in God", (83) 
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The dialectic di d not fit into the normal, empl rically 
based structure of Brightman's philosophy. Apart from its 
reference to the experience of desire, a number of 
important factors were left out of the structure of the 
dialectic. For example there is no consideration of evil, 
although Brightman did recognise he had omitted It. As a 
consequence of this he qualified any force the dialectic 
might have had by admitting that "until evil has been 
examined, all conclusions about good remain Insecure". (84) 
Evil in the dialectic is 'forgotten temporarily'. 
The dialectic is curious for there Is no attempt to address 
the problem of there being no necessary connection between 
the desire for something and Its existence. Thus I might 
well desire a Supreme Person, but the object of this desire 
might nevertheless turn out to be a nonentity. 
And thirdly we can offer comment by way of reference to the 
concept of obi i gatlon. In an early essay Brightman wrote: 
There is some ground for the assertion of a relation 
between obligation and desire. Obligation Is, In 
large part, a principle for organizing and Judging 
desires; and conformity ought to be a dominant desire. 
Yet It remains true that no desire, because It Is a 
desl re, and for no other reason, Is therefore 
obli gatory. The law of '1 want', even when 
calculated with the utmost prudence, Is not the law of 
'1 ought'. (85) 
The thrust of this essay is that the concept of obligation 
is an i rreducl ble category. Brl ghtman challenges those 
who "Interpret obligation as a form of desire". (86) 
Such reasoning is "not true to moral experience". Desire 
must not take precedence over obligation. Brightman 
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again : 
No desire, however long-lived or dominant, constitutes 
an obligation merely because of Its existence as a 
desire. Often we acknowledge obligations without 
any desi re to fulfil them; often we have no desi re to 
discover the obligations that we know we should find 
if we looked. (87) 
It is regrettable Brightman did not address some of the 
problems that arise, even within his own works between 
obligation and desire in his 'dialectic of desire'. Is 
this an Issue which we must address now? Or can we accept 
that the dialectic of desire, eccentric in Brightman's 
philosophy, is best left with these questions? 
By way of answer we can remind ourselves that the dialectic 
of desire only appeared in the pages of A Philosophy of 
Religion and nowhere else. It was not even reconsl dered 
or redeveloped In Person and Reality. Whilst Inferences 
based upon silence are notoriously dangerous, we feel safe 
in suggesting that Brightman's lack of further treatment of 
the dialectic indicates of something of his own view of Its 
continuing worth. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
BRIGHTMAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENCE 
AN EVALUATIVE CRITIQUE 
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In this chapter a critique of Brightman's account of 
experience will be developed. The chapter Is divided Into 
two principal sections. In the first a number of Initial 
weaknesses in Brightman's position will be exposed. In the 
second, more detailed analysis, I shall Identify 
substantive difficulties. 
1. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON BRIGHTMAN'S ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENCE 
In this first section we must ask 'was Brightman Justified 
in maintaining the strict bifurcation between experience 
and its object given the definition of experience he 
adopted?' 
To begin answering this we need to bring Into focus 
relevant aspects of Brightman's account of experience. 
Having done this we will then consider the bearing these 
have upon his description of the distinction between 
persons and selves, as well as persons and the 
subconscious. It will become evident that a closer unity 
between experience and its object is more in accord with 
our understanding of person than Brightman was prepared to 
allow. This Is a bold claim to make. Initially, only 
interim conclusions will be offered. More firm results 
will develop. 
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The Implications of Experience Brightman calls his method 
'personalistic', because it uses the data of personal 
consciousness - there being no other data availabie. He 
equates personal consciousness with experience and 
understands 'experience' as immediate ongoing activity and 
data in the consciousness. Brightman's starting point was 
an appeal to experience as an undeniable beginning for 
metaphysical reflection. 
This experience is experience of the person who, exists and 
thinks at a time, now. (1) Present experience implies the 
existence of an 'other': "We find ... that in the very 
nature of the present there are references to the absent". 
(2) Every experience transcends itself. It goes beyond 
the present data of experience with the intention that 
those data are then understood and comprehended in their 
relatedness with the rest of reality. The experient is a 
part of that reality to which his experience testifies. (2) 
He Is not an alien In a strange land: "the being of the 
present involves and requires the being of the absent If 
the present is to be understood". (3) 
Throughout Brightman's philosophy an Interactive dynamic 
operates between experience and knowledge. For the success 
of his system, transcendence of present experience (the 
shining present), Is fundamentai. It is Brightman's sole 
guard against solipsism. His 'transcendental' method is a 
systematic uncovering of the conditions and presuppositions 
implied In the Immediate data of experience. Brightman saw 
the metaphysician as one trying to answer the questions, 
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'Who am I? What do I mean? What confronts us? How are we 
all related? What are our reasonable and legitimate 
goals?' (4) 
Experience is always coming face to face with new 
situations. It is always discovering newness. The act of 
exeriencing when it discovers newness Is unthematic, it Is 
preordered. Rational reflection upon the experience must 
then take place. But the preordered experience Is 
undeniable and immediate; It Is Brightman's shining present 
and situation-experienced, It Is ..... the 'this' and the 
'mine', 'the immediacy of feeling.'" (5) 
The shining present is constituted by all that has gone 
before and which to greater or lesser extents has 
influenced the person I now am. Thus, preordered act of 
experience and ordered content of experience are In 
constant interface. But their dialectical movements are 
not rigidly temporal in that all past experience does not 
have to be ordered before new preordered experience comes 
along. 
Persons and Selves In Brightman's evolutionist 
philosophy persons enjoy the most sophisticated advancement 
in that they are able to develop ideal values and realise 
them In practice. Varying levels of consciousness have 
emerged In creation and are developing out of and within 
the creative process. Significant for this study is 
Brightman's contention that there Is no reason on the basis 
of known evidence to say that only human beings are 
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persons. (6) 
Thus whilst many animal species live to re-create their own 
kind and live in order to eat their next meal, in others 
incipient personality presents itself. Equally there are 
human selves whose levels of abnormality are such that 
their incapacity to develop Ideal values means they cannot 
be considered persons. "Such beings would be subpersonal 
selves, without eventual potentialities of any real 
development or redemption". (7) 
Brightman is arguing for the emergence of several layers or 
phases of selfhood which at a given stage of evolutionary 
progression pass Into personhood. But who, we must ask, 
is to decide when such a stage has been reached or passed? 
Upon what criteria Is such a decision to be made? As Is 
evident, the title 'Homo Sapiens' does not necessarily 
indicate a person, for It would seem a profoundly and 
mentally handicapped child Incapable of developing and 
realizing ideal values would not qualify, on Brightman's 
terms, for the title 'person'. Perhaps Increased 
evolutionary sophistication will allow horses and dogs to 
be called persons at some stage In the future, if not now 
I n some remote cases. 
Whilst Brightman has given epistemological criteria for 
defining the nature of persons, these criteria have the 
potentiality to overlap any given number of selves. 
Thus difficulties In,fevltably arise when one attempts to 
identify those who are persons and who are not. 
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Therefore following Brightman we find him Implying, if 
not actually saying, that some of the same species may be 
persons and some may not be. Equally some may be 
persons for a while who through circumstances beyond 
control (perhaps through conditions such as senility In 
humans) fall to be value-creative, and therefore cease to 
be persons. The philosophical consequences of this are 
obvious, t4amely that the application of Brightman's 
criteria of personality In particular Instances raises 
almost insurmountable problems of Judgement and 
estimation. 
Agai n, when he says "various levels of selfhood and 
personality merge Into each other and defy 
classification" (8) the Implications are substantial. If 
there is such merging, and taking further our comments 
about the application of his concept of person, we must 
suggest that Brightman's definition of person is 
contingent upon a metaphysical concept, the parameters of 
which cannot be properly Identified or given coordinates. 
All this has profound Implications for his account of 
person. As will be shown, Brightman's account of person 
as an experiencing consciousness alone, Is not as 
empirically secure as he Intended. Brightman, far from 
resolving the problem of personal identity, has made it 
more problematic. 
Conscious and Subconscious Brightman argues that he 
finds it more responsible to regard the subconscious as 
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"a complex of relatively transient or relatively 
permanent other selves which are related to the normal 
self by interaction, without being part of it". (9) The 
subconscious for Brightman was part of the persons's 
environment, not part of his person. However, he did 
make important concessions: 
The subconscious is in one sense nearer to being part 
of the person than any other environmental factor, 
because it is a series of conscious processes which 
almost always (perhaps always) accompany the person as 
satellites accompany a planet, yet act on the person 
more intimately than the tidal action of any moon; but 
in another sense the subconscious Is more definitely 
excluded from the person than Is biological and 
physical nature, for our knowledge of it is more 
clearly inferential. (10) 
How does his understanding of the subconscious relate to 
his concept of the person? The question must be posed, 
'has Brightman given sufficient evidence to argue 
pursuasively that the subconscious is not part of my person 
but constitutes another self?' 
In passing, we note that a considerable philosophical 
debate surrounds this issue and still arrests contemporary 
philosophers. (11) That debate is not one into which we 
should be diverted here. More pressing is our critique 
of the way Brightman handled himself when he referred to 
related Issues. 
If the person is to interact with his or her subconscious, 
it would appear that this Interaction, on Brightman's 
terms, would register in the conscious experience of the 
person. This is what happens, Brightman tells us, between 
experience and any object of Its attention. 
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Brightman wrote, concerning the 'first-personal dimension' 
of person that, the situation-experienced, "may be called 
immediacy, if it be remembered that immediacy Includes both 
terms and relations ". (12) Regrettably he did not specify 
precisely what he meant by 'terms' but It seems he was 
referring to the data of experience. With the same care, 
we take him to mean, by 'relations', the experience of 
relation between experience and Its object. In the 
present context the object Is the subconscious. 
Accord i n g to the canons of Bri g htman 's personalism, a 
person has experience of Interaction with his or her 
envi ronment. However we submit that except perhaps In 
certain psychotherapeutic conditions, one Is not aware of 
interaction or relation with the subconsciousness. 
Therefore the Interplay between consciousness and the 
subconsciousness cannot normally be said to be a datum of 
experience, if indeed available to experience at all. That 
the two do interact Is not In doubt, but It would seem that 
the interaction Is more at a non-cognitive, pre-thematic 
level than at the level of experience. Even if one 
attempts to be aware of this Interaction it is unll kely one 
will succeed. 
If this is the case, and I believe it Is, then the relation 
between consciousness and subconsciousness is different in 
some way, or to some degree, from that of the relationship 
between consciousness and the physical world. In other 
words, conclusions of arguments concerning the relationship 
between consciousness and su bconsclousness do not say the 
same as do those which apply to consciousness and world. 
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If this is so, 'how may their interaction be expressed 
better?' We shall come to this in due course. 
2. THE CATEGORY OF SUBSTANCE 
The Relevance of the Categories The most appropriate 
place to begin this second part of our critique Is with 
those conditions which make experience understandable, or 
at least potential I y understandable. Bri g htman i ntrod uced 
the concept of category as something which enables a whole 
universe of discourse based on experience to be understood. 
Thus if one were to take away knowledge of the categories, 
whilst "understanding of experience will have been lost" it 
nevertheless follows that "as long as experience continues, 
the potentiality of reason remains and categories will be 
rediscovered". (13) 
pubstance as Continuity and Discontinuity Brightman 
argues that our experience testifies to continuities and 
discontinuities in both shining present and illuminating 
absent. (14) Accordingly he proposes the category of 
substance as a category which unites and unifies all 
reality in an interpenetrating, interacting organic whole 
of consciousness. What we experience of reality In 
ourselves is therefore somehow definitive of what reality 
is: 
Sensations appear in ou r personal consciousness; as is 
the structure and sequence of our sensations, so is 
the structure and the sequence of nature. (15) 
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Brightman's contention is that if reality was not of the 
nature of consciousness it would be difficult to advance 
any inferences concerning reality since the only experience 
(on Brightman's terms) we have of reality is our own 
consciousness. 
Brightman's rhetorical answer to the question, 'What Is the 
nature of reality?' would be something like, 'It Is what I 
experience it to be, namel y consciousness'. Now we have 
seen that Brightman does not Include anything other than 
one's own experiencing in consciousness, neither the 
subconscious or the world we see and touch. If the 
Illuminating absent really is constituted by consciousness, 
it has to be experience of another person, or persons. 
Since the individual person's experience does not Include 
all reality, and since reality as consciousness is the 
conclusion of Brightman's investigation we find that he 
posits a Supreme Experient who Includes In his experience 
all reali ty that constitutes what Brl g htman descrl bes as 
the illuminating absent. Such an experient Is God. 
At no point does Brightman define the illuminating absent 
as a non-mental physical entity. His account of reality 
al ways defines matter In terms of mind. When he refers 
to The Given as "matter", he does not mean "physical 
substance, but conscious content". (16) For Brightman 
matter is "the very presence of God with us In his actual 
will and energy ... " (17) 
For Brightman, the human person is exhaustively identified 
with conscious experience, this Identification does not 
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include the body but admits Interaction with It. However 
in contrast to this, God as the Divine Person has no body, 
is uncreated and creates other persons. (18) By this 
Brightman means that God is not dependent for his being 
upon his creation. The world of physical nature, part of 
God's creation, is an expression of the divine will In 
action and Is Included In the person of God, and as such Is 
identified solely as conscious experience. Human persons 
are not Included in the consciousness of God. Brightman 
argued God has willed there should be consciousness in the 
world other than his own. 
From this it can be seen how Brightman proposes that all 
inferences about reality are based upon personal 
consciousness, experience. The consciousness of each 
person is that microcosm of which reality at large is the 
macrocosm. Our experience of our own consciousness is 
according to Brightman our only experience of reality, and 
as such is definitive of the nature of reality. 
Awareness that this physical absent (which we do not 
directly perceive as consciousness) is really a part of the 
divine consciousness, comes after appraisal of our own 
experience and it comes In the manner of analysis and 
synthesis. Brightman grants that whilst persons do not 
have continuous experience of events In the physical world 
(sleep, inattention, unconsciousness all inhibit this 
continuity), rational interpretation of these 
discontinuities demands that persons "postulate a 
continuous physico-astronomical world" beyond human 
experience by reference to which thel r experiences can be 
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understood. This physico-astronomical world is "incurably 
interactive", it is 'event-full'. Brightman as Is being 
shown, treats the physical world very seriously, and 
although he rejects the realist view that the physical 
realm is non-mental he nevertheless accepts there is a 
physical world, and this physical world needs appropriate 
criteria according to which its might be best understood. 
(19 ) 
Thus, that which facilitates our understanding of the 
physical world is our rationally ordered thought. In 
other words our capacity to make inferences is based upon a 
rational and coherent interpretation of experience. 
But, if our experience does not include any aspect of 
physical nature, as Bri ghtman says it cannot, have we a 
sufficient empirical basis for arguing that another's 
experience (i.e. a 'Supreme Experlent', God) does? 
Further, if our experience does not include our bodies, as 
Brightman argues is the case, and If our experience is the 
model upon which our concept of the universe Is founded, 
does Brightman have any Justification to say that our 
bodies are incl uded in the personality of God? 
As might be expected, answers are not easy to obtain. They 
will emerge however if this section is subdivided into 
three more specific areas; God and Nature, Person and 
Nature and Person and Body. 
(i) God and Nature Brightman writes: 
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Natural objects and processes are, to be sure, not 
persons; but their purposive adaptions are the 
conscious experiences of the cosmic Person of whom 
nature is but one of many orders in his consciousness. 
Purpose in physical nature is a sign of the conscious 
goals of the cosmic person. (20) 
Brightman recognizes that the existence of evii poses a 
problem - how In the face of so much evil can there be 
purpose, most especially the pu rpose of benevolent deity? 
He answers: 
In short, the facts of evil and their relation to 
creative purpose may be solved by postulating a cosmic 
Experient whose purpose is one, but whose control Is 
incomplete over non rational factors in his 
nature ... (21) 
It may be reasonably proposed that the purpose of God ("the 
cosmic personal Substance") is the rational control of 
these non rational factors - what has been called elsewhere, 
the Given. Indeed this purpose Is "for the sake of the 
creative development of finite substance-purposers". (22) 
Purpose, considered by Brightman to be inexhaustible, "must 
include the development of more and better persons". (23) 
God makes his purposes known through his self-presence to 
us in what we perceive to be physical nature. By this Is 
meant that God is self-revelatory, he reveals himself in 
the realm of nature. In this realm (at least) God's 
purposive will may be discerned to be at work In, as 
Brightman would put it, his progressive control of The 
Given. The natural world Is part of God's nature, It Is 
part of his being, it Is within his experience. God at 
work in nature is God very much at work with himself. 
For Brightman, the human purposer, the human experlent Is 
aware of purpose In the iluminating absent through its 
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"interacting with human purpose". (24) The relevance of 
the concept of purpose will be seen very shortly. 
ii. Person and Nature We may accept what Brightman says 
concerning the unity of substance. By this is meant that 
there are not many kinds of substance in reality and that 
the category of substance allows for continuity between our 
experience and the object of that experience. There is 
also discontinuity between the two, particularly in the 
sense that my own consciousness is free, as is that of God 
By allowing this Brightman safeguards the divine dignity 
against any accusation that the human experlent's evil ways 
might be contiguous with the divine will. Brightman was 
quite explicit in affirming that God has willed there 
should be consciousness in the world other than God's own, 
and that this consciousness should be free, rational and 
purposeful. Thus whilst God's consciousness does not 
include the consciousness of the human, the two are part of 
one interacting substance. The category of substance 
explains this continuity of interaction, and this 
continuity Is the yardstick against which discontinuities 
in experience may be understood. 
The relationship between the human experlent and physical 
nature may best be explored by appeal, again, to purpose. 
Brightman writes: 
... purpose Is best defined as the conscious selection 
of a foreseen end, together with acts appropriate to 
the realization of that end ... purposing... is the 
entire process of organizing experience under the 
dominance of the end. (25) 
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Bri g htman descri bes the "total conscious situation ... a 
person's present experience" as that experience in which 
"vision, insight and synopsis are functions of the will to 
purpose values". (26) Now we must admit that there will 
be an inevitable mingling of purposeful with the 
purposeless, "No purpose is wholly purposive; even In 
dreamland, purpose must be an ordering of given brute facts 
which were not made by any purpose, and which resist the 
desire of purposers to destroy them". (27) In other 
words, "The creative aspects of reality - Its free, 
valuable purposing - exist within an uncreated framework 
that is given, a framework of rational law and of brute 
fact". 
The same sort of thing may be said of freedom; it only 
exists within limits. But this notwithstanding we may 
contemplate an ideal vision of freedom, or 'true freedom', 
"True freedom", Brightman wrote, "Is the choice of a 
valuable purpose and the process of carrying It out". (28) 
And again, "free purposive striving for value persists 
in every normal mind, however perverted that striving may 
become". (29) How is our experience of purpose put Into 
practical effect? Brightman answers: 
When I purpose to give [a] rose to my wife, that 
purpose, which means an orientation of my total 
experience, Is as certainly experienced as is the 
sensory pattern of the rose. (30) 
Now by 'orientation of total experience' Brightman on the 
one hand means his purposive will to give the rose. But 
on the other hand his meaning Implies far more than this, 
for purpose is both the selection of a foreseen end ('I 
will give my wife a rose') and 'acts appropriate to the 
r~ization of that end ('I will use my hands in order to 
carry out the act of giving the rose'). An important 
issue is arising here. It seems that purposes may be 
described as 'social' in that they have a public, social 
reference. "An act of public verification", Brightman 
wrote, "is an appeal to the free purposes of others to 
affirm or deny the item under discussion In the light of 
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the evidence to which purpose directs attention". (31) He 
continues, "Your act of pointing at an object ... Is a 
futile gesture until I know your purpose In pointing". 
Now whilst a guess may correctly yield knowledge of the 
purpose, guessing is not the normal method of inquiry in 
any field of study. It seems to be the case rather, that 
rational inquiry into the publicly obvious and visible 
manifestations of purposes gives real and genuine 
information about the purpose and the purposer. To quote 
Brightman, "If purposes are not public, nothing is public". 
iii. Person and Body What are the implications of what 
has been said so far? Firstly, we must point to the the 
responsiveness of our bodies with respect to our purposing. 
Brightman considers the regularity and reliability of 
communication through phenomenal cause vital for 
interpersonal communication. The point may seem basic but 
it has important resonances for this dissertation: 
Were phenomenal cause not dependable, were there no 
mechanisms, were there no regular sequences In 
experiences, there would be worse than isolation among 
persons; there would be chaos. (32) 
Thus we apply our bodies to the task of realizing our 
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purposi ng. We use our bodies as the outward and visi ble 
signs of inward and spiritual intention. Is it possible 
for a purpose to be realized or even manifested by the 
experient totally devoid of external manifestation? It 
would seem that on Brightman's terms purposing is both the 
seeing of the end and the attempt to carry it out. The 
nature of this relationship is one of Interaction and 
control. The mind interacts with the body and 'causes' It 
to perform certain functions In accordance with these 
purposes. Vice versa the body receives certain stimuli 
(pain, light etc.) which result in given experiences In the 
experient. 
The experient's body is the mode (if not the medium) of the 
experient's self-presence both to other persons in the 
world and to reality at large. Without the body, to quote 
Brightman: 
... it is at least abstractly possible that 
self-experience might continue were all experience in 
the space form to be extinguished, - if the trumpet of 
the Lord were to sound and space be no more. Then 
logic and mathematics and obligation and love might 
survive and SOCiety develop and communicate by 
telepathic, instead of by telegraphic, or other 
spatial modes. (33) 
Brightman's point in all this is to show the logic of the 
pOSition which states that even If the physical-space 
matrix were to be destroyed It Is conceivable that 
experience might remain. Now whilst this might be 
'abstractly possible' and Lewis, Badham and others point to 
its possibility I am unable to comprehend the state of 
affairs that would persist should this ever come about. 
The onus is on Brightman to establish his 'abstract 
possibility' and this he does not do. Bare assertion is 
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not enough. 
In his epistemology Brightman has attempted to drive a 
wedge between the person one experienced oneself to be and 
the body which he claimed one could not experience. Our 
view is that his argument is false. Consider the two 
statements 'I shave myself' and 'my hand shaves me'. 
Ordinary use of language (If the phrase is not too question 
begging) and its conventional application, indicates the 
former is a more correct description of the act of shaving. 
For simi lar reasons 'I shave my beard' is more correct 
than, 'I shave myself in the region of my beard'. What is 
indicated by the words 'my beard' is not primarily a 
possessive relationship akin to my possession of a pair of 
shoes. The activity of shaving is exercised immediately 
upon the beard, but insofar as this beard belongs to me, 
the activity may be said to be upon me, albeit perhaps in a 
mediate way. 
All my bodily members express something of me. But they 
do not all say the same thing, they do not speak the same 
language and their communications are far from being 
equally important. None of them fully express what I am. 
Matters, say, which affect my hands affect me more than 
matters which affect my beard. Thus whilst the activity 
of shaving may not affect me In any signficant way, other 
activities which affect my hands might. In other words, 
various levels of interaction or mediacy pertain between 
the hairs of my skin and person, and between my hand and 
person. 
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Again, a person can be a person without having a beard. 
Equally one can be a person with out a hand. But can one 
be a person without a body? For Brightman the answer to 
this is we saw, abstractly possible, though I am much 
puzzled as to how the existence of such a disembodied 
person might be verified, setting aside for the moment such 
matters as communication with the dead. One might be 
anxious about a person being deformed In body at birth. 
But one would not be anxious about the possibility of a 
person being born without a body. 
If these illustrations serve any pu rpose at all they at 
least prompt us to ask suggestively whether the nature of 
the person Is more closely identified with the body than 
Brightman allowed? In other words might It not be that 
the relation between myself as a person and my body is 
something more than that of cognition, possession or 
instrumental control? 
This can be developed further. When I purpose to do 
something my body does not of Itself express the whole of 
the purposive act. We may say that when we purpose 
something, and we are putting the purpose Into effect, 
certain parts of our body are more important than others. 
In designing a tower the architect's toes may be of little 
use. To the footballer, with his will to win a game, the 
toes are of greater worth than knowledge of civil 
engineering and skill as a draughtsman. Thus In the 
presentation of our acts of purposing different parts of 
our bodies operate at varying levels of Importance with 
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respect to that experience which originated the purpose and 
according to which they are carrying out the Intention. 
My body, it may be said, Is the extension of my purposing 
in 'the direction of the world. It Is the bridge between 
the shining present and the illuminating absent beyond my 
body. It is the expression of my subjectivity in the 
~ 6 {~c- t- i f,-c< b/ .e 
reaim of the -*'J.JA; srH~ The numerically identical 
subject is confronted through his body with the plurality 
of nature. 
Now when I consider my body as object I am not equating it 
with, say, a garden fork, or even another person's body. 
Each of these, it is admitted, are equally available for 
consideration and inspection. But the difference, and it Is 
a difference not without some considerable significance, is 
that without my body I could not consider other objects in 
any way at all. It is a condition of my knowing and 
experiencing. I could not be the person I am without my 
body therefore. Likewise with purposing; without my body 
it is 'abstractly possible' that I might have experience of 
purposing. But as Brightman has already told us, 
'purposing is best defined' as both conscious selection of 
the foreseen end, 'together with acts appropriate to the 
realization of that end'. Thus without the body, 
purposing would be a grossly anaemic activity, relying for 
its succesful completion upon telepathy. Our experience 
tells us that in the realization of purpose, mind and body 
act together, the one following the will of the other, and 
vice versa the will needing the body for Its succesful 
completion. 
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There is a simple but important issue concerning the role 
of the body in communication which must be mentioned here. 
When I meet another person his or her body language tells 
me something of the other's internal mental life. Gestures 
indicating pain, joy and so on will be evident. Some 
persons may deny, however, they are In pain. If we suspect 
they are, then we shall closely watch thei r behaviour to 
support or refute our suspicion. 
The role of the body cannot be minimized here. Its 
performative actions are fundamental for personal 
self-understanding both of oneself and of others, and also 
of oneself by others. I could not be the purposer and 
communicator I am without my body. 
If body and person are so closely linked, as Is being 
argued here, is it not the case that their interaction Is 
so close as to make a strict Brightmannian divide between 
them untrue to experience? Is it not rather the case that 
body and person are so closely linked (through, for example 
the category of purpose) that their Interaction In terms of 
mutual cause and effect only expresses part of their 
relationship? Could It not be the case that their 
relationship is much more that of personal unity? In the 
next chapter we shall argue this Is the case. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE REDEFINITION OF BRIGHTMAN'S ACCOUNT OF PERSON 
In the foregoing chapter we saw how Brightman's phiiosophy 
of experience position is open to serious question. We 
indicated that problems relate to his account of the 
relation between persons and selves, between the person and 
his subconscious, and between the person and his body. A 
discussion of the category of substance was used to 
highlight a number of problems. In addition the category 
of purpose was examined to show, in a critical way, how 
Brightman's split between experience and body is less than 
convincing. 
Upon the basis established In the previous chapter, and 
following from the critical conclusions reached, we have 
sufficient grounds to advance a redefinition, or 
reinterpretation of the concept of person. Our contention 
is that this offers a more adequate account of the 
relationship between experience and body than that given by 
Brightman. We shall also propose that this redefinition of 
the nature of person offers a more adequate model from 
which an account of the nature of God can be structured. 
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1. The Person as a Functional Unity of Experience and Body 
Person is a term that can be made to bear a different load 
to the one allotted it by Brightman. The term 'person' 
is not synonymous with the terms consciousness, mind or 
experience in the way Brightman argued. Person is, we 
propose, a unity of experience and body. 
We can accept that the term experience refers to the 
immediate data, or sensa of consciousness or mind. We can 
accept also that this term is not reducible to expressions 
of bodily behaviour alone. Thus far, we agree with 
Brightman. We can accept also that there is a divide of 
some form between experience and the object of the 
experience. On one level this divide separates the 
experient from the world of sensible objects (chairs, 
tables etc). This much is self-evident. But to what 
extent is it possi ble to speak of a divide between a 
person's experience and that person's body? The question 
is fundamental. 
In the last chapter we recognised two things at least. 
Firstly, close causal interaction between experience and 
body. Secondly we developed the thesis that between each 
there is such a close kinship that any tal k of a 
substantive divide between them looks seriously flawed. 
Our conclusions so far have indicated serious difficulties 
in Brightman's account of person and his equation of person 
with experience. The evidence we have presented leads us 
to argue that the equation between person and experience is 
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false and that person is better understood as a unity of 
experience and body. Person Is not reducible to either, 
especially if this entails the exclusion of the other. 
This unity which I am calling the person, Is a unity that 
enables experience and body to be viewed separately, for 
purposes of analysis say, but which nevertheless posits 
thei r unity as the fundamental constituency of the person. 
We shall call this unity a 'functional unity'. 
Defining person as a functional unity of experience and 
body sees purposive willing of the mind finding Its outward 
expression through the body. Additionally the person 
receives stimuli and data In Its experience through the 
inward mediation of the body. For example, the role 
of emotion, bodily health, genetic make-up (etc) all play 
their part In forming the person I am. We have shown how 
as a purposive, willing person, one can separate neither 
mind nor body from the content of the acts, or the willing 
that intended them. The part all these play Is so 
directly Involved with the total functional unity that Is 
my person, that each can only be considered a part of that 
whole which the term 'person' most adequately encompasses. 
From another perspective It could be considered a weakness 
of Brightman's philosophy that he has largely Ignored the 
empirical and psychological environment of the person. 
Brightman admitted as much In his University Lecture In 
Boston in 1951: 
Nothing has been said about the chemical or biological 
causes of persons, nothing about the physical 
environment, nothing about psychological research on 
personality. Stress has been laid rather on the 
personal basis of all causal and value theory and 
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research. (1) 
Bri g htman considered the self, the person, not so much a 
phenomenon for investigation but as an immediately 
experienced Cartesian-like datum. This datum he considers 
sufficient in itself to support a theory of reality and to 
be definitive of the nature of this reality and he believes 
his method empi rically secure when begun from this basis. 
However Brightman made the claim persistently throughout 
his writings that a synoptic inquiry of all evidence should 
be considered in any thorough metaphysics of reality. But 
in that he has defined the person as experience alone, and 
has defi ned experience as consciousness alone, the 
empi rical content of experience can be nothing other than 
the claim that a person is characterized by 
reflective-consciousness. Now whilst this Is a 
significant claim to make it really says very little, for 
if a person is described as a rational unity of experience 
and all a person can experience Is his own experiencing as 
a person we are involved in a self-perpetuating circle. 
It is a circle which can be broken Into though. For a 
unity of experience can only exist If It Is the product of 
physical and mental stimulus and cause. Thus an 
exhaustive definition of person ought to take account (at 
some point in its analysis) of relevant evidence revealed 
by the physical and social sciences. Brightman does not 
do this and admits that his position Is "psychologically 
unorthodox insofar as It restricts personality to actual 
conscious experience". (2) Many past and present 
psychologists would baulk at Brightman's claim that we can 
experience ourselves directly with a level of Immediacy 
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that does not include the body. 
Brightman's argument that if one includes one's body In a 
functional unity of mind and body there would be no logical 
reason why the whole of reality should be similarly 
included Is flawed. The world can never be experienced 
with the directness that pertains to experience of one's 
own person. The world is always 'pointed to' by one's 
experience, and Is acted on by one's body through direction 
from the will. Brightman should maybe have seen that the 
way one experiences one's own self (as purposive will and 
responsive or active body) is epistemologically different 
to the way one has knowledge of the world. Both body and 
world are needed in order to explain the concept of person. 
However as we have shown - against Brightman - inclusion of 
body In the person does not perforce require us to Include 
all of the rest of nature in that person as well. 
This particular discussion may be summarised. It seems I 
cannot understand who I am as a person without reference to 
that human body In which my experiences are contained and 
with which they seem so inextricably linked. It may be 
also that I cannot know myself except as distinguished from 
others and from that world which they inhabit. 
2. The Human Person and the Divine Person 
Finally we must turn to Brightman's theism, and the 
relationship between the human person, now defined as a 
functional unity of experience and body, with the Divine 
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Person. 
What may be said of the human experient's relationship 
with God? For Brightman the body is Included in the 
divine experience along with the rest of nature. The 
body is a point of Interaction, he believed, between God 
and the human experient. Accordingly Brightman wrote: 
A brain is the Divine Personality In action at the 
point of continual creation of a human personality. 
Mind is not in nature, but nature In the Divine Mind 
is God's way of creating human mind. (3) 
Thus the human mind needs the body as a 'point of 
interaction' with God and therefore the rest of reality. 
Without the body the mind would not be able to communicate 
in the way it does. It would be in a solipsistic vacuum, 
unable in its windowless cell to see outside nor yet to 
understand the outside. The person in such a position 
would be in a worse position than the prisoner in Plato's 
cave with only shadows upon which to model his account of 
reality. Whilst such a view does not prove much more than 
that mind and body Interact It does further advance the 
case for their interdependence. The substantial degree of 
this interdependence is part of the evidence I am 
assembling to support my view of person as a functional 
unity of mind and body. 
We saw earlier that Brightman spoke of human persons as a 
combination of active and passive features. The active 
part was described by Brightman as the persons's capacity 
to select, the passive as those inhibiting factors upon our 
will and the clue to the influence of the external world 
Upon us. Brightman gave the name of 'The Given' to all 
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that which in God "is eternal and uncreated in the divine 
nature, other than the actual will of God" including both 
the "passive element" and "the eternal divine reason, with 
its principles of truth, beauty and goodness", (4) The 
active will In God has to operate within limits presented 
by the "passive factors In experience", (5) 
Now we recall that Brightman has said that when God creates 
human persons they "cannot be thought of as a part of God 
nor as a rearrangement of matter", (6) God In creating 
persons has willed that there shall be consciousness In the 
world other than his own; that there shall be wills which 
are self-determining; and so In this supreme act of his 
creative power, he limits his control over the universe, 
(7) Brightman describes persons so created as free and 
able to choose and will within limits of possibility 
determined by the person, society, nature and so on, He 
says of God as a creator that" he has to create as a 
will limited both by reason and by nonrational content", 
(8) This has particular consequences for the created 
person, namely " .. , when man Is created there enter Into 
his being the same constituents that obtain eternally In 
God and in all his deeds", 
Insofar as we are persons, "the small segment of the 
universe which we call ourselves is truly a sample of what 
the whole universe Is", (9) And again, "there Is no 
definite reason for supposing that any of God's unknown 
attri butes are anything other than forms of conscious 
experience", (10) When we consider his treatment of the 
content of God's consciousness we recognize that Brightman 
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included within it the realm of physical nature. 
Including both experience, or mind (as the purposive will) 
and body into our own definition of person as a functional 
unity has in no way impaired or denied the freedom that 
Brightman argued should be assigned to the person. Can 
this definition of person as a functional unity be the 
basis of an analogy between divine and human persons? Does 
my revision of person as a functional unity of mind and 
body provide an adequate analogue for understanding the 
nature of God? By comparing Brightman's analogy of 
action, form and content between human and divine persons 
with our own understanding of person I hope to demonstrate 
that it does. 
First, action. According to Brightman's view because God 
is active in the world through his inclusion of It In his 
experience, his activity may reasonably be described as his 
own activity with himself as subject. Only human 
experients, s ince they are not Included In the divine 
experience, may be considered as objective to God's own 
experiencing. Everything else therefore - the physical, 
the human subconscious is the subject of God's experience. 
Brightman's definition of the human experient is different 
from his definition of God as experlent. The human 
experient includes only his own experience in his 
consciousness, this being the defining quality of his 
personality. The human person therefore knows the world 
and the subconscious as 'illuminating absent' whilst God 
knows it as 'shining present', In Brightman there Is 
therefore a difference between human and divine persons in 
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the way each Is active In the world. Brightman attempts 
to overcome the potentially destructive nature of this 
difference to his analogy by arguing that both human and 
divine experients are both alike in that each includes only 
thei r ow n consciousness In thei r person (person here for 
the present, being defined according to Brightman's usage). 
The difference between them lies In the nature of that 
which is included in the experience. In this sense God's 
consciousness Includes what we would understand as the 
illuminating absent. In Brightman's own schema this 
referred to physical objects as well as to our own 
subconscious. For the human experlent it referred only to 
the content of consciousness, including the memory of 
former such experiences. 
If, however, Brightman's schema is reworked in the way we 
are arguing it should be, and the human person defined as a 
functional unity of purposive will and responsive body, 
does the analogy of person between divine and human stili 
hold? 
We maintain that it does. We have shown how and why it is 
necessary to distinguish person and experience. 
Experience is no longer the defining characteristic of 
person. Experience so viewed, is one aspect of the being 
of a person. Such a redefinition enables one to see that 
there are differing levels of experience such that one can 
have experience of one's own body. 
Therefore on the basis of action we have a model of person 
that is analogically applicable to God. Such a model 
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enables one to see God as an active, purposive will working 
with a body (nature), variously responsive, variously 
recalcitrant. It is therefore stili possi ble to say with 
Brightman, albeit with an altered concept of person, that 
'within myself I find the universe mirrored'. 
How is the second part of the analogy, 'form' affected by 
our redefinition of person? Form, Brightman tells us, 
refers to the experient's conformation to law, Its 
membership of a rational order, its awareness of rational 
relations or of ideal values. God, as supreme person, 
includes In himself "all possible relations". In his 
person therefore God Includes his relation with an ordered 
and rationally governed physical world. The relationship 
between God and the physical world Is defined by Brightman 
in terms of Inclusion; Inclusion of the latter In the 
former. The human experient also Includes in his 
experience, experience of relationship. But for the human 
experient, in Brightman, the manner of the relationship 
will be different from God's experience of relationship. 
This is so because in Brightman's original presentation, 
the human person's experience of relationship with the 
physical cannot be defined, as was God's relationship with 
the physical, to be that of Inclusion of the physical in 
experience. But we have found Brightman's position to be 
flawed In this respect. It therefore follows that the 
analogy will be weak. Our own redefinition of the concept 
of person however, strengthens the personal analogy. 
EVen though it is the case that we are most at variance 
with Brightman here, it was part of the purpose of the 
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earlier critique to show that the human person includes not 
only relations with, but also direct experience of, the 
physical realm. This Is so with respect to the person's 
own body. In this sense both human and divine persons 
directly experience the physical realm. Indeed in the 
terms of our redefinition it becomes easier for the human 
person to see him or herself made in the image and likeness 
of God. Given this the divine - human analogy, on the 
basis of form, holds good. 
The third point can now be considered; this is 'content'. 
We have al ready noted that Bri ghtman has defined the 
content of God's experiencing, and the content of the human 
person's experience as comprising one substance. It Is 
the content of God's experience which limits the 
possibilities open to his will. This content Is described 
by Brightman as 'Irrational' or 'purposeless'. Though 
Brightman was not entirely clear on this point, It seems 
that 'content' refers to the Given - that which thwarts the 
realisation of good. The Given, an object of our own 
experiencing, is internal to the consciousness of God. 
For God this means that what we know as 'physical', Is 
defined as conscious experience In the divine mind. The 
human person according to Brightman's account does not 
experience these, in that they are not Included In the 
content of the person's experience. All that, for 
Brightman, Is the content of the human person's experience 
is the 'qualla, essences, subsistents, sensa' and so on. 
Although these may limit the person's will, because they 
are simply terms referring to immediate consciousness they 
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lack adequate reference until they are placed In context. 
In the Divine Person they have a context because God's 
consciousness includes what we understand as both mental 
and physical aspects. God's Inclusion of the physical on 
Brightman's own terms, Includes ' the human person's 
body. If however my redefinition of person Is accepted 
then the body Is better Included within the human person. 
In this reworked definition of person, the functional unity 
of mind and body involves both the person's experience and 
the person's body interacting In one substantial organon. 
Thus whilst experience has no physical content, person In 
the way bei ng spoken of here, does. On this basis 
therefore it is possible to maintain a personal analogy 
between divine and human persons. Both are persons; both 
have mental and physical 'poles' comprising one personal 
substance of both continuity and discontinuity, unity and 
diversity. 
Therefore we may conclude that when the person is defined 
as a functional unity of purposive will and body the 
analogy between human and divine persons on the basis of 
action, form and content is secure and our redefinition of 
Brightman's account of person Is given further support. 
To concl ude; we saw at the end of section one that 
Bri g htman 's concept of person is best reworked as a 
functional unity of experience and body. This Is more In 
accord with our understanding of experience and Its 
relationship with our body than Brightman realized. We 
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were led to this conclusion by an examination of the 
category of purpose in particular. With regard to human 
and divine persons we found that It was more empirically 
secure to view the human body as part of the human person 
than as part of the divine person. Finally we tested this 
reworked model of person against the three-fold analogical 
model of action, form and content offered by Brightman. 
Again, with appropriate redefinition of his understanding 
of person, we found the analogy valid. 
With these results we offer both the critique and the 
subsequent reworking of Brightman to others' serious 
reflection and, we trust, acceptance. 
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